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Amber D. Spry
This dissertation, “Group Identity in American Politics: A Multidimensional Approach to
Study and Measurement,” offers novel measurement strategies and theoretic insight toward the
study of group politics. My research examines how best to explain group political preferences in a
society that is becoming more culturally pluralistic while at the same time experiencing an increase
in within-group heterogeneity.
The first chapter frames the dissertation as an exploration group politics with both critical and
positive implications. I outline the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics, addressing
the tension between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed
categorical identity variables, and research in political psychology which often treats identity as
fluid and malleable. I argue that a full understanding of relationship between an individual’s self-
identification and sense of shared outcomes with the identity group requires us to understand the
different ways individuals may self-categorize and link their identities to political attitudes and be-
havior. In chapter one I introduce the type-predictor framework, a theoretical contribution that rests
on the notion that it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular trends
in attitudes and behaviors, but the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity
when group membership becomes individually salient. I argue that different types of individuals
may process group consciousness in a variety of different ways when group membership becomes
salient at the individual level, leading them to express different conclusions about the notion of
shared fate with in-group members. The type-predictor typology consists of five “types” that de-
scribe how individuals self-categorize (non-affiliation, abstract conceptualization, non-conformist
identification, multiple identification, and strong identification) that correspond with four “predic-
tors” of how an individual will conceptualize and respond to questions about group consciousness
(disassociation, group membership, group identity, and group attachment). My typology clarifies
the theoretical discussion by providing a framework that considers the subjective nature of the re-
lationship between demographic characteristics and their political correlates, which can vary by
groups.
Drawing on a series of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, the second chapter of this thesis
presents support for the type-predictor framework, and demonstrates how individuals link their
sense of identity to their political attitudes and behaviors when given the opportunity to explain
the process in their own words. One contribution of my work has been to provide an analysis of a
linked fate measure based on an open-ended question that allows interview subjects to respond in
reference to the group with which they primarily self-identify rather than having subjects answer
the linked fate question in reference to an ascribed social category such as race or gender. The
linked fate measure is frequently cited to explain the seemingly homogenous political attitudes
and behaviors of African Americans and has been used increasingly in the past two decades to
argue for a sense of shared outcomes leading to political solidarity among other groups such as
Hispanics and Latinos, women, and the LBGT community. The question asks, “Do you think
what happens to [people in your group] will have something to do with what happens in your
life?” My interviews reveal that people interpret the linked fate question quite differently, with
a wide degree of variation the range of responses. These findings are consistent with existing
empirical research showing consistent statistical support for linked fate, yet substantial variation
between and even within groups. Moreover, the open-ended responses to group consciousness
questions in my interviews provide support for the type-predictor framework. I find examples
of all five “types” and all four “predictors” in the typology, and the relationships between types
and predictors are consistent with the directions I expected. Thus, my analysis of the interview
data emphasizes the theoretical underpinning of the type-predictor framework: it is not ascriptive
identity that we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes and behaviors, but
rather the way individuals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership
becomes individually salient. In other words, among the interview sample, a sense of shared
outcomes is related to the different degrees of group consciousness individuals may hold at the
individual level depending on the group categories with which they do (or do not) self-identify.
The third thesis chapter further explores the multidimensionality of identity by using survey
data to examine how group identity matters to individuals across policy areas, with particular at-
tention paid to the politics of immigration and welfare policy. In the 2015 Identity Measurement
Survey (IMS) (N=3,010) I introduce a point allocation system for measuring identity that allows
subjects to allocate a fixed number of “identity points” to a number of socially relevant identity
categories and compares this new approach with conventional survey methods by randomly as-
signing respondents to one of six methods of identity measurement and assessing the differences
in policy-related attitudes across the six randomly assigned groups and across identity categories.
Existing empirical work relies almost universally on a set of fixed, categorical measures that fail
to reflect the multidimensionality many scholars associate with racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, and
other forms of identity. The identity point allocation system allows survey respondents to identify
with multiple group identities and to weight the strength of their association across groups. In ad-
dition to racial categories, the identity point allocation design includes class, religion and gender as
categories to which respondents allocate points, and the random assignment of individuals to dif-
ferent measurement conditions allows us to understand how different approaches to measurement
may reveal different outcomes on important identity-related questions. The design also allows us
to explore whether the attitudes observed when individuals select a primary identity are different
from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures of demographic correlation.
Data from the IMS reveal that attitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary
identity offered by respondents, and differ for some groups from what we might observe using
the conventional “checked box” measure of ascriptive group identity. In particular, individuals
who primarily identify as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as having distinctive
views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what we would observe
under conventional correlation between ascriptive categorization and attitudinal outcomes. Those
who ascriptively identified as Protestant, male, or as a white person are most likely to have colder
feelings toward immigrants and more conservative views toward providing welfare than people
who more strongly associate with other groups. These attitudinal differences were even more
pronounced when the analysis considered policy views according to the primary identity offered
by respondents rather than through ascriptive categorization alone. These results underscore the
opportunities afforded by alternative measurement strategies to reveal additional information about
the links between identity and expressed policy attitudes when we allow individuals to tell us which
identities matter most to them.
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation provide perspective on individual thresholds
for self-identification, and offer a novel measurement strategy to understand how individuals sub-
jectively relate to group identities. Continued work will shed light on the relationships between
individuals, their subjective identities, and the empirical correlates of identity such as inequality,
intergroup conflict and violence, coalitional politics, and descriptive representation. The implica-
tions of these, to be sure, are not limited to the study of American politics.
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Current politics are as ripe with examples of appeals made on the government from identity groups
as they have ever been. The Black Lives Matter and Brown Lives Matter movements are not only
conduits for social activism among black and Hispanic/Latino Americans, they have harnessed
the ability of new media to provide timely and relevant information about policies important to
their respective causes, and opportunities for allies to hold representatives accountable to those
policies. Pride flags representing solidarity with the LBGT community adorned homes in the
D.C. community where Mike Pence lived in advance of his relocation to the vice presidential
residence, a signal of criticism from Pence’s neighbors regarding his conservative views on LBGT
issues. From January to June 2017 there have already been as many as 13 organized marches on
Washington, D.C. including the March for Life (in dissent of the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court
decision), the Native People’s March on Washington (led by primarily indigenous people in protest
of the Dakota Access Pipeline and the U.S. Government’s relationship with native nations), the
March for Science (in support of evidence-based policy related to science and the environment), the
National Pride March (in support of LBGT rights), the Immigrants and Workers March (an appeal
for members of Congress to stop funding the Trump administrations mass deportation efforts and
secure rights for migrant workers), and the Women’s March on Washington (to address women’s
rights and the related issues of immigration reform, LBGT rights, racial equality, labor issues, and
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the environment), marked as the largest combined protest in the history of the United States. The
magnitude of social demonstration from groups mobilized under banners of identity and interest
signal the rising tide of identity politics in the United States.
But on what basis should we form our inferences about group members and their identity-
related appeals? When we further interrogate how attitudes and behavior respond to self-
categorization, can we develop a more refined picture of identity and intersectional politics in
the United States?
In the following three chapters, I present work that examines the subjective nature of self-
identification, and explain how our inferences about important political attitudes and outcomes de-
pend on our understanding of how individuals choose to self-identify with relevant social groups,
or not. Using both qualitative and quantitative support I demonstrate how additional theoretical
conceptions and measurement strategies may add context to our understanding of identity group
politics in the United States specifically, though my work may be useful for conceptualizing and
measuring identity across groups in broader comparative contexts as well. In chapter one I intro-
duce a typology of group conscious thinking called the “type-predictor framework”, in chapter two
I demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework for understanding self-categorization and a sense
of shared political fate using data from semi-structured interviews in chapter two, and in chapter
three I contribute a novel point allocation strategy for the survey measurement of identity in chap-
ter three, demonstrating how our inferences about group attitudes change depending on whether
the relevant attitudes are assessed according to a person’s ascriptive group membership versus a
self-selected primary identity. I conclude by discussing the contributions of my work to the field
of political science and the broader academic literature, providing recommendations for social sci-
entists and practitioners interested in the application of social science research tools, and outlining
my plans for continued research.
2
1 Typologies of Group Conscious Thinking
Part I Introduction
Introduction
This dissertation assesses how political attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, and
asks whether additional information can be gained about the links between identity and political
views when we allow individuals to tell us which identities matter most to them. The present
chapter sorts through the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics and addresses the tension
between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical
identity variables, and political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. I
then introduce the type-predictor framework, a theoretical contribution that represents a departure
from much of the current literature by interrogating the relationship between an individual’s self-
identification and sense of shared outcomes with the identity group and, by extension, the host of
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with group consciousness. I argue that the ways
in which different types of individuals process group consciousness when group membership be-
comes salient at the individual level lead them to think about the politicization of their identities in
importantly different ways.
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For decades, scholars and political actors have noted the significance of group identity to polit-
ical attitudes and behaviors (Brown 1931; Taifel et al. 1971; Conover and Feldman 1984; Conover
1984, 1988; Fazio 1990; Cross Jr 1991; Lien 1994; Sellers et al. 1997; Duckitt and Mphuthing
1998; Bobo and Johnson 2000; Lee 2008; McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez et al. 2011; Ferguson
2012). However, the nature of the relationship between demographic characteristics and their
political correlates seems to vary by groups. At the same time, a wide range of theories have
emerged to explain how individuals conceptualize the self in relationship to the social categories
and groups that exist in social environments. Among the most prominent theories in the social
psychology literature are social identity theory, social categorization theory, and social interaction
theory. Different theories emphasize different aspects of one’s identity and while some scholars
disagree (Hogg et al., 1995), others argue that there are substantial areas of overlap between major
theories of identity (Stets and Burke, 2000). I believe the different aspects of self-categorization
emphasized by each of the major theories can be linked in ways that enhance our understanding
of how different types of individuals politically relate to social groups. Indeed, Stets and Burke
(2000) have noted the similarities between identity theories and argued for the further development
of research that meaningfully synthesizes various identity theories.
Most theories of identity treat the self as reflective in that it can “take itself as an object and can
categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories” (Stets
and Burke, 2000, p. 224). Social identity theory refers to this process as self-categorization (Turner
et al., 1987; Haslam et al., 1996) while identity theory refers to this process as identification (Burke
and Stets, 2009; Stets and Burke, 2000). I use the terms self-categorization and identification
somewhat interchangeably as my work emphasizes the utility of each theory for describing an
underlying process of relating self to group, although for broad purposes, self-categorization tends
to refer more the placement of self in social categories (such as a racial group, religious group,
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or gender identity) while identification tends to refer to self-placement according to social role
(such as teacher, sorority member, or ambassador) or, at times, personality traits (such as kindness,
extroversion, or tenacity). Because my work is centered on the belief that individuals may affiliate
with multiple groups at varying levels of intensity at a given time, and because I find reason to
believe there is overlap between the concept of social role and social category, I use the terms
self-categorization and identification throughout my work to refer broadly to the process of self-
placement in group context.
Why Group Politics?
While any socially relevant category may constitute a group (mothers, sports car enthusiasts, vet-
erans, dog-lovers), a standard belief is that politicized group identities are more likely to cause
an individual to believe her political interests are bound to the status of the group, leading that
individual to believe collective action is the best means for the group to realize its shared interests.
Social science research differentiates group membership, group identity, and group consciousness;
the theoretical and operationalizational differences between each will be discussed in this chapter.
While racial group identities are an accessible starting point for this discussion considering the
prevalence of appeals made on behalf of racial groups throughout the history of United States pol-
itics, this chapter is also concerned with how to deal with the notion of group consciousness from
an intersectional perspective. Many scholars would agree that race is related to political attitudes
and behaviors, but the field must do more to account for the ways that race interacts with other
social identities. Further, the interactions between an individual’s set of social group memberships
and identities may lead to political attitudes and behaviors that vary from person to person. For ex-
ample, Chong and Kim (2006) compare the effects of economic status on support for racial group
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interests among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. They find that for all mi-
norities, preferences toward affirmative action and government policies to ensure equality between
racial groups were mediated by the socioeconomic status of individuals. Similarly, Austin, Mid-
dleton, and Yon (2012) find that while group consciousness is expressed generally among people of
African descent in Miami-Dade County, Florida, group consciousness has a greater impact on po-
litical participation among African Americans while socioeconomic status more heavily influences
political participation among immigrant black people and black ethnics (Africans, Afro-Caribbean
Americans, Afro-Cuban Americans, and Haitians).
Indeed, scholars have continually found support for the existence and influence of group con-
scious political attitudes, yet substantial variation between and even within groups (Sanchez and
Vargas 2016; Gay et al. 2016; Hochschild and Weaver 2015; Gay et al. 2014a; Cohen 1999). To
move the field forward in an increasingly pluralistic society, social science researchers must con-
sider the nature of a person’s relationship with the social group categories to which she is ascribed
in order for emerging research to more fully account for the relationship between identity and
political outcomes without overextrapolating at both the individual and the group level.
To begin this important, if formidable research task, I introduce a new framework for under-
standing how different types of people ascribe political significance to their salient individual iden-
tities. The type-predictor framework presented in this chapter posits that the way a person process
group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level may result in
one of several different conclusions about linked fate (the belief that her individual status is tied to
the status of the group). We may care about the political stakes of group consciousness especially
because the relationship between identity and political choice has clear and immediate implica-
tions for both public policy and electoral politics. Race, class, gender, and religion have always
been situated close to the surface and have occasionally risen as important elements of political
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dialogue, especially during times of crisis. Indeed, identity has emerged as a central force shaping
the current political landscape of the United States, and the scope of categories that may influence
individual political considerations are ever broadening. Claims made by social identity groups,
and appeals from politicians to these groups are an explicit part of our current political discourse.
An ideological tension also exists between groups and political figures who assert and respond to
identity-based claims, and those who do not appeal to identity as a basis for political discourse. In
short, contemporary politics are framed in the rhetoric of group identity, or the rejection thereof.
My work in this chapter, and in the dissertation more broadly, is grounded in a theoretical
framework set forth by E.E. Schattschneider (1960), who argues that “what happens in politics
depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc. The
outcome of the game of politics depends on which of a multitude of possible conflicts gains the
dominant position ( Schattschneider, 1960 as cited in Drutman, 2016)." Indeed, political factions,
parties, and class identities should be placed alongside race, gender, religion, and the host of other
social groups with which individuals may self-identify and develop a sense of shared political out-
comes. And though partisanship and ideology certainly play an important role in American politics
(see Converse et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Green and Palmquist, 1994; MacKuen et al., 1989; Green
et al., 1998; Benjamin and Shapiro, 1992; Green and Yoon, 2002; Green et al., 2004), the active
literature on partisanship and ideology illustrate that ideological thinking will always play a role
in American politics, but will never have exclusive influence (see see Achen and Bartels, 2017).
Other identities such as class, gender, religion and other social categories are groups with which
individuals self-identify and develop a sense of shared political outcomes. If political outcomes
depend on where the dividing lines of politics are drawn, and current politics are waged along
the lines of identity for a substantial portion of the United States population, we may stand to see
a more robust portrait of identity and its ties to the policy preferences and political behaviors of
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groups, the influence of these groups in political spaces, and the effects of group influence as they
relate to political outcomes.
To ultimately derive the typologies of group conscious thinking, this chapter begins by ex-
amining the literature on group membership, group identity, and group consciousness, discussing
how scholars have theorized and defined each, and the designs used to measure each when used
as an explanatory or dependent variable. In addition, I discuss further the theory of linked fate,
a politicized form of group consciousness used throughout the literature to explain the seemingly
homogenous political behavior of African Americans, and employed more recently to describe the
political behavior of other groups in the United States and in comparative contexts. I also discuss
the survey measure used to operationalize the linked fate theory, presenting the challenges and
opportunities afforded by the conventional survey measurement of identity and its political corre-
lates. While the majority of the section focuses on group consciousness among racial minorities, I
also address literature regarding group consciousness for white Americans, women, and religious
groups.
The chapter next addresses the empirical correlates of identity, and examines how researchers
have related identity to political attitudes and behaviors across social groups.
Finally, I introduce a new set of typologies of group conscious thinking that incorporate existing
theory to explain how different types of respondents respond to the politicization of their identities
(i.e.: the concept of linked fate) in different ways. The typologies help explain the most puzzling
characteristic of the linked fate literature: that researchers consistently find support for linked fate
across large populations, yet substantial variation within groups.
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Group Membership
Group membership refers to the “assignment of an individual into a particular group based on char-
acteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held intersubjective definitions
(McClain et al., 2009, p. 3).” In the United States, institutions such as courts, laws, and the cen-
sus have codified and reified the criteria of membership in social groups, especially racial groups.
As illustrated in Figure 1, officially recognized classifications have expanded and contracted over
time for a number of reasons such as increased pluralism within the society, and changes in the
colloquial names used to describe groups. For example, the categories “Mulatto,” “Quadroon,” and
“Octoroon,” were retired after Census 1890 and are no longer used to describe mixed race people.1
Census 2010 allows black Americans the option to check African American as opposed to only
Negro or Black in previous years. Additionally, Census 2010 allowed individuals to identify with
more than one race, distinct from the use of terms like “quadroon” and “octoroon” to describe
partial black ancestry.
The United States Census Bureau recently released the proposed Census 2020 Questionnaire,
which will include a citizenship question (see Figure 2) alongside hispanic origin (see Figure 3)
and race/ethnicity questions (see Figure 4) and requiring respondents to provide more specific in-
formation about their racial and ethnic identities. The new classifications have drawn criticism,
1In 1850, enumerator instructions included the following specification: “Be particularly careful to distinguish
between blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons. The word ’black’ should be used to describe those persons who
have three-fourths or more black blood; ’mulatto,’ those persons who have from three-eighths to five-eighths black
blood; ’quadroon,’ those persons who have one-fourth black blood; and ’octoroon,’ those persons who have one-eighth
or any trace of black blood (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).” Curiously, the instructions included no further explanation
of how to determine fractions of black blood.
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especially the citizenship question which has not been asked of all citizens on a United States Cen-
sus since Census 1950.2 The Census Bureau claims that including a citizenship question allows
the government to more effectively prevent discrimination in voting and enforce Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Likewise, the Bureau claims that the questions about race and Hispanic origin
help the government ensure equal opportunity and identify segments of the populaiton that may
not be receiving public goods for which they are eligible, for example, medical services under
the Public Health Service Act, or residential provisions under the Indian Housing Block program
(United States Census Bureau, 2018). Critics believe the changes will discourage non-citizens
from participating in the Census, causing an underreporting of segments of the population, espe-
cially immigrants and communities of color, which could have meaningful consequences for the
redistribution of seats in the House of Representatives and the drawing of legislative districts, both
of which are determined by census population counts.
Debates over who belonged in each category have been highly consequential. Indeed work by
Nobles (2000) and Schor (2017) emphasize the idea that categories used to describe groups of peo-
ple in the United States, particularly through the census, are part of a process of the creation and
codification of national identity defined by inclusion, exclusion, and eligibility for full participation
in the U.S. political system. The coveted position of whites at the top of the racial hierarchy meant
that inclusion in the category of “white” significantly influenced a person’s social standing. Other
social categories affected a person’s life chances as well: whether Mexican Americans should be
subject to Jim Crow laws, whether Native Americans were deemed assimilable or categorized ac-
cording to fractions of black and white “blood,” whether Latin Americans were classified as white,
2A citizenship question was asked of the total population on each decennial census from 1890 to 1950. Prior to
1890 census questionnaires included some form of a question about citizenship. Until 1920 the question was asked
only of adult men (women and children assumed the same citizenship status as their husbands or fathers). The question
was not included in Census 1960. Since then, only a sample of U.S. households have been asked a citizenship question,
either on the long form census or the American Community Survey (Pew Research Center, 2018a).
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mulatto, or as a racially distinct, and the increasing detail with which Asian Americans are clas-
sified by nationality all impacted how people characterized themselves, and how they developed
attitudes and opinions about their social communities and the politics that affected their lives. The
terms used to classify individuals into groups allowed them to be seen as potential insiders or “de-
fined them as perennially outside the status of American (Hochschild and Powell, 2008).” While
the classification of individuals can at times profoundly impact the way people and groups inter-
act with policy, it is important to note that these societal and legal definitions are distinct from
the feelings and preferences of individuals themselves, thus group membership is the subjective
assignment of people that is arbitrary, albeit flexible at times (McClain et al. 2009).



























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Census 2020 Proposed Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin Question
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Figure 4: Census 2020 Proposed Race / Ethnicity Question
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Political science research that focuses on group membership often describes group-based dif-
ferences in political behavior and public opinion using group categories such as race, religion,
gender, and class as controls in empirical analyses. While group-based differences may account
for variation in public opinion and political behavior, using ascriptive group membership as a
proxy for the broader social and cultural values held by individuals may lead researchers to con-
flate the measurement of ascribed group membership with self-identification, and inappropriately
infer causal relationships based on data lacking identification strategy.
Group Identity
Group identity refers to an individual’s self-location within a particular social group, along with a
psychological sense of belonging or attachment to that group (Miller et al. 1981). In psychology
and sociology literature, group identity has been conceptualized within the framework of social
identity theory (SIT) which posits that an individual’s identity is primarily comes from the groups
to which she belongs. Because individuals do not just have personal self-hood, but multiple affil-
iations with different social categories, a person’s behavior might change depending on the social
context in which she considers her identity. Relevant social identities vary from person to person,
and can include a national origin, the neighborhood where a person resides, the school where a per-
son studies, family relationships, religious affiliations, and many other possibilities. SIT addresses
the notion of intergroup bias and social conflict, especially concerning interethnic relations. Ac-
cording to SIT, intersubjective distinctions between groups provide the basis for the comparison
of a person’s ingroup with members of the outgroup (for example, a fan of the New York Yan-
kees baseball team cheering, “Go Yankees!”). Because even subtle distinctions between groups
can provide the basis for intergroup bias, the tendency to view ingroup members more favorably
relative to other groups can become the basis for discrimination against out-groups (for example,
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the same Yankee’s fan yelling, “Boo Red Sox! (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; McClain et al.
2009; Turner et al. 1979). Central to SIT is the notion that people have a need for positive social
identity which “requires them to establish a positively valued distinctiveness for their own group
compared to other groups (Turner and Reynolds 2001, p. 134).”
Tajfel (1974) described the extent to which a person acts as an individual or as a group mem-
ber in her interpersonal relationships as the “interpersonal-intergroup continuum,” an idea which
explains when social identity processes are likely to operate and the social behaviors that differ
between extremes on the continuum. According to Tajfel, social behavior falls on a continuum
which ranges from interpersonal behavior (when a person is inclined to act primarily in terms of
self) to intergroup behavior (where a person is most inclined to act in terms of the group). The
interpersonal-intergroup continuum is not related to personal versus social identity, but rather fo-
cuses on differences in the cognitive processes and relationships between the personal and social;
most social situations require a compromise between the two extremes.
Social categorization theory (SCT) emerged in the 1970’s as a concept distinct from, but related
to, SIT. Where Tajfel placed interpersonal and intergroup behavior on a continuum, SCT theorists
suggested that the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behavior could be explained
by a latent individual distinction between personal and social identity (Turner et al. 1987). Less
concerned with ethnocentrism and bias, SCT attempts to explain the psychological motivations for
group behavior.
SCT posits that self-concept varies between personal and social identity, and that as a person
moves from defining self as an individual to defining self in terms of social identity, group-based
behavior emerges. For example, the member of a sports team could think of herself as an indi-
vidual player aspiring to improve her personal stats in the game, or think of herself as a team
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player at times foregoing actions that could improve her personal stats if it meant she were pur-
suing a different course of action that would allow the team to advance as a whole. According to
Turner et al. (2001), when a shared social identity becomes psychologically operative, a individ-
ual’s self-perception depersonalizes, and the perception of mutual group interests and collective
similarities are enhanced. This phenomenon of individual-level distinctions between personal and
social identity led Turner et al. to hypothesize that there are different levels of self-categorization.
Categorization theory suggests that when a person moves from describing herself as “I” and “me”
to describing herself as part of “we” and “us,” it represents a cognitive representation of the col-
lective self. In other words, the collective self is a reflexive representation of self structured by the
realities of group life in society.
SCT can be seen as a reconceptualization of the theory underlying SIT, though both theories
emphasize the notion that personal identity can be distinguished from social identity, and that group
behavior is the simple idea that people are acting more in terms of social than personal identity
(Turner and Reynolds 2001). The distinction is that SIT is useful for understanding intergroup
relations while SCT provides a way to think about group formation and the cognitive process by
which a person situates herself in a collective identity.
Distinct yet from SIT and SCT is identity theory, developed by Burke and Stets (2009). Identity
theory draws its intellectual heritage from the symbolic interaction theory (SI), which argues that
social behavior can be best understood by identifying individuals’ definitions and interpretations
of themselves, others, and their social environments. By focusing on the meanings that individuals
attribute to their social situations and interpersonal interactions, symbolic interaction attempts to
understand how individuals construct their actions, and how actions are orchestrated with others
to accomplish individual and collective goals. From this theoretical underpinning, two strands of
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SI diverge, each differing in their emphasis on the social structure as a constraint on individual
agency, identification, and action.
One strand, traditional SI treats social structure as fluid, flux, and in a constant state of being
created and recreated through the interpretations and actions of actors in various situations. Tradi-
tional structural interactionists emphasize the notion that “Individuals are free to define situations
in any way they wish with the consequence that society is always thought to be in a state of flux
with outcomes determined by negotiation, but with no overarching organization or structure from
the view of the individual (Stets and Burke, 2009, p. 34).”
Structural SI, on the other hand, emphasizes the influence of social structure on the actions and
choices available to individuals in negotiating their identity and presentation of self. Through social
interactions, individuals learn that society contains an array of groups, networks, communities and
institutions that are distinct from one another, but that sometimes overlap to produce cooperation
or conflict. Of structural SI Stets and Burke explain that “we navigate in and around these various
crosscutting groupings depending upon our tastes, and they influence who we become (2009, p.
35).” Exposure to particular social structures over time helps shape both individual and collective
goals.
Identity theory prioritizes the structural approach over the traditional approach to social inter-
action theory, and argues that because society is organized and patterned, the self must also be
organized in a way that reflects the context of a complex, structured social environment. Identity
theory features a perceptual emphasis, conceptualizing identities as hierarchically arranged, but in
a system of control rather than salience or prominence hierarchy. According to Stets and Burke
(2009), “identities higher in the control system hierarchy are conceptualized as more abstract such
as one’s moral identity, and they influence identities lower in the hierarchy such as the parent iden-
tity or friend identity. The relationship between identities at higher and lower levels in the control
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system of identities delves into the area of multiple identities (p. 54).” According to identity theory,
the way an individual performs a given identity depends on how salient that identity is within one’s
overall hierarchy of identities – the more salient the identity, the more likely it is for an individual
to invoke that identity in a given situation.
The cognitive and motivational underpinnings of SIT, SCT and identity theory are useful for
understanding the substance of intergroup politics (McClain et al. 2009), and the influence of
political attitudes on identity formation (Huddy 2001). Indeed, researchers have operationalized
group identity in a number of ways throughout the literature. For example, Olsen (1970) compared
black Americans who considered themselves to be members of a minority group with those who
had not. Verba and Nie (1987) devised an index that summed the number of times black Americans
referred to race in response to a series of open-ended questions. Lee (2009) employed a point
allocation system in which respondents were asked to allocate a fixed number of identity “points”
to a set of socially relevant categories.
To more fully understand the relationship between identity and its political correlates, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between group identity, which is concerned with how a person describes
herself, and group consciousness, which extends the notion of group identity to consider the politi-
cization of a person’s identity.
Group Consciousness
Group consciousness involves identification with a group, plus a sense of political awareness about
the group’s relative position in society, plus the belief that collective action is the best means to
realize the group’s shared interests (Dawson 1994; Miller et al. 1981).
Miller et al. (1981) describe group consciousness as a multidimensional concept with four
components that reflect both affective and cognitive elements:
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1. Group identification: the conscious, psychological feeling of belonging or attachment to a
particular social stratum.
2. Polar affect: a preference for members of one’s own group (the “ingroup”) and a dislike for
people outside the group (the “outgroup”).
3. Polar power: expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group’s status, power, or ma-
terial resources in relation to that of the outgroup.
4. Individual vs. system blame: the belief that the group’s status in society is either attributable
to individual failings or inequality in the social system.
Miller et al. argue that the four components of group consciousness form the basis for a political
ideology that provides a way for subordinate groups to express their dissatisfaction with social
injustices and lack of legitimacy with the social hierarchy. At the same time, the ideology of group
consciousness justifies the advantage of dominant groups, giving legitimacy to their social status
and providing a rationale for action aimed at securing permanence for the advantaged position
(Miller et al. 1981). Members of many socially stratified groups (race, gender, class, religion)
may develop a sense of group consciousness and indeed, this dissertation is concerned with the
intersectional aspects of group opinions and behaviors. However, because much of the political
science literature revolves around racial group consciousness, this chapter proceeds by digging
deeper into the literature surrounding racial group consciousness. I argue that continued research
must consider more fully the intersectional aspects of identity, taking into account the theoretical
and empirical challenges and opportunities presented by a multidimensional approach to identity
studies, if we are to properly appreciate the relationship between group consciousness and political
attitudes and behavior in an increasingly pluralistic society.
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Verba and Nie’s landmark study Participation in America (1987) was among the first to quan-
tify the relationship between racial group consciousness and political participation among black
Americans. The authors argue that socioeconomic factors influence the rate at which individuals
participate in politics.3While in the aggregate, data suggest that black Americans participate in con-
ventional forms of political action less frequently than their white counterparts, once the analysis
controls for socioeconomic status, black American participation outpaces that of white Americans,
which the authors explain using the theory of group consciousness. Verba and Nie measure group
consciousness as the number of times black respondents mention race in a series of open-ended
interview questions and show that, once controlling for group consciousness and socioeconomic
status, black Americans participate in politics at far greater rates than raw data suggest, and indeed,
higher rates than those of white Americans.
Another important group consciousness study, Shingles’ Black Consciousness and Political
Participation (1981), argues that the large effect of group consciousness on African American po-
litical participation can be explained by a missing link: a sense of political mistrust which induces
political involvement. Shingles explains, “the primary reason black consciousness has such a dra-
matic effect on political participation is that it contributes to the combination of a sense of political
efficacy and political mistrust which in turn induces political involvement (p. 77).” He analyzes
the same dataset used in Verba and Nie’s study, and similarly operationalizes black consciousness
as the number of times black respondents voluntarily refer to race in response to a series of open-
ended questions related to the presence of conflict in their communities, problems in their personal
lives, or issues in the community and the nation. Shingles finds that poor black respondents were
3Verba and Nie define participation as action that aims at “influencing the government, either by affecting the choice
of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel (p. 2).” Thus, participation in
the Verba and Nie study includes voting, contacting elected representatives, and contributing to, or volunteering for a
campaign, but does not include actions such as protest activity, community organizing, marching in parades, or similar
expressions of political attitudes.
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more likely to focus on political action through the policy process in contrast with poor white re-
spondents, who were more inclined to participate through conventional forms of political action
such as voting. Shingles adds that in their efforts to influence policy, black Americans in the sam-
ple were more likely to express a mistrust for government officials, though this mistrust tends to
lead to community advocacy to influence policy rather than conflict with government officials.
The next part of the chapter describes a canonical element grown out of the racial group con-
sciousness literature: linked fate. After discussing the theoretical underpinnings of linked fate
and highlighting empirical examples, I turn to the final task of this chapter, the contribution of a
new theory that introduces a typology of group conscious thinking that accounts for the different
cognitive processes that lead people to self-identify and subsequently develop a sense of shared
consciousness with in-group members, or not.
Dawson’s Linked Fate
While generally acknowledged as a social construct, race as a form of identity is believed to be
largely influential not only in the formation of individual and group identity, but also in the forma-
tion and explanation of political attitudes and opinions. Rooted in the study of identity in American
politics is the concept of linked fate. Michael Dawson’s theory of linked fate as described in his
1995 book Behind the Mule argues for the decisive power that identity, particularly racial iden-
tity, has on the political outlooks and choices of African Americans. Dawson develops a basis for
linked fate described as a “black utility heuristic” which rests on three theoretical underpinnings:
1. Despite increasing economic status and the growth of the black middle class, the life chances
of African Americans are still mainly affected by race.
2. Because their life chances are affected by race, it is rational for African Americans to view
their fate as being linked to the success of the group as a whole.
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3. It is therefore efficient for blacks to use group interests as a proxy for their own self-interest
(Dawson, 1994).
Linked fate is not a distinct concept from group consciousness, rather we should understand Daw-
son’s conception of linked fate as a mechanism through which group consciousness is manifest for
African Americans.
Linked fate is measured using a pair of survey questions. The first asks, “Do you think what
happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in
your life?” Given an affirmative response, respondents are subsequently asked, “Will it affect you
a lot, some, or not very much?”
There seems to be support for the notion of linked fate most consistently through the cor-
relational evidence that African Americans have voted overwhelmingly as Democrats for many
decades. Survey evidence cited by Dawson (1994; 2003) and others (Harris-Lacewell and Junn
2007; Harris 2009; Brown and Shaw 2002; Tate 2003; Gay 2004) indicates that African Ameri-
cans routinely see their life chances as being tied to the status of the group as a whole. However,
empirical evidence for linked fate relies almost universally on Dawson’s original survey measure
without much further consideration about measurement validity. Specifically, there seems to be
little indication that discriminant validity exists between linked fate and other correlates of group
identity. In the absence of empirical validation checks to verify the distinctiveness of linked fate,
we are left to question whether it is really linked fate driving African American public opinion, or
perhaps some other sort of correlate such as shared identity or shared political ideals at work.
Behind the Mule
Dawson begins his book by challenging the popular conjecture that political diversity is likely to
follow economic diversity among black Americans, who experienced a rise in middle class status
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in the 1980’s when Dawson conducted much of his inaugural work on linked fate. Although his
empirical support is thin (the survey used to support Dawson’s claims in the book has a small
sample size, and he uses linked fate as both a dependent and explanatory variable)4, Dawson urges
readers to consider two main points from his book. First, Dawson claims that black political behav-
ior is influenced by perceptions of racial group interests, which are not associated with individual
economic status. Second, Dawson claims that as blacks become more affluent, they become less
likely to support redistributive policy (p. 204).
While support for linked fate in Dawson’s book rests on the use of a single survey measure,
the notion of linked fate in race and identity politics literature has been widely influential. The
keywords “linked fate” return 2,120 separate items in Google Scholar (as of February 21, 2018)
suggesting not only the breadth of influence of Dawson’s work, but also the widespread use of
linked fate theory as a way to explain behavioral outcomes. In the following section, I review
three major themes in the literature that are particularly relevant to this present project: linked fate
across the population, linked fate and political outcomes, and linked fate over time. Though not an
exhaustive review of the entire set of literature available, I highlight the empirical evidence used
to support the concept of linked fate and discuss how future social science research should address
theoretical and empirical shortcomings in the literature by employing a mixed methodological
approach, particularly through rigorous qualitative work and the use of a novel strategy for the
survey measurement of identity. The following section will consider group consciousness broadly,
as well as studies which operationalize group consciousness using Dawson’s linked fate measure.
4Empirical support for the linked fate measure in Dawson’s book Behind the Mule comes from the 1984-1988
National Black Election Panel Study (N=100 in the 1984 panel, N=134 in the 1988 panel).
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Part II Empirical Correlates of Group Consciousness
How Have Researchers Attempted to Measure Identity?
The following sections will show that although identity is often theorized as being fluid and oper-
ating along a continuum of sorts (Taifel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Reynolds 2001;
Burke and Stets 2009), it is nearly always operationalized using fixed categorical variables. There
are both limitations and opportunities provided by the existing conventions of measurement in the
field: while checking boxes within racial, gender, class, and religious survey categories affords
little flexibility for individuals to indicate their magnitude of self-identification with each category,
checked boxes are an easily recognizable task for many people. The choices made by researchers
over what to do with such survey results present another set of opportunities and limitations. As
social scientists have become increasingly concerned about the effects of group identities and the
interconnectedness, or intersectionality of identity categories across a host of political outcomes,
the amount of data and methodological innovations have increased substantially. Despite advances
in data and methods, many research designs still place social categories such as race, gender, class,
and religion on the right-hand side of regression equations.
Work by Gay, Hochschild, and White (2014a) complicates the notion that linked fate operates
uniformly across groups. Using a national survey, they examine Americans’ views on linked fate
by race, ethnicity, gender, class, and religion. The authors find strong support for linked fate across
groups, but little support that linked fate is associated with political views or political participation.
Their conclusion offers that researchers should further the conceptual development and empirical
experimentation of linked fate: the present chapter sits on that very frontier.
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Empirical Support: Group Consciousness in the Literature
In general, large shares of non-white survey respondents express a sense of shared outcomes with
in-group members. The proportion of respondents who share a sense of group consciousness, and
linked fate in particular, is largest among African Americans. In seven surveys from 1984-2008,
60-83 percent of blacks expressed a sense of shared fate, although these figures dipped in the 2000s
compared with earlier decades (Gay et al., 2014b). These surveys, which were either specific to
blacks or featured oversamples of African American respondents, are consistent with findings in
general population surveys such as the American National Election Study (ANES) and the General
Social Survey (GSS).
The linked fate measure used by Dawson to operationalize group consciousness was first intro-
duced in the National Black Politics Survey (NBPS) in 1994, and has since been regarded as the
standard survey question for linked fate. Since Dawson’s study, the case for linked fate has been
submitted by numerous scholars of public opinion and identity politics. Linked fate has continu-
ally been associated with a sense of support for race-based coalitions and nationalist movements
(Block, 2011; Brown and Shaw, 2002; Hoston, 2009), preference to live in racially diverse neigh-
borhoods (Gay, 2004; Krysan et al., 2009), criticism of the mainstream media (Davis and Gandy,
1999; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007), and support for majority-minority Congressional district-
ing and descriptive representation (Griffin, 2014; Manzano and Sanchez, 2010; Schildkraut, 2012;
Tate, 2003). Taken together, the associations between a strong sense of shared fate and support for
these political outcomes form the basis for the empirical claim that linked fate serves as a heuristic
for political decisionmaking, especially among African Americans.
Block (2011) examines the effect of linked fate and “disillusionment with racial progress” on
black support for nationalist ideology. According to Block, the linked fate pathway suggests that
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feelings of in-group affinity are unrelated to black Americans’ attitudes about white people. In con-
trast, when support for nationalism is driven by disillusionment, black respondents who perceive
themselves to be treated unfairly by white people are more likely to express feelings of shared fate
with other black people (Block, 2011). Using data from the 1993-1994 National Black Politics
Survey (NBPS) and the 2004-2005 National Politics Study (NPS), Block finds conditional support
for linked fate: black respondents who expresses a strong sense of shared outcomes with other
blacks show corresponding strong support for nationalism, regardless of the level of disillusion-
ment. When blacks reject the notion of linked fate, support for nationalism is high only among
blacks who express high levels of disillusionment.
Block interprets these correlations as evidence of a causal relationship between linked fate,
disillusionment, and nationalism. However, the NBPS data were 16 years old at the time of Block’s
study, and the NPS data were five years dated as well. We may expect feelings of shared fate to
vary over time or across social and political contexts, a point developed further in a later section
of this paper. However, even if we are to accept the data used in Block’s analysis, we should be
suspicious of the fact that the effect of linked fate on black nationalism weakens significantly at
high levels of disillusionment.
Block is only one of several scholars who have continued the use of the linked fate question
along with 1994 NBPS data.
Rather than addressing the pathways to black nationalism, Brown and Shaw (2002) use the
linked fate theory to argue that not all “black nationalisms” are the same. Results from an OLS
regression show that blacks with a higher sense of linked fate are more likely to favor community-
based nationalism (support for black political and economic autonomy within the American insti-
tutional structure) over separatist nationalism (support for autonomous black institutions marked
by a physical separateness between black and white America). The authors believe linked fate is
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more strongly associated with community nationalism because linked fate is “more arguably a sig-
nificant component of a group identity that blacks value as being inextricably both black/African
and American (Brown and Shaw,2002),” although Brown and Shaw do not include any measures
for distinctions between identity group affiliations among respondents.
Though less extreme than nationalist ideology, racial solidarity also belongs on the spectrum of
group conscious politics. While nationalism calls for the institutional autonomy of black commu-
nities, black solidarity promotes an awareness of shared racial identity and the belief in collective
action as a way to advance the interests of black people. Hoston (2009) argues that linked fate
is positively associated with black solidarity. His data comes from the 2000 Mayoral Approval
Surveys, a dataset of black and non-black registered voters in New Orleans, Detroit (cities with a
majority black racial context), Chicago, and Charlotte (cities with a majority white racial context).
Using OLS regression of an index of racial group solidarity on linked fate and other explanatory
demographic variables, Hoston finds that blacks exert a sense of black solidarity regardless of the
racial context of the city in which they live, perhaps because the measures for linked fate and
measures for group solidarity are similar in the first place. Linked fate does seem to be a stronger
predictor of solidarity in majority black cities in Hoston’s dataset, however, the effect size is larger
in majority black cities for all of Hoston’s explanatory variables. It is possible that a substantial
portion of adults self-select into the cities where they live, thus we may expect that an unmeasured
confounding variable could influence not only the decision to reside in a city with a particular
racial context, but also support for preferences such as nationalism and racial group solidarity.
Indeed, racial attitudes may vary systematically with individual socioeconomic status, and the ge-
ographic concentration of socioeconomic groups may lead to distinct racial norms and behaviors
(Gay 2004).
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Gay (2004) posits that neighborhood quality and socioeconomic composition will influence
whether black Americans see race as a defining interest in their lives. Using data from the 1992-
1994 Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality and the 1990 Census, Gay finds that the quality of
a neighborhood, including its socioeconomic environment, sustains the belief that race influences
an individual’s life chances. Neighborhoods rich in resources that facilitate future socioeconomic
mobility are associated with a decline in the sense of linked fate among blacks. Living among
more highly educated blacks is also associated with a weaker sense of shared outcomes with other
blacks. Gay argues that her findings are suggestive of the material roots of black racial identity,
and that actual exposure to material deprivation impacts the salience of race.
When should we expect to see the salience of race manifest in political choices, quite apart
from ideological and neighborhood preference?
Davis and Gandy (1999) explore how racial identity affects individual responses to mass media.
Their survey of black residents of Alabama, California, and Pennsylvania uses two measures of
racial identity. The first is the conventional linked fate question, intended to consider self-interest
as a component of racial identity. The second question referred obliquely to race and asked for
agreement with the statement, “Each of us can make real progress only when our community as
a whole makes progress,” intended to emphasize the collective aspects of racial identity by using
terms that signify “group, community, and collective (Davis and Gandy, 1999)”. Respondents
with a higher sense of shared identity on both dimensions were more likely to be critical of the
portrayal of blacks in the media, though the authors concede that their measures for racial identity
are strongly correlated. These findings are echoed by scholars such as Gandy (2001), Bobo (1997),
Hecht, Collier and Ribeu (1993).
The studies just described in this section reflect the broader literature aimed at understanding
the attitudes and behaviors of racial minorities in the United States, especially African Americans.
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One shortcoming of this literature is that it relies on correlational evidence built almost exclusively
on the use of measures that are highly associated with one another. Given the nature of this evi-
dence, the field must advance by using new research design strategies to assess the causal relevance
of group consciousness and the conditions under which a sense of shared political fate persists.
Another shortcoming of these studies is that they tend to treat minority public opinion as mono-
lithic. As Griffin states, when studies anticipate that the size of a minority population should be
linearly related to legislative behavior, greater support for a particular type of policy, or coalesc-
ing views on race-related issues, they implicitly assume that minorities share the same opinions
despite growing heterogeneity in socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, neighborhood choice,
and other factors among those ascriptively identified as black Americans (2014). Continued social
science research should address intra-group differences in relevant political outcomes to appreciate
more fully group politics in a pluralistic context.
Variation in Group Consciousness
Dawson’s work has influenced scholarship on group consciousness for more than two decades.
One natural extension of Dawson’s work has been to examine how well linked fate accounts for
diversity within black populations along the lines of gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality (Harris,
2011). As the African American population in the United States has grown increasingly heteroge-
neous, some scholars have attempted to address variations in linked fate among individuals who
may be ascriptively identified as black, but differ in their sense of shared history, culture, and
political preferences. Several authors examine linked fate among Afro-Caribbean immigrants, or
black ethnics, in America. For example, Greer (2013) argues that although shared racial attitudes
exist among black ethnics, ethnicity remains a “significant determinant of intraracial attitudes and
policy stances for black populations,” especially among new immigrants (Greer, 2013).
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Findings from the ABS News Polling Unit / Columbia University’s Center on African Ameri-
can Politics 2008 Black Politics Survey (Harris, 2011) also demonstrate the complexity of linked
fate as it relates to other social identities held by black Americans. About 64 percent of blacks
respondents in the ABC / Columbia University Black Politics Survey report feelings of linked
fate with other African Americans. However, when asked whether blacks should stop thinking of
themselves as a group and think more of themselves as individuals, nearly half of black respon-
dents agreed that blacks should think of themselves more as individuals than as part of the group.
Furthermore, 60% of black respondents reported feeling more connected with their social class
than fellow black Americans (36%), indicating that although many African Americans express a
sense of linked fate, a nearly equal proportion express feeling more closely connected to people
of the same social class regardless of race. Harris’ findings reflect the notion that while the reali-
ties of racial discrimination may link the black community together in a broad sense, many black
Americans also seem to simultaneously adhere to the values of individualism that are prevalent in
American society (Harris, 2011). Further work by Harris and McKenzie reveals that black Amer-
icans’ views about the primacy of identities are “conditioned by experiences with discrimination,
attitudes toward racial identity, social class standing, residency in black neighborhoods, and sense
of financial security (Harris and McKenzie, 2015, p. 1).”
Cohen discusses the limitations of linked fate among black Americans in her influential work
Boundaries of Blackness (1999), which investigates the relationships between power, status, and
political action within black communities. Cohen argues that rather than operating under a uni-
versal linked fate political framework, a more accurate characterization of the political positioning
of most black Americans is that of a “qualified linked fate,” since not every black person is seen
as “equally essential to the survival of the community, as an equally representative proxy of each
individual’s interests, and thus as equally worthy of political support by other African Americans
31
(p. xi).” Cohen specifically examines political activism within the African American community
around the AIDS epidemic and argues that because the disease has been perceived as an issue af-
fecting primarily black gay men, black men who have sex with men, and black injection drug users,
the response was silence or delayed mobilization among black community leaders, churches, polit-
ical organizations, the black press, and black elected representatives who treated AIDS-vulnerable
groups as less essential to the shared fate of black Americans as a whole.
Austin, Middleton and Yon (2012) find that group consciousness has more of an impact
on American blacks, whereas socioeconomic status more heavily influences the political con-
siderations of black ethnics (Africans, Afro-Caribbean Americans, Afro-Cuban Americans, and
Haitians). The authors specifically examine the relationship between group consciousness among
people of African descent and political participation. The authors create an index of group con-
sciousness which includes the standard linked fate survey measure along with measures such as
support for collective action among group members, belief that the respondent’s group shares sim-
ilar social and economic interests with African Americans, experience with discrimination, politi-
cal ideology and support for political candidates. They find support for the positive effect of racial
group consciousness on black political participation that other research has suggested. However,
the authors concurrently find that while racial group consciousness has a comparatively strong ef-
fect on American black political participation (a one unit increase on the consciousness index cor-
responds with increased political participation in the range of 3 to 16 percentage points depending
on the activity5), the effect size weakens among Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Cuban, and Haitian Amer-
ican respondents for whom socioeconomic status is a stronger determinant of participation. Age,
5Austin, Middleton, and Yon use a number of dependent variables to measure political participation including at-
tending political rallies, contacting political officials, donating funds, meeting officials, signing petitions, participating
in volunteer activities, and voting.
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gender, generation of citizenship, partisanship, and church attendance appear to influence political
participation among all groups, but to varying degrees (Austin, Middleton and Yon, 2012).
Research has increasingly taken into account the political associations of Latinos (McClain
et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2006, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010). McClain et al. find that Latinos
with a higher sense of linked fate are more likely to find Blacks to be a palatable coalitional
partner (McClain et al., 2009). Using data from the 1999 Kaiser/Post National Survey of Latinos,
Sanchez finds Latinos are more likely to display group consciousness and a sense of linked fate in
the context of political activities directly tied to Latino communities and when commonality and
perceived discrimination were highest. Sanchez observes a positive relationship between group
consciousness and political participation in activities specifically related to the Latino community
such as attending meetings and demonstrations, and donating money and time to the political
campaigns of Latino politicians rather than indirect participation through voting (Sanchez, 2006).
In a corresponding study, Sanchez (2010) finds that group consciousness has a greater impact
on Latino political attitudes across issues directly related to ethnicity (such as immigration and
bilingual education) rather than those that are not directly tied to Latinos (such as abortion and the
death penalty), moderated by nativity and the length of time lived in the United States.
The linked fate measure has been used to study other racial and ethnic groups including Asian
Americans (Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Kim and Lee, 2001; Lien, 1994, 2010; Lien et al., 2004; Ma-
suoka, 2006; Wong et al., 2011), Latinos (Burnside and Rodriguez, 2009; Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez
and Masuoka, 2010; Segura, 2012), and, to a lesser extent, Arab Americans (Barreto et al., 2008).
A survey experiment by Junn and Masuoka (2008) finds that racial group attachment among
Asian Americans is malleable, in contrast to African Americans, whose racial identification re-
mains relatively stable over various contexts. The authors randomly assigned respondents in each
racial group into two conditions designed to measure the effect of descriptive representation on
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racial group consciousness. In the treatment condition, self-identified Asian American and African
American respondents were shown photographs of U.S. presidential cabinet appointees belonging
to the same racial group as the respondent, those in the control condition were not exposed to
photographs. Respondents were asked five dependent variable questions related to their feelings
of closeness to other people in their racial group, as well as the linked fate question. Junn and
Masuoka found that African Americans showed relatively consistent support for the identity re-
lated variable questions across treatment and control conditions, and while Asian Americans in the
control condition reported lower levels of closeness and linked fate relative to African Americans,
exposure to the “descriptive representation” treatment produced levels of support for linked fate
and feelings of closeness to members of one’s own racial group to a proportion nearly identical to
those reported by black Americans – nearly 80 percent. In other words, black Americans appear to
have an active racial identity and consistent sense of racial consciousness, while Asian Americans
appear to move along the identity scale when identity is politicized (or activated by the prospect
of a descriptive representative). Junn and Masuoka claim that it is a shared racial identity distinct
to the context of the United States that unites Asian American political consciousness rather than
claims to a universally “Asian” culture or other descriptive characteristics, since Asian Americans
are a group comprised of many diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious communities.
Wong et al. use an original dataset, the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS), to
demonstrate meaningful variation in the range of ways that Asian American citizens and non-
citizens make their political opinions known. The authors concentrate on five acts of political par-
ticipation: voting, political donations, contacting government officials, working alongside mem-
bers of one’s community, and protest activity Wong et al. (2011). They argue that Asian Americans
with limited English-language ability will be less comfortable participating in political activities
that require verbal communication such as contacting representatives, and will require stronger
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mobilization efforts. Because campaign contributions require discretionary income, and voting
is encouraged by partisan affiliation and party mobilization, both activities will be more likely to
occur among Asian-Americans born in the United States and naturalized citizens who have lived
in the country longer and likely learned the political norms. Protesting and community organizing,
on the other hand, are encouraged by a sense of connectedness (or shared fate) with community
members and have low barriers to entry, making participation in such activities more accessible for
Asian Americans with limited English language ability or limited knowledge about United States
institutions. The NAAS also includes two measures of linked fate – one asks the linked fate ques-
tion with respect to Asians, the other asks the linked fate question using the respondent’s ethnic
group as the reference category. When asked the first question about whether respondents think
what happens to Asians generally in the United States will affect what happens in their lives, 44
percent respond affirmatively to a sense of linked fate, though fewer than 10 percent feel their
personal fate is strongly linked to that of other Asians in this country. When the question wording
was changed to refer to people who share the same ethnic or national origin, respondents were
somewhat more inclined to report feelings of linked fate: about 50 percent reported a sense of
shared outcomes with people of the same ethnic group or national origin, and among those, about
12 percent believed that linked fate was strong.
The 2012 ANES reported 52 percent of Latinos and 62 percent of white Americans feeling at
least some sense of shared fate, as compared with 65 percent of black Americans, that their own
life chances depend at least partly on the fortunes of their racial group as a whole. Similar results
hold for Latinos in the 2008 ANES with a slightly higher percentage sharing a sense of linked fate
among a small sample in 2004 (The 2008 and 2004 ANES did not include whites on the linked
fate question, and Asian Americans were excluded all three years).
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The majority of opinion studies find, similar to the ANES, that black Americans express the
strongest sense of shared fate compared with other groups. However, pan-ethnicity has become an
increasingly influential component of the political considerations of Asian Americans, especially
relating to views on education and employment issues (Bobo, 2000; Bobo and Johnson, 2000; Cain
et al., 2000; Cho and Cain, 2001).
Within-group comparisons reveal an even greater degree of variation in responses to the linked
fate question. Scholars have attempted to explore the strength of shared fate among cross sections
of populations within groups including gender and sexual identity (Moore, 2010; Simien, 2005;
Cohen, 1999), socioeconomic status (Chong and Kim, 2006; Gay, 2004), and religious affiliation
(Reese and Brown, 1995; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014).
Moore (2010) examines the strategies used by black lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LBGT) people to assert a gay identity that is simultaneous with a black identity. Moore conducts
in-depth, in-person, semi-structured interviews with 25 self-identified lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered black Americans who live or work in predominantly black or black and Latino
neighborhoods in Los Angeles, and supplements his interviews with participant observation and
ethnographic work in neighborhoods, churches, spiritual centers, and cultural spaces where LBGT
people spend time in Los Angeles. Moore explains that black sexual minorities who see their self-
interests as linked to those of other black Americans use shared culture to connect their struggles to
historical efforts for black equality, using nationalist symbols and language to frame their political
work.
Simien (2005) analyzes the 1996 National Black Election Study used in Dawson’s work to
examine the effect of gender identification on racial group consciousness. She finds that black men
report a higher sense of race identification than black women, though both black men and black
women report strong support for linked fate regardless of the reference group.
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Cohen’s book Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics (1999)
further complicates the notion of linked fate by asking why black leaders and the black press failed
to mobilize around the issue of AIDS despite the fact that the disease was threatening significant
numbers of African Americans. Cohen argues that issues that cut across race, class, gender, and
sexuality challenge conventional notions about who belongs in a particular community. Cohen
contends that because African Americans were already a marginalized community, many of the
institutions indigenous to black communities were unable or unwilling to make AIDS a major
issue for African Americans and their politics.
Masuoka (2006) uses data from the 2000 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey and
the 1999 National Survey on Latinos to determine the predictors of pan-ethnic consciousness
among Latinos and Asian Americans. The ordered probit models confirm that for Asian Amer-
icans, high levels of income, prior participation in Asian-American politics, Democrat party iden-
tification, and experiencing racial discrimination are associated with higher levels of pan-ethnic
group consciousness. For Latinos, pan-ethnic consciousness is more strongly associated with high
income, gender, being foreign-born, participation in Latino politics, and perceptions of discrimi-
nation. Masuoka concludes that social contextual factors like discriminatory experiences have an
important role in shaping group consciousness across pan-ethnic identity groups.
Chong and Kim (2006) use data from a 2001 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Founda-
tion/Harvard University national survey to analyze the effect of economic status on expressions
of group consciousness (operationalized as preference for more/less attention paid to racial issues
in the United States, preference toward affirmative action, and preference for government policies
to ensure equality between minorities and whites in health care, education, jobs, and the adminis-
tration of the law) among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. The authors argue
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that intergroup differences in expressions of shared consciousness are driven by varying expe-
riences and perceptions of discrimination rather than from group-specific theoretical processes.
African Americans in the sample are less responsive to changes in economic circumstances (rela-
tive to Asian Americans and Latinos) because they are generally more pessimistic about their life
chances and more likely to have encountered discrimination. However, broadly in the sample the
authors find that for minorities who perceive equal opportunity and experience less discrimination,
higher economic status is associated with a reduced emphasis on shared fate with racial group
members.
Gay’s (2004) work on the environmental determinants of black racial attitudes focuses on how
the socioeconomic character of neighborhoods impacts whether black Americans view race as a
defining interest in their lives. Using multi-city survey data and block-group-level demographic
statistics from the 1990 Census, Gay finds that as the economic quality of neighborhoods improve,
the salience of race (measured by the linked fate question and level of perceived discrimination)
recedes. Gay also finds that the educational composition of neighborhoods impacts the salience
of race: black Americans living in neighborhoods with greater numbers of highly educated black
residents expressed more pessimistic attitudes about perceived discrimination, but their perceptions
of linked fate were unaffected. This study demonstrates how racial attitudes are impacted by
socioeconomic factors while challenging prior theorizing in black public opinion that middle class
black Americans would be more racially oriented than their lower class counterparts.
Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss religious consciousness in the United States, citing survey
evidence that nearly 90 percent of Americans identify with some religious group or tradition.
The authors also show that service attendance, participation in “rites of passage” (such as naming
ceremonies, celebrations of progress through life, and funerals) in religious organizations, and
donations to religious organizations still occur at high rates, challenging the claim that religion has
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become a casualty to American secularism. Religiosity, the authors argue, persists in the United
States because it provides a social identity that is particularly important in American culture. As
physical mobility, economic change, and immigration continue to threaten people who sense they
are losing their roots, religion provides a sense of stability, supplying what science and politics
fail to address. Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss three faces of religion: creed, institution, and
social/cultural group, arguing that the third, religion as a social group, often produces a sense of
shared status, a common culture, and a distinctive way of life. As members of the same religious
community develop a similar way of looking at the world, group consciousness emerges and, at
times, draws religious institutions into politics (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014).
Research by Reese and Brown (1995) explores the impact of religiosity on racial-group con-
sciousness among African Americans, emphasizing both the civic message communicated and the
political activism encouraged by religious organizations. Using data from the 1984 National Black
Election Study, the authors find that members of faith communities that communicate messages of
civic awareness (discussions about politics during religious service, encouraging members to vote,
respondent’s belief that the religious organization should be involved in politics) expressed higher
levels of racial group consciousness, while members of faith communities that promote political
activity (political meetings hosted at the place of worship, whether the religious organization col-
lects money to support political candidates, whether other work for candidates occurs at the place
of worship) tended to perceive more power imbalance and place greater blame on the governmental
system for inequality.
More recent scholarship has begun to compare the notion of shared fate across as well as within
groups. Junn and Masuoka (2008) examine the effect of shared fate among Asian Americans and
black Americans. Junn and Masuoka use an embedded survey experiment to examine whether a
sense of linked fate is more of a psychological predisposition or a perception that may be cued
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by outside contexts. They hypothesize that black Americans, who have a strong and deeply held
racial identity should show a smaller increase in group consciousness compared to Asian Ameri-
cans, whose racial identity has a latent political context. Respondents from each racial group were
randomly assigned into two groups. Respondents assigned to treatment were shown pictures of
U.S. presidential cabinet officials (Ronald Brown and Rod Paige for the black respondents, and
Norman Mineta and Elaine Chao for the Asian American respondents. Each picture was given a
caption with identifying information about the cabinet official and a description of their position,
and was accompanied by the text: “Both President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have included
diverse Americans in their cabinets.” Respondents in the control group were exposed neither to
the images nor text. As dependent variables, Junn and Masuoka employ five measures of racial
identification and consciousness including the “close to” question asking how close respondents
feel to members of their own racial group, how important racial political identity is to the re-
spondents, whether respondents favor a racial cultural identity (preference for children to study an
African/Asian language, preference for children to marry other black/Asian people, and desire to
learn black/Asian history and culture), and a variant of the linked fate question that asks respon-
dents to rate on a likert scale their agreement with the following statement: “as things get better for
[whites; blacks/African Americans; Hispanics/Latinos; Asian Americans] in general, things get
better for me.” In addition the authors ask black respondents whether it is more important to be
black, both black and American, or American. Asian American respondents are asked whether it is
most important to be a specific ethnic group (e.g., Chinese), a specific ethnic group and American
(e.g. Chinese American), Asian, Asian and American, or American. For black respondents, ex-
posure to the image of a black public official only produced a statistically significant difference in
responses to the linked fate question, increasing from 56 percent who agree and strongly agree in
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the control group to 64 percent among those who received the treatment. Asian Americans demon-
strated strong results from the manipulation, signifying that exposure to descriptive representation
increased levels of linked fate, feelings of closeness to other Asians and Asian Americans, and
feelings of political racial identity. Respondents who viewed the stimulus were also more likely to
say it was most important to be a specific ethnic group and American (i.e., “Chinese American”)
or Asian American, meaning they favor the inclusion of “American” in their self-categorization.
Importantly, Junn and Masuoka’s study provides illuminating findings when comparing black
and Asian racial consciousness. When comparing feelings of closeness to members of one’s own
racial group, the authors report that 79 percent of black respondents in the control group respond
affirmatively. While 67 percent of Asian respondents reported feelings of closeness in the con-
trol group, respondents in the treatment group reported feelings of closeness almost identical to
the level of black respondents, 78 percent. Likewise, affirmative responses to linked fate among
Asian respondents who view the descriptive representation treatment jump nearly to the level of
black respondents who have not been primed to think about racial group representation. Junn and
Masuoka’s study underscores the idea that racial political consciousness should be thought of in a
structural as well as constructed sense.
Lien (2004) compares rates of political participation between Asian Americans and Hispan-
ics and finds that despite large differences in socioeconomic status, the two groups “bear similar
ethnicity and participation structures.” Specifically, Lien argues that a sense of shared outcomes
between in-group members plays a complex and important role in the acculturation and subsequent
participation process for Hispanics and Asian Americans.
Chong and Kim (2006) examine the conditions under which economic status increases support
for racial group interests among African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans. Using results
from a national survey, Chong and Kim suggest that African Americans are less responsive to
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individual changes in economic status because they are “on the whole more pessimistic about their
life prospects and more likely to encounter discrimination” than Asian Americans and Latinos.
However, in general the authors find that among minorities who experience less discrimination
and perceive their chances to be equal to others in society, higher economic status is associated
with a reduced emphasis on race and ethnicity (Chong and Kim, 2006).
Group Consciousness Over Time
Sanchez, Moran, and Sanchez-Youngman (2011) acknowledge that an increasingly diverse elec-
torate should prompt us to consider how considerations of linked fate may differ across racial
groups and across generations. Indeed, the continued use of the linked fate question on mass opin-
ion surveys over the past two decades suggests that scholars are still interested in the theory and its
potentially wide-ranging implications. However, there is a distinct deficit in the long-term study of
linked fate: there have been no large scale panel studies to date that examine the influence of linked
fate within respondents over time. The American National Election Study has included linked fate
as a measure in 2004, 2008 and 2012, but comparisons are only available for blacks as whites,
Latinos, and women have not been included in all years, and Asian Americans are still not asked
the linked fate measure with respect to their racial identity.
While the literature suggests a longstanding interest in the effects of linked fate, the variation in
findings, absence of panel studies, and lack of diversity in measurement techniques points toward
a clear agenda for future research to focus on developing a more precise way to link the theory of
group consciousness with measures for shared fate.
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Non-minority Racial Consciousness and White Nationalist Ide-
ology
While white nationalism is neither the subject of this chapter nor this dissertation project as a
whole, I do argue that the emergence of contemporary white nationalism should be understood
as white racial consciousness, and indeed, white Americans who may not align with a nationalist
ideology may also exhibit a sense of racial group consciousness. In a “Monkey Cage” article
citing data from the American National Election Study surveys, Sides (2017) explains how in
2012, 30 percent of Republicans believed there was at least a moderate amount of discrimination
against white people in America, a figure that jumped to 47 percent in the ANES study in January
2016 and at least partially accounts for the particular brand of identity politics that tapped into
white racial attitudes and fueled Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral victory. An October 2015 Public
Religion Research Institute poll similarly found that nearly two-thirds of Republicans thought
“discrimination against whites has become as big of a problem as discrimination against blacks
and other minorities.” Sides explains that support for Trump depended less on personal economic
anxiety (“I’m afraid of losing my job,”) and was more heavily influenced by a distinctly racialized
anxiety (“I think minorities are taking jobs away from people like me”). In light of such polling
data and other research documenting white racial attitudes (some of which I detail below) it should
come as no surprise that the importance of “white” identity is now recognized as a substantial
political influence, though latent racial attitudes have been influencing political preferences and
behaviors long before the outcome of the 2016 presidential election caused political scientists and
pundits to turn their attention to the identity-based appeals of white Americans.
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Consequently, I argue that theory and measurement strategies in social science research that
address group identity must also account for white racial group identity, its motivations, and its dis-
contents. The attention paid to group identity and group consciousness among minorities, women,
and other marginalized communities has not been extended to the study of white identity to nearly
the same degree. Indeed, compared to other minority groups, white Americans are less likely to
encounter discrimination, or experience systemic and institutional disadvantage because of their
race. For other groups, politics are often framed in the rhetoric of identity – discussions about wel-
fare often evoke images of the black welfare queen living lavishly off of food stamps, immigration
debates evoke images of Mexicans illegally crossing the border to the U.S., and recent travel ban
policies have expressly targeted and restricted passage to the U.S. from several majority-Muslim
countries. For white Americans, however, dominant status in society means that white-ness is often
the baseline from which other groups are compared. Unsurprisingly, “our understanding of inter-
group relations with respect to white Americans is dominated by theories that focus on outgroup
attitudes” (Jardina, 2014).
In this section I review research on white racial consciousness, in particular, the existence of a
contemporary movement of white nationalism that differs, at least in its approach to the collective
realization of its goals, from older racist right movements in the United States such as the Ku Klux
Klan and the American Nazi Party. I also highlight emerging research that focuses on white identity
apart from white nationalism, signaling the need for future studies to further account for the role of
white identity alongside other social identities to advance our understanding of intergroup politics
in the United States.
In their discussion of theories of racial prejudice, Kinder and Sears (1981) contrast realistic
group conflict theory, or the racial threat hypothesis (which argues that the origins of prejudice
can be found in the realities of direct competition between blacks and whites for scarce resources
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such as jobs, and positions in desirable schools and neighborhoods), with symbolic racism, or
sociocultural prejudice (in which a solid core of prejudice is learned by children and adolescents
alongside other normative values and attitudes that are prevalent in their social environments).
Kinder and Sears use evidence from the outcomes of two mayoral elections in Los Angeles to argue
that symbolic racism – the abstract, moralistic resentment toward black Americans for violating
the values of individualism and self-reliance – is more pervasive and deterministic of the voting
behavior and policy preferences of white Americans than the realistic group contact theory. In
other words, the response of some white Americans to racial issues stems from moral and symbolic
challenges to the racial hierarchy in society rather than direct experiences with challenges to their
own personal lives. The authors’ findings imply that although the politics of change to the racial
status quo may be framed as issues addressing the status of minority communities, the argument
can be made that white racial consciousness is activated through the politicization of minority and
diversity issues as well.
Swain (2002) argues in her book The New White Nationalism in America that at least seven
conditions have spurred the growth of white racial consciousness in the United States. These in-
clude: (1) an increase in both documented and undocumented non-white immigrants resulting in
the possibility of a majority non-white United States population; (2) global economic changes
that have contributed to the decline in high wage jobs for unskilled workers who now view doc-
umented and undocumented immigrants as competition for low wage employment opportunities;
(3) white resentment over the perceived unfairness of race-based affirmative action policies; (4) the
perceived prevalence of black-on-white violent crime; (5) the increased social acceptance of racial
and ethnic pride and identity politics that emphasize a preference for multiculturalism; (6) rising
expectations of social and economic equality among racial minorities; and (7) the rapid growth in
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the number of people who have access to the Internet, which provides a forum for like-minded peo-
ple to consolidate their strength, converge on their ideas, and mobilize their resources for political
action. According to Swain, the heightened awareness of collective grievance and the existence of
a target of blame for their perceived injustices have given resentful white people enough reason to
mobilize around their shared racial group consciousness. Indeed, her claims seem to be bolstered
by Abrajano and Hajnal’s work in the book White Backlash, which uses panel data from national
surveys to show that changes in public opinion on immigration at one point in time can predict
changes in aggregate white partisanship to favor the Republican party in future periods (2015).
As immigrants have increasingly impacted the country and native-born racial minorities continue
to advocate for just and equal treatment to address persistent social and economic disparity, more
white Americans than ever have flocked to the Republican party (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015) to
seek recourse through policy for their own perceived injustices. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck also
note that white American’s opinions toward minority groups became more intertwined with their
partisan identities and became stronger predictors of their opinions across a number of policy ar-
eas – including the economy, immigration, and attitudes toward Muslims – particularly during the
Obama administration (2016).
Swain argues the existence of a new white nationalist movement which differs from older
forms of white radical nationalism such as the Ku Klux Klan or the America Nazi Party - or
their contemporary counterparts such as the loosely organized skinhead movement. New white
nationalism rejects the violence and intimidation advocated by the older racist right and instead
seeks to expand its influence through policy advocacy, rational discourse, and outreach to its target
audience of white Americans who have become frustrated and embittered over what they perceive
to be a landscape of racial double standards and race-based grievances in the areas of policy and
the economy. Because new white nationalism seeks a mainstream audience, it has abandoned the
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violent and intimidationist tactics used by the Klan and Nazi movements, which is less palatable
in the contemporary United States.
For Swain, the next logical step for research in the field is to develop a national survey designed
to identify developing white racial consciousness and white identity politics, and to explore how
much traction the arguments advanced by white nationalists have gained among mainstream white
Americans.6Swain (2002) says such a survey would allow researchers to “systematically examine
whether [white nationalist] arguments are having the desired effect of getting more people to think
and act more like the members of other racially self-conscious, self-interested minority groups (pg.
12).”
Walters (2003) writes about how white nationalists have advanced their interests through con-
servative policymaking in the United States. He argues that because white Americans are dominant
to the extent that they control the institutions of decisionmaking in the United States, they can use
those institutions and the policy outcomes they produce as instruments with which to structure
their racial instruments. Because white Americans have historically been dominant in the U.S.
government, most policy actions appear to take on an objective quality – in other words, it be-
comes difficult to distinguish the objective civil interests of the state from the subjective racial
interests of those who wield decisionmaking power precisely because there has been little need for
the dominant majority to articulate their interests in racial terms. Like Swain, Walters claims that
in the wake of increased influence from groups advocating for minority interests, affirmative action
and redistributive policies aimed at advancing the interests of racial minorities became targets of
blame for resentful whites who view the societal push toward pluralism as a threat to white na-
tional interests. For Walters, the interests of white nationalists are inherently political as the goals
6In a different chapter I introduce a survey measurement task that, at least in part, addresses Swain’s objective
to identify developing white racial consciousness and white identity politics. See “Can Alternative Measurement
Strategies Provide New Insights for Our Understanding of Group Political Attitudes in the United States?” for more.
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of the ideology are realized by using collective action to secure and cement the dominance of white
American interests in policymaking and political institutions.
Zeskind (2009) writes about the history of white nationalism in the United States and prognos-
ticates about a future in which white Americans will no longer constitute the racial majority, and
consequently will no longer be able to preserve a system of white privilege through majority-rule
winner-take-all democracy. He details the historical account of white nationalism in the United
States and argues that in colonial America the practices of domination came into existence before
the ideas that justified them, but as time passed, the pervasiveness of white dominance in political,
economic, and ideological structures became so ingrained that it was practically invisible to most
white people. Because institutional privilege to white Americans goes largely unchecked, times of
crisis that challenge white privilege become the targets of white nationalist movements to oppose
change and preserve the status quo.
Most authors in their discussions of white nationalism also reference a related phenomenon:
the articulation of a Christian conservative ideology (Barkun 1997; Swain 2002; Swain and Nieli
2003; Zeskind 2009). Although the ideologies of white nationalists and far-right conservative
Christianity are distinct and should be treated as such, the two converge in many of the ideas that
motivate their movements. For example, religious and cultural traditionalists both adhere to the
notion that the legitimization of LBGT equality threatens the (white) nuclear family, the conviction
that abortion is unlawful killing, and the belief that middle class white people, particularly men,
are the victims in contemporary society (Zeskind, 2009).
Compelling work on white racial identity also comes from Jardina (2014) who argues features
of contemporary U.S. politics, including a mass influx of non-European immigrants, the election
of America’s first African American president, and the nation’s growing non-white population
have signaled the end of white cultural and political dominance, which had previously allowed the
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group to take their racial identity for granted. Jardina explains that racial identity is a meaningful
antecedent of political behavior among white Americans, and, using survey data, shows that when
the dominant status of white Americans relative to other racial and ethnic minorities is unchal-
lenged, white identity is likely to remain dormant. When whites perceive that the dominant status
of the group is threatened, or that the group has been unfairly disadvantaged, white racial identity
becomes politically salient, invoking political attitudes that reflect a desire to preserve social and
political privilege and advance ingroup interests.
Studies focusing on white nationalism and identity demonstrate that the explanatory power of
racial group consciousness is useful for understanding the motivations and behaviors of minority
and majority groups in society. Indeed, the concept of race as constructed and perpetuated by white
Americans must be understood as a social force that influences the politics of the majority as well
as those on the margin.
Part III A New Typology of Group Consciousness: The Type-
Predictor Framework
Group consciousness becomes activated in different ways for different kinds of people; that much is
clear from existing literature, which consistently finds statistical support for the linked fate measure
(understood here as the survey operationalization of group consciousness), but substantial variation
between and sometimes even within groups. Indeed, Dawson states in his book Behind the Mule
(1994) that “not all individuals possess the same degree of group consciousness or substitute group
utility for individual utility (p. 63).”
To foreshadow, the following chapter of this dissertation presents the qualitative findings of a
set of interview data, which shed additional light on the topic of group consciousness by allowing
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participants to answer the linked fate question with an open-ended response format. First, I begin
here by providing a theoretical framework – the type-predictor framework – for understanding why
the differences borne out in existing research may manifest the way they do.
A separate question asks when and how any particular group membership becomes salient at
the individual level. This question, though important, is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Readers may see Burke and Stets (2009) for further explanation and a review on when and why
group memberships and identities become salient at the individual level. The authors write:
“What is termed a salient identity in social identity theory is an identity that is activated
in a situation. A particular identity becomes activated or salient as a function of the
interaction between the characteristics of the perceiver (accessibility) and the situation
(fit). As indicated earlier...accessibility is the readiness of a given category to be called
up into awareness, and fit is the congruence between characteristics of an identity and
stimuli that are present in the situation (p. 207).”
I take group membership as given throughout this dissertation and seek to understand how, given
the salience of a particular group membership, individuals belonging to a particular type process
group membership and, correspondingly, interpret the notion of shared political outcomes, includ-
ing linked fate. I adopt the Sellers et al. understanding of salience as described in the Multidimen-
sional Inventory of Black Identity7. For the purpose of this study, I apply to all subject identities
what Sellers defines particularly for black Americans in his Multidimensional Inventory of Black
Identity, where salience refers to the extent to which a person’s group membership is a relevant part
7The Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI) developed by Sellers et al. consists of three dimensions
of African American racial identity: centrality (the degree to which a person normatively defines herself with regard
to race), ideology (a person’s beliefs and attitudes about the way she feels members of the race should live and interact
with other people in society), and regard (a person’s affective judgement of her race, or the extent to which she feels
positively or negatively toward her own membership and toward members of the ingroup). The authors claim that
salience (the extent to which a person’s race is a substantial part of her self-concept) is the mechanism by which the
other three dimensions influence the way a person experiences a given situation at a particular point in time. Sellers et
al. find support for the internal validity of the inventory in a 1997 survey of 474 black American college students from
both predominantly African American universities and predominantly white universities.
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of his or her self-concept at a particular moment in time. As explained by Sellers et al., salience is
concerned with the specific event as the level of analysis (Sellers et al., 1997).
The type-predictor framework illustrated in Figure 5 represents a departure from much of the
current literature by challenging the notion that group membership has a direct, causal relationship
with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes
associated with linked fate. Rather, I argue that the ways in which individuals process group con-
sciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level leads them to interpret
the notion of linked fate in importantly different ways. In effect, my framework accommodates the
multidimensional nature of identity by acknowledging the different degrees of group conscious-
ness individuals may hold. As noted by Stets and Burke, “a complete theory of the self would
consider both the role and the group bases of identity as well as identities based in the person
that provide stability across groups, roles, and situations” (2000). The type-predictor framework
accommodates different conceptions of self-relation to person, role, and group as a way to further
understand how self-categorization relates to an individual’s perception of shared outcomes with
a social group. This is especially useful for understanding how people who express intersectional
identities may relate to groups. People who belong to hegemonic groups may not feel the effects
of group stereotype as personally, or as urgently, as members of subordinate groups. The type-
predictor framework theorizes the consequences of varying concepts of group identity (including
those reflective of hegemonic and subordinate identities) and provides a pathway for understanding
how these different concepts of group identity may relate to variation in the ways that individuals
interpret the notion of group consciousness and shared fate.
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Figure 5: Type-Predictor Framework
I now begin the task of introducing a new typology of group conscious behavior and explain
how each type corresponds with a particular interpretation of the linked fate question. In doing so
I must first define two terms: type and predictor.
A person’s type refers to her categorization in one (or more, in the case of multiple identifiers)
of five typologies that describe how an individual thinks about group consciousness when group






A person’s type then corresponds with the one or more types of theoretical predictors we would
expect to produce her interpretation of the linked fate question or other measures of group con-
sciousness, which will be discussed in the following chapter of this dissertation. The predictors,






Figure 3 provides a brief description of each type and its corresponding predictor(s).
Figure 6: Consciousness Type Descriptions and Group Consciousness Predictors
For each type and predictor I present a description and provide theoretical motivation from
previous work, drawing especially from the literatures of psychology and sociology. Rather than
developing my typology from one theoretical perspective, I synthesize multiple perspectives on
identity to explain how the combination of several theories more fully addresses variations in self
identification as they relate to group conscious thinking. In other words, individual theories often
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have a specific explanatory scope. This typology complements existing theoretical work by sug-
gesting the scenarios in which we should expect theories of identity to have the most explanatory
power concerning individuals, their relationships to social groups, and the political consequences
of group identification.
Non-Affiliates
Though non-affiliates may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, they do not view
group membership as being tied to their life chances. In fact, they may intentionally disassociate
themselves from group affiliation instead focusing on individualistic qualities such as personality
as a motivator and basis for their actions and beliefs. Non-affiliates provide negative responses
to the linked fate question, even when prompted to think about identity, because non-affiliates
rarely associate their sense of personal well being to the collective fate of the groups of which
they are members. Rather, non-affiliates have a more individualistic sense of outcomes, especially
in political matters such as policy attitudes and voting behavior. Non-affiliates are the types of
people who may tick boxes for their appropriate demographic traits on a survey, but would rarely
be inclined to describe themselves according to categories such as race, gender, or religion, and opt
rather for descriptions that better reflect a sense of personal identity, such as being “a kind person,”
“an introverted book-lover,” “a good friend who likes having fun,” or something similar.
Non-affiliation is best explained by social interaction theory (SI), and specifically, the tradi-
tional approach to social interaction theory, which draws its intellectual heritage from the seminal
work of George Herbert Mead (1934) and Charles Horton Cooley (1902). SI posits that social be-
havior can be best understood by focusing on individuals’ definitions and interpretations of them-
selves. Traditional SI emphasizes the behavior of actors, and attributes a great deal of agency and
autonomy to the individual in articulating his or her sense of self. Traditional social interactionists
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do not view the social and cultural environment as a constraint on individual. Instead, social struc-
ture is viewed as constantly in a state of flux, created and recreated “through the interpretations,
definitions, and actions of individuals in situations” (Burke and Stets, 2009, p. 34).
Non-affiliation is also explained by theories of identity that focus on the “person” as a category
of identity rather than the group or role as an individual’s level of of self-categorization (Stets
and Burke, 2000). Deaux (1992) argues that although personal identities may be connected to
particular social identities, individuals who prioritize personal identity do so because personal
identity represents a general view of the self as a unique entity, distinct from other individuals.
As a result, the personal identity pervades all the group membership categories to which one may
otherwise belong, making it unlikely that non-affiliates should view group membership as being
tied to their life chances (Stets and Burke, 2000).
Abstract Conceptualizers
Abstract conceptualizers relate group membership to their personal identities but attach no affective
value to team "wins" or "losses" at the individual level. Abstract conceptualizers are not only aware
of their membership in a particular group, they are aware that belonging to that group may cause
others to view them along with any perception of shared beliefs, feelings or interests associated
with group members (McClain et al., 2009), even if the individual may not entirely share those
beliefs, feelings or interests. Abstract conceptualizers are able to understand such perceptions and
misperceptions but are overall unmoved in their personal belief structures by them. Consequently,
membership alone in a particular group would seem to be an insufficient condition to produce the
type of utility proxying behavior required of group consciousness. Group membership itself does
not carry any affective value of group-belonging, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would
not uniformly motivate strong enough sense of collective fate.
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While traditional approaches to social interaction theory help explain non-affiliate behavior,
the structural approach to social interaction theory helps explain the cognitive motivations of ab-
stract conceptualizers. Structural SI places a stronger emphasis on the role of social structure in
shaping the social life and self-identification of individuals. While traditional SI treats the social
environment as being in a constant state of flux, structural SI treats the social structure as stable
and durable, which structural social interactionists claim is evinced through the patterned behav-
ior within and between individuals. Because structural SI treats society as being preexistent to
the person, individuals learn about social organization through the process of socialization. As
individuals come to learn that society is comprised of many groups, networks, communities, and
institutions, individuals begin to navigate these crosscutting groupings, the social structures influ-
ence how individuals identify and present themselves to the world. As Stets and Burke (2009,
p. 35) argue, “Exposure to particular social structures helps shape individual goals.” The authors
further explain,
“Social structure provides both limits and possibilities for actors’ behavior... Be-
cause social actors have agency, that is, their actions are oriented to individually held
goals (from proximal goals such as accomplishing a particular task in a situation to
distal goals as in achieving one’s moral objectives), individuals have the capacity to
create social structures. Social structures emerge from individual actions as those in-
dividual actions are patterned across persons and over time. And, actors have the
capacity to change social structures as well, thereby reorienting social behavior with
the results that new patterns emerge. However, individual action also occurs in the
context of social structures within which the individuals exist. On the one hand, social
structures impose constraints on the agency of actors. For example, there is strong ev-
idence on the intergenerational transmission of class position or the intergenerational
transmission of aggression. On the other hand, social structures can provide resources
and opportunity structures for actors such that they can overcome these constraints.
For example, we take notice when the unexpected occurs, as when people become
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upwardly mobile actors in the class structure or when their experience of a violent up-
bringing becomes transformed into an adult life of nonviolence. Complexity is added
to the picture when we see that although agency involves an individual accomplish-
ing certain goals, if the goals are consistent with social structural arrangements, they
are reinforcing not only for the person but also for the structures within which the in-
teraction is embedded. If the individual’s goals are in opposition to social structural
arrangements, interaction may, on the one hand, become disruptive and destabilize
the existing structures or, on the other hand, become squelched as the individual is
prevented from obtaining his or her goals.
Considering the influence of the social structure makes us aware that individu-
als’ outcomes are not completely orchestrated by their own or even others’ actions as
traditional symbolic interactionists would maintain. Structural arrangements persist
according to their own principles and intrude into interaction, and they can constrain
the actions of actors. Indeed, every situation has an implicit status hierarchy, a distri-
bution of resources, a set of norms that shape and guide interaction and so forth, and
this may constrain what actors can accomplish. (p. 35)”
Abstract conceptualizers reflect the core of structural symbolic interactionism in that abstract con-
ceptualizers spend more time than non-affiliates contemplating how social structures shape their
interactions. Still, an abstract conceptualizer type person does not go so far as to believe her per-
sonal success in life is tied to the groups with which she may affiliate. The role of personal agency
is yet prioritized over group fate for the abstract conceptualizer.
Non-Conformists
Nonconformists see themselves as members of a particular group, but do not adhere to common
group stereotypes. They tend to process group membership as part of their personal identity even
if they "don’t fit the mold." Non-conformist behavior is best explained by social identity theory,
which assumes that when group membership becomes salient, an individual’s sense of membership
in a minority group would become a meaningful basis for perceiving self and others. However,
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because the social identity approach presents the self as relatively malleable, we may expect to see
some variation in responses to the linked fate question. Abrams and Hogg (2001, p. 9) claim,
“The social identity approach emphasizes that categorization involves differenti-
ation of our self and others into meaningfully distinctive categories. The process is
both inductive and deductive – inferences are made on the basis of category-based
stereotypes, but those stereotypes depend on the features that maximally distinguish
the category from relevant other categories (Haslam et al., 1996; Oakes, 1996). The
process involves both the application of stereotypes to others, and the depersonaliza-
tion of self. Depersonalization means that the self-inclusive category becomes self-
defining. Social identity is the perception of self in terms of stereotypical ingroup at-
tributes. Throughout the 1980s social identity researchers (e.g., Turner & Giles, 1981)
described social and personal identity broadly as consisting of category memberships
and traits, respectively (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988, for a comprehensive review). The
social identity/personal identity distinction was depicted as if these were two different
parts of identity structure.”
Thus, while abstract conceptualizers may understand the self and group through the application of
stereotype, abstract conceptualizer type individuals do not confine the self (nor do they confine the
presentation of self) to the stereotypes commonly used to describe the group.
Multiple Identifiers
Multiple identifiers do not process one group membership in isolation as a component of their
identity. They may at times have a heightened sense of awareness of their belonging in one group
over others at any given time, but their considerations and actions are overall guided by the fact that
they cannot, or perhaps will not, compartmentalize their sense of personal relationship between any
of the groups with which they feel a strong sense of identity. They tend to interpret the linked fate
question from the lens of self categorization theory, social identity theory, or group attachment and
58
depending on an individual’s categories of self identification, may fall under more than one type in
the type-predictor typology.
Strong Identifiers
For strong identifiers, personal identity is inseparably tied to group membership, and is explained
by the self-categorization theory developed by Turner and others (Turner et al., 1987, Turner et al.,
Haslam et al. (1996)). While social identity theory treats self categorization as a process in which
individuals distinguish the self and others, the self categorization approach makes more explicitly
explains the process by which individuals treat the self and the ingroup as mutually exclusive.
To the extent that an individual’s behavior is inseparably tied to her need for proximity to the
attachment group, self-categorization theory may suggest that linked fate is the mode of behavior
through which individuals achieve proximity, thus strong identifier types will tend to answer the
linked fate question affirmatively. Although Dawson sees linked fate as a means through which
individuals make decisions ultimately for self-gain, strong identifiers who view the world through
a self categorization framework would see linked fate as one of a variety of behaviors that facilitate
closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned with the extent to which favoring
the policy of the attachment group allows the individual to signal her ultimate desire to be bonded
with the group.
Abrams and Hogg (2001, p. 10) explain,
“Self-categorization theory more explicitly developed the analysis of social catego-
rization to define personal and social identifications as being functionally antagonis-
tic. Depersonalized self categorization means that the self and ingroup are one and
the same. For example, Smith and Henry (1996) have shown that when social cat-
egorizations are made salient, the ingroup becomes psychologically merged with, or
linked to, the self. Depersonalization is also consistent with phenomena such as so-
cial projection, which seems to operate more strongly when people make judgments
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about others who share a categorization with self than when they are categorized as
outgroup members (Kreuger, 1998; Kreuger and Clement, 1994). The functional an-
tagonism means that if self-categorization becomes salient at a particular level (e.g.,
European) self-categorization at the lower level (e.g., British) becomes less salient.
Which level of categorization is salient is flexibly influenced by contextually bounded
comparisons between potential ingroups and outgroups.”
Thus, for strong identifiers, the self and the group are inextricably tied once group membership
becomes salient to the individual, as explained by self-categorization theory. In this sense, we
should expect strong identifiers to answer affirmatively to questions relating personal outcomes to
the status of the group with which a person strongly identifies.
Predictors of Response to Group Consciousness
Disassociation
Dissociative responses are given by non-affiliate types who report feeling a stronger sense of at-
tachment to one group relative to other groups in their identity set yet do not frequently refer to
the group in relation to their political considerations. I expect to see little evidence of a sense of
shared outcomes for individuals whose identity ties to a particular group are relatively weak.
Disassociative responses are characterized by individuals who express a sense of belonging to
groups that would not presumably be ascriptively identifiable, such as political parties, veterans,
marital or family status, or in some cases, religion. In this sense, disassociative responders may be
less inclined to feel a sense of shared outcomes the groups to which they belong are often “selected
into” by the individual, and perceptions of group membership from others depends almost entirely
on what the individual projects. In contrast, individuals who feel a stronger sense of attachment
to racial and ethnic groups, class-based groups, or other minority groups may be more subject to
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differential treatment based on out-group perceptions of individual group membership and thus,
whether negatively or positively, may respond differently to the linked fate question.
Group Membership
Membership alone in a particular group would seem to be an insufficient condition to produce
the type of utility proxying behavior Dawson describes. Group membership itself does not carry
any affective value of group-belonging, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not
motivate particular feelings or behaviors other than perhaps a sense of belonging. Membership
is akin to a “fan,” who may occasionally cheer for his team and celebrate team successes, but is
ultimately unburdened by the team’s victories or losses at the individual level to the extent that his
own self-concept and decision making behaviors are meaningfully affected.
Group Identity
Unlike membership alone, group identity appears to have implications for the predictions of linked
fate among respondents in this sample. If group membership allows individuals to act, at most, as
“fans of the team,” moving along the continuum from membership to group identity would seem-
ingly make an individual a “team player.” A person’s status and sense of self are more connected
with the status of the group, and hence there may be a stronger relationship between group and in-
dividual well-being. Both social identity theory and self-categorization theory might assume that
minority status makes minority group membership a salient category for individuals, thus minority
group membership would become a meaningful basis for perceiving self and others.
It is difficult within the framework of self-categorization theory to address why, when social
identity is salient, not all group members think or behave similarly (Abrams, 1990). The theory
does not give a compelling account for why consistent individual differences may exist, though
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Abrams (1990) and others have suggested that while subjective stability in the self must be based
to some degree on a person’s ability to make stable social comparisons, individual stability may
be accompanied by subtle variations that “allow people to arrive at different interpretations of the
same categorization at different times (Abrams and Hogg, 2001).
Group Attachment
To the extent that an individual’s behavior is inextricably tied to her need for proximity to the
attachment group, attachment theory may suggest that linked fate is the mode of behavior through
which individuals achieve proximity. Although Dawson sees linked fate as a means through which
individuals make decisions ultimately for self-gain, individuals who view the world through a
group attachment framework would see linked fate as one of a variety of behaviors which serve
the function of facilitating closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned not
only with self-perception, but also about the extent to which favoring the policy of the attachment
group allows the individual to signal her ultimate desire to be bonded with the group.
Readers may quibble over whether the conjectures offered by the social identity theory and
the group attachment framework differ at all. I contend that the distinctions lie in whether the
individual is perceived by out-group members to be a member of the identity group (as in the case
of group membership) or not (as in the case of group attachment), and whether identity reflects
an underlying motivation for higher status among in-group members. While both theories would
suggest a sense of shared outcomes at the individual level, the motivations for individuals to link
their fate to the group varies by context.
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Discussion
The type-predictor framework bridges theories of group consciousness by reconciling the work
of political political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity
variables, with that of political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. The
type-predictor framework rests on the notion that perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that we should
think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes/behaviors, but the way individuals understand
their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually salient. My
typology transitions the theoretical discussion by providing a framework that considers the nature
of the relationship between demographic characteristics and their political correlates, which seem
to vary by groups.
In the following chapter I explore the range of support for the type-predictor framework through
an analysis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014. To foreshadow, the
open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provide support for the
type-predictor framework. I find examples of all five “types” and all “four” predictors, and the
relationships between types and predictors appear to be in the directions I expected.
Political and social psychology research is ripe with opportunities for researchers to engage in
qualitative studies to develop a richer contextual understanding of identity, as well as quantitative
studies to empirically demonstrate the distinctiveness of identity-related concepts, especially in
relation to political preferences and related behavioral outcomes. There is an especially strong
need within the identity literature to develop causally identified research designs in order to fully
understand the conditions under which aspects of an individual’s identity may causally motivate
her preferences and behaviors. The literature must grow to incorporate new design strategies aimed
at validating empirical distinctions between often-cofounded concepts. Though a formidable task,
broadening the scope of available measures will, at least, be beneficial to the scholarly community
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and, at best, demonstrate an improvement in measurement precision and provide a benchmark for
future studies to build upon.
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2 The Type-Predictor Framework in Action
Introduction
In this chapter I present support for the type-predictor framework by analyzing a set of 40 in-
depth interviews conducted in 2014. The previous chapter explains the theoretical underpinnings
of the framework as a reconciliation between the work of political political behavior which often
links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical identity variables, and political psychology which
often treats identity as fluid and malleable. The type-predictor framework represents a theoretical
contribution that departs from much of the current literature by challenging the notion that group
membership has a directly causal relationship with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension,
the host of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with group consciousness. Rather, I
argue that the ways in which different types of individuals process group consciousness when group
membership becomes salient at the individual level lead them to think about the politicization of
their identities in importantly different ways.
I argue that we should interpret the relationship between ascriptive identities and attitudinal,
behavioral, and political outcomes with nuance. There may be instances when we want to gener-
alize these relationships, but our inferences may change meaningfully if we allow individuals to
explain the nature of those relationships in their own words. Perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that
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we should think of as being tied to particular trends in attitudes and behaviors but the way individ-
uals understand their relationship to group identity when group membership becomes individually
salient.
Chapter Overview
This chapter begins by providing a brief recap of the type-predictor framework, introduced in chap-
ter one of the dissertation to provide a basis for understanding how the different ways individuals
think about their membership in a relevant group may lead them to think about the politicization
of their identities in importantly different ways. The remainder of the chapter provides support
for the type-predictor framework through the analysis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews
conducted in 2014. After reviewing the process for selecting respondents and describing the inter-
view population, I detail the constant comparative method used to analyze the interview responses.
I then proceed with an analysis of the interview data, highlighting the questions used to exam-
ine the two elements of the theoretical framework: consciousness types and group consciousness
predictors. I provide examples from the data that characterize each element of the type-predictor
framework to demonstrate the usefulness of this theory for understanding the relationship between
group identity and group consciousness from a more nuanced perspective, contextualized by real-
world descriptions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what can be learned from this
exploration of the type-predictor framework and ideas for future research.
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Figure 7: Type Predictor Framework
The Type-Predictor Framework for Understanding Group Iden-
tity and Group Consciousness
Group consciousness becomes activated in different ways for different kinds of people; that much is
clear from existing literature, which consistently finds statistical support for the linked fate measure
(understood here as the survey operationalization of group consciousness), but substantial variation
between and sometimes even within groups.
The type-predictor framework illustrated in Figure 7 represents a departure from much of the
current literature by challenging the notion that group membership has a directly causal relation-
ship with a sense of shared outcomes and, by extension, the host of attitudinal and behavioral
outcomes associated with linked fate. Rather, I argue that the ways in which individuals process
group consciousness when group membership becomes salient at the individual level leads them
to interpret the notion of shared fate in importantly different ways. In effect, my framework ac-
commodates the multidimensional nature of identity by acknowledging individual-level variation
in group consciousness that may change depending on the set of groups with which an individual
self identifies.
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A person’s type refers to her categorization in one (or more, in the case of multiple and con-
flicted identifiers) of five typologies that describe how an individual processes her consciousness






A person’s type then corresponds with the one or more theoretical predictors we would expect to
produce her interpretation of group consciousness related questions such as linked fate, which will
be discussed in the analysis section of this paper. The predictors, based on existing theories in the





Figure 8 provides a brief description of each type and its corresponding predictor(s).
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Figure 8: Consciousness Type Descriptions and Group Consciousness Predictors
I investigated the usefulness of my theoretical framework for understanding the relationship
between subjective identities and a sense of collective fate using semi-structured interviews. Semi-
structured interviewing is an especially appropriate method for this type of inquiry for three main
reasons:
• Open-Ended Formatting. Unlike closed-form survey formats, interviews allow for a great
deal of variation in responses because subjects are not confined to a set of choices in forming
their answers to each question. For example, when asked, “How do you identify yourself?”
respondents can answer in any way that they choose, rather than having to select from a
list of pre-selected categories. This type of flexibility in response also allows respondents
to answer questions from a variety of perspectives, providing a more insightful illustration
of the thought process by which individuals reason through relationships of importance to
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social science research. My work builds upon the foundation laid by scholars who have used
interviews, participant observations, and other qualitative techniques to investigate questions
related to identity, group consciousness, and politics (Price, 2009; Simpson, 1998; Gamson,
1992; Walsh, 2004, 2008).
• Narrative Power. As noted by Cramer (2008), employing a methodology driven by active
listening revealed things that I, the learner, might never have thought about prior to the in-
terview. While interviews do not dissolve the self-reporting biases present in most opinion
surveys, interviews do provide revelatory power through the narratives respondents provide.
When beginning an interview, I included time to build rapport with respondents. I asked them
about their daily routines, things they enjoy, their background, life experiences, friendships,
jobs, and hobbies. I asked questions, but interjected as little as possible in their responses
to allow respondents to tell me about their viewpoints on politics and identity in their own
words. This practice of asking and listening rather than responding revealed important in-
formation about how respondents see themselves and the world around them.
• Novelty of Theory. Because the type-predictor framework is a new theoretical contribution,
investigating its explanatory strength through the use of interviews is a necessary first step
before further empirical analyses can be employed, which is itself an attempt to reconcile
theory that treats identity as fluid and malleable, with existing empirical studies that treat
identities as fixed categorical variables.
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Interview Process
A purposive sample of 40 individuals were selected for semi-structured interviews in 2014. In-
dividual interviews were conducted by the author and by two additional research assistants8 in-
person whenever possible (N=19), but interview respondents were also able to elect a telephone
(N=17) or Skype interview (N=4) when it was not possible to meet in-person.
To be eligible for inclusion in this study, participants were required to be age 18 or older, and
speak conversational English or Spanish. I employed a snowball sampling method that allowed for
the recruitment of respondents from a variety of ages, education levels, religious affiliations, and
racial and ethnic backgrounds. After being selected for, and consenting to, the study, individuals
were asked to recommend an additional individual for inclusion in the study. The first subject was
asked to call or email her acquaintance and if the second individual agreed to participate in the
study, a member of the research team contacted the second individual to provide the consent form
and arrange a time and date for an interview. To safeguard the anonymity of respondents, all names
and personally identifying information have been changed in this analysis.
Forty subjects participated in the interviews, including twelve subjects recruited for a set of
pilot interviews. The entire set of interviews was conducted from March through August 2014
and included 18 male and 22 female participants. Ages ranged from 20 to 84 with a mean age of
39 and a median age of 35. 3 individuals had completed no more than a high school education,
4 completed some college, 13 completed a bachelor’s degree, and 20 had obtained a graduate or
professional degree.
8The research assistants for this project were two undergraduate researchers in the Columbia University Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences Summer Research Program. Information about the race and gender of each interviewer
is included in the Appendix A “Interviewer Profiles.”
71
The sample tended toward Democratic party identification with 19 participants self-identifying
as Democrats, 7 self-identifying as independents, 2 self-identifying as Republicans, and the re-
maining 12 participants self-identifying as apolitical or declining to indicate a party identification.
Ten individuals self-identified as being white or Caucasian, 13 as black or African American9,
8 as Asian or Pacific Islander, 5 as Hispanic or Latino, and 4 self-identified as being of mixed racial
background. All are U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
Researchers conducted the interviews in a semistructured format using a standard questionnaire
for all respondents, and each interview was digitally recorded. I transcribed each of the interviews
myself. My choice to transcribe the interviews personally was an invaluable part of the analytic
process. Although transcribing requires a tremendous amount of time and attention to detail, I
combined the process of transcription with note-taking and was able to gain important information
by listening not only to the content of each interview, but to the tone of respondents’ voices – their
pauses, their inflection, the moments when they are hesitant or eager to respond to a question, the
laughs, and sighs – all elements too easily missed by reading a transcript alone.
The full questionnaire used to conduct the semistructured interviews and a descriptive infor-
mation about respondents are included in Appendix A. Each part of the interview focuses on a
different aspect of the relationship between identity and political attitudes and preferences, and
the interview progresses from more abstract concepts to more structured questions that are com-
mon in social science survey research. To maintain a natural flow of conversation, interviewers
were allowed to ask questions in any order within each part of the survey, but the parts themselves
remained in sequence to maintain continuity between interviews.
9One respondent identified as black, but revealed that her mother is of Native American and Dutch descent while
her father, whom she never met, is Creole. Despite being raised in a predominantly white family, the respondent iden-
tifies as black, and not mixed, and is therefore counted as black for the purpose of this interview. Another individual
in the sample identified as being of continental African descent.
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Part 1 of the interview collected background and demographic information including each re-
spondent’s age, place of birth, parents’ countries of origin, gender, education level, and party ID.
Part 2 asked questions specific to identity, asking each respondent how she self identifies, whether
she feels a stronger sense of identity with some groups over others, and how the respondent thinks
other people identify her. Importantly in Part 2 of the interview, researchers did not initially prompt
respondents about what types of identities to consider. Respondents were encouraged to draw from
their own conceptions of identity in answering the questions. Part 3 of the interview asked respon-
dents about political decisionmaking including what policy issues are the most important, how
each respondent decided which policies are best, and what considerations each respondent weighs
when voting in an election. In Part 4 respondents are asked a series of commonly used survey
questions related to group consciousness including the linked fate question, whether the respon-
dent feels her life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion, and whether the respondent
believes her own success is tied to the success of the group. Part 5 of the survey links group iden-
tity with collective action and asks whether respondents prefer to foster in-group unity to achieve
common group goals versus joining forces with other groups to achieve similar goals.
The semi-structured interviews lasted 20 minutes to 1 hour in duration, with an average inter-
view duration of 37 minutes.
Analysis
To analyze the interview responses I employ the constant comparative method of qualitative anal-
ysis. The constant comparative method developed by Glaser (1965) combines an explicit coding
procedure with theory development. According to Glaser, “the purpose of the constant compara-
tive method of joint coding and analysis is to generate theory more systematically by using explicit
coding and analytic procedures (p. 437).”
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There are four stages to constant comparative analysis: (1) comparing incidents applicable to
each theme of interest, (2) integrating themes and their properties, (3) delimiting a theory, and, (4)
writing the theory. As one stage transforms itself into the next, previous stages remain in operation
throughout the analysis and provide continual development to the following stage throughout the
duration of the analysis (Glaser 1965). Here I make an effort to outline, as explicitly as possible,
the process by which I identified themes in the data. Following this section, I discuss the scope of
the theory supported by my data and subsequently describe how the data compellingly illustrate
my proposed theory: the type-predictor framework.
Two features of the constant comparative method should be noted. First, in contrast to other
methods of analysis such as analytic induction, the constant comparative method prioritizes the
development and suggestion of properties of a general phenomenon rather than the provisional
testing of a hypothesis. Second, no attempt is made to ascertain “the universality of the proof of
suggested causes nor other properties (Glaser 1965, pg. 438).” Because theory development is
prioritized and no attempt is made to prove universalistic causal propositions, the constant com-
parative method does not require consideration of all available data, and many types of cases may
be considered.
Comparing Incidents within Categories of Interest
The selection of themes, sometimes referred to as “categories” (Glaser and Strauss 1967), or
“codes” (Miles and Huberman 1994) is partly inductive (coming from the data) and partly a pri-
ori (coming from the investigator’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being re-
searched) (Ryan and Bernard 2003). And while themes themselves can be somewhat abstract and
subjective, the identification of themes is an important element of semistructured interview analy-
sis. The importance of a theme is related, among other factors, to how often it appears, and how
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pervasive it is across different sets of observations. For the present analysis a theme answers the
question: What is this an example of? While this conceptualization of a theme may appear broad,
it allows for a more encompassing scope of analysis of concepts and categories of interest within,
and between relevant cases (Opler 1945).
The analysis of interview data began with transcribing the audio recordings from each inter-
view. Transcripts were then uploaded to the qualitative data management software NVivo where
the coding and classification of themes began. Prior to coding interview transcripts for themes, a
base set of themes were developed based on the catalogue of questions used in the semi-structured
interviews. Additional themes were developed during the constant comparison process itself by
making systematic comparisons between the similarities and differences across each unit of data.
For each interview, or case in the study, I employed a line-by-line analysis that involved compar-
ing the topic of each sentence with the sentence before it – or the interview before it – asking,
How is one expression similar to, or different from, another? The running list of similarities and
differences within and across cases generated themes (Ryan and Bernard 2003).
A Priori Themes A priori themes are based on the questionnaire used during the semistructured
interviews, and were identified prior to the coding of interviews. The themes are broken down into
5 main categories with sub-themes later developed within each:
• Group Consciousness
• Group Success Strategies




Inductive Themes Inductive themes were generated as comparisons between units of analysis
and revealed similarities and differences between responses within each of the five main thematic
categories:
• Group Consciousness
– Group Success (Affirmative or negative belief that the respondent’s success in life is
related to the success of her identity group overall).






– Linked Fate (Affirmative, negative, or mixed support for the notion that what happens
to people in the respondent’s group will have something to do with what happens in her
own life).
– Group Empathy (Using group outcomes as a proxy for respondent’s own well-being).
• Group Success Strategy
– Join Other Groups (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is to join forces
with other groups fighting to achieve similar goals).
– Ingroup Unity (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is to foster unity
within the group first).
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– Mixed Strategy (The best way to achieve positive group outcomes is through a com-
bined strategy of fostering ingroup unity and joining forces with other groups).
• Perceptions of Identity
– Belief that other people’s perceptions don’t matter
– Belief that other people’s perceptions do matter
– Positive self-perception of the ingroup
– Negative self-perception of the ingroup
– Positive perception of the ingroup from others
– Negative perception of the ingroup from others
• Political Decisionmaking
– Most Important Issue(s)
– Opinion Formation (Respondent refers to one or more of the following elements as
affecting the way she forms her opinion on politics and public policy):
∗ Candidate character and values
∗ Family and upbringing
∗ Feasibility of policy
∗ Issue-specific voting
∗ Party solidarity
∗ Personal experience and values
∗ Racial solidarity
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∗ Research and reading
∗ Utilitarianism (do the most good for the most people)













Although I expected all of the typologies identified in the previous chapter to appear inductively
in the interview data, I did not select them as themes a priori because I wanted to see whether they
would appear organically rather than attempting to fit data into these themes.
I did not restrict the coding to one type and one predictor per interview, and instead allowed
for as many types and predictors to be coded as were applicable to a given interview. As a result,
the total number of entries coded as types or predictors may sum to a number greater than the
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40 unique interview cases. This coding decision allowed for a greater degree of flexibility in ac-
commodating the range of identity expressions within an individual case, especially in the case of
strong identifiers and multiple identifiers, who tended to express a sense of belonging to more than
one group, but may have also fallen into different predictor categories depending on the specific
identity groups they were considering at any given point in the interview process. While restricting
the coding to one type and one predictor per case may have resulted in a more direct mapping
of types to predictors, I convey through my coding decision the fluid nature of identity, and con-
tribute a method of categorization that accommodates such fluidity while maintaining a theoretical
grounding.
Another important coding element to note is the internal validity of the coding frame itself.
Resource limitations prevented me from employing a second researcher blind to the purpose of the
study to code the transcripts using my code frame. Ideally, an intercoder reliability test using a
second coder would reveal how consistent the coding frame is across respondents (an intercoder
reliability score is computed by counting the number of unique codes per respondent by each
coder as the denominator, and the number of overlapping codes as the numerator) (Walsh, 2008).
In the absence of a second coder, I read through each interview transcript and its coded responses
a minimum of three times to check that themes had been coded appropriately. Multiple readings
(and coding) of each transcript was a time-insensitive task, but was certainly worth doing to elevate
the quality of analysis.
Integrating Themes and Their Properties
As examples of a priori themes materialized, and as inductive themes emerged in the data, I began
the process of integrating themes and their properties. In other words, rather than comparing
from incident to incident, I began comparing each incident to an accumulated knowledge within
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the theme under calculation (Glaser 1965). This stage illustrates the diverse range of properties
within a theme. For example, I realized that some respondents characterized as multiple identifiers
also described strong identity ties to one or more groups. This realization led me to understand
that consciousness type categories, in this case multiple identifiers and strong identifiers, are not
mutually exclusive as defined by my theory. Similarly, a respondent might have described the
same group identity in abstract conceptualizations under one context, but when asked to consider a
different scenario would talk about her identity using more concrete and exacting examples. Thus,
I realized that the consciousness types I define may not be as specific to individuals as they are to
the contexts individuals are asked to consider.
Delimiting Theory
Looking at the entire set of cases reveals the underlying uniformities between the original set of
categories and their properties. The similarities and differences between cases and the themes
they describe reveal the scope of the interview dataset. While the purposive sampling method pro-
duced a diverse population of respondents, the dataset is not representative of a broader population.
Generalizations about the applicability of the type-predictor theory to a population other than the
interview sample may not be an appropriate way to understand this data. Rather, the data provide
examples and real-world context about how the theory is borne out among a diverse cross-section
of people, providing a meaningful basis from which the theory can be understood and from which
further analyses, empirical and otherwise, may be tested.
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Type-Predictor Typologies Among Respondents
Type Descriptions
At the start of the survey respondents were asked a number of questions related to their self-
identification used to determine whether interview subjects fell into the “type” categories described
by the type-predictor typology. Without any prior prompting other than the prior collection of
demographic characteristics (age, place of birth, parents’ countries of origin, gender, education,
party identification, and whether they are a resident or citizen of the U.S.), respondents were asked
to describe their identity in the following questions:
• How do you identify yourself? Why?
• (If respondent identifies with multiple groups): Do you feel a stronger sense of identity with
one group over the others (Or, what group do you feel closest to)? Why?
– Do you think your personal identity is tied to this group?
– How do you feel about the status of your group in society right now?
• How do you think others identify you?
– Do you think that people in your group identify you in a different way than people who
aren’t in that group? Why or why not?
– Do you think other peoples’ perceptions of your identity matters? Why or why not?
I find support within the sample for each of the 5 types illustrated in Figure 9. Among the sample
I observe the highest incidences of abstract conceptualizers (N=16) and similarly high incidences
of strong identifiers (N=14) and multiple identifiers (N=14). Examples of non-affiliates and non-
conformists were the least common among the sample, with 8 and 7 examples of each, respectively.
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Figure 9: Frequency of Types Among Sample
I describe the in further detail the range of responses for each consciousness type, with context from
selected individual interviews below.
Non-Affiliates
Among the 40 interview participants, there are 8 examples of non-affiliate types (see Appendix
A). Non-affiliators may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, but do not closely
associate a sense of personal identity with those categories, much less a sense of shared outcomes
with members of the group. In fact, they may intentionally disassociate themselves from group
affiliation and instead prefer to focus on individualistic qualities such as personality as a motivator
and basis for their actions and beliefs. When asked to describe themselves and their sense of
identity, non-affiliate types gave responses like:
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“I don’t think I particularly identify myself in groups...I guess I do but, I don’t
know, I think of myself as separate from everything. I’m myself. I’m my own person.
I don’t really put myself in a category, that’s not how I view myself. [Whispers to
interviewer] this kind of makes me nervous these deep questions – I don’t think about
these.” - Amy, 20, from New York City.
“I mean, there are things that people apply to being Asian American, I think there’s
two kinds. One that’s born here, and one that comes as an immigrant. I guess it doesn’t
really apply to me because I don’t really feel like I should really be held down by what
other people think about these Asian Americans in general. I like to do things myself.”
- Brian, 21, from Chinatown, New York City.
“I first came to this country in 1975 I lived in North Carolina for four years while I
was going to college. And you know, you had people back then at that time there was
more of a stigma. But I don’t need to worry about what people are saying about me.”
-Fausto, 58, from Nicaragua.
Other non-affiliate types referred to qualities like work ethic, having a caring personality, and be-
ing a work-in-progress when describing their senses of identity. Even when other social categories
such as class, race, gender, or religion came up in conversation, non-affiliate types did not con-
sistently refer to group-based identities when describing their political considerations, and were
unlikely to express a sense of group consciousness because they are most inclined to see their
identity (and consequently, their life chances) as being contingent on individual factors rather than
the status of a social group.
Beth Greer, Non-Affiliate
It was a busy weekend for Beth Greer and her husband Charles, who owned a small convenience
store inside a Montgomery, Alabama hotel. There were two conferences going on, one at the
convention center across the street, and the other at nearby Alabama State University. Downtown
Montgomery isn’t exactly a tourist hotspot. Along Tallopoosa Street there are a handful of trendy
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looking places: a Thai restaurant with a patio overlooking the town’s historic train station, a popular
Mexican-cuisine franchise, a tapas bar and lounge, and Dreamland Barbecue, which boasts its
“Food Network’s Best” designation on a plaque next to a shelf of brightly colored T-shirts for
customers to purchase after a sit-down meal. Occasionally newcomers take the $3.00 trolly from
the visitor center in Union Station around a circuit of Montgomery’s historically relevant sites: the
Civil Rights Museum, the former White House of the Confederacy, the spot where Rosa Parks was
arrested, the Hank Williams Memorial, and the home of Martin Luther King, Jr., among others.
But besides providing a modest nightlife scene for Alabama locals, the promise of authentic
Southern barbecue for passers-through, and a rich civil rights legacy for those intrigued by the
city’s history, downtown Montgomery does not tend to attract much activity. So Beth and her
husband rely mostly on conference attendees and college visitors for business. For the past ten
years they have managed the hotel convenience store. Eight months ago the couple bought the
business and re-opened it two weeks ago under its new name, The Nick Knack Shop.
The walls of the store are sparse; Beth is still waiting for a shipment of Montgomery parapher-
nalia - novelty name keychains in the shape of the state, I “heart” Montgomery T-shirts, beanie
babies and other plush toys - that should arrive later in the afternoon. There is a modest collection
of snacks, toiletry items, and coloring books already, as well as a shelf of handmade bracelets
woven in brightly colored hemp by Beth’s eight-year-old granddaughter, Kaylee. The bracelets,
sold at $2.00 a piece, are a sort of side-business Beth does to encourage her granddaughter’s en-
trepreneurial spirit. Kaylee purchases the materials for the bracelets, handles inventory, and man-
ages the finances while Beth oversees. It’s a bonding activity that Beth speaks of warmly. From
behind the cashier’s desk, she brings out a photo of Kaylee from her wallet. Kaylee favors her
grandmother with thin, light-colored hair, blue eyes, and slightly broad shoulders. “It’s easy to
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spoil someone who reminds me so much of myself,” Beth says with a chuckle. Her granddaughter
and the store are her two biggest sources of pride.
When Beth moved with her husband from Syracuse, New York to Montgomery in the late
1990’s, the two were surprised by how quickly the acclimated to the culture of the South. Despite
being raised in a white, middle class home in the Northeast, Beth now speaks with the faintest
southern drawl and formed her words slowly when asked to describe herself:
“I’m outgoing. I belong to a sorority...but I don’t think [I feel a strong sense of identity
with any particular group]. That’s always a hard question to answer...I think other
people might say I’m outgoing, a pretty even-tempered person. But other people’s
opinions don’t matter to me.”
When prompted to talk about her identity, Beth did not make any verbal indication that race,
ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, or education had anything to do with her concept of
personal identity. In fact, her membership in those groups did not come up during any recorded
portion of the interview. Although she is a sorority member (of a cultural and intellectual sorority,
to be precise), a business owner (who earned her MBA in her twenties), and a proud Republican
(who wishes Sarah Palin had run for president because “she has a handle on what’s good for the
country”), all groups in which individuals may affiliate and derive a sense of identity, Beth did not
believe these group to define her in any way.
Beth’s concept of identity typifies the way non-affiliates view themselves. Though non-
affiliates may be aware of the social categories to which they belong, they do not view group
membership as being tied to their self-concept. This is consistent with the traditionalist interpre-
tation of social interaction theory, which forms the theoretical basis for non-affiliate typology and
posits that social behavior can be best understood by focusing on individuals’ definitions and inter-
pretations of themselves. Traditional SI emphasizes the behavior of actors, and attributes a great
deal of agency and autonomy to the individual in articulating his or her sense of self. Traditional
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social interactionists, and thus non-affiliates, do not view the social and cultural environment as
a constraint on individual, thus non-affiliates tend not to focus on group identities that are often
the subject of cultural focus such as race, class, or gender. In fact, they may intentionally disasso-
ciate themselves from group affiliation instead choosing to focus on individualistic qualities such
as personality as a motivator and basis for their actions and beliefs. Consequently, non-affiliates
tend to provide negative responses to linked fate and other group consciousness questions because
non-affiliates rarely associate their sense of personal well-being to the collective fate of the groups
of which they are members.
Abstract Conceptualizers
Among the 40 interview participants, 16 examples of abstract conceptualization emerged, making
abstract conceptualizers one of the two most common types, along with multiple identifiers (see
Appendix A). Abstract conceptualizers relate group membership to their personal identities but at-
tach no affective value to team "wins" or "losses" at the individual level. Abstract conceptualizers
are not only aware of their membership in a particular group, they are aware that belonging to that
group may cause others to view them along with any perception of shared beliefs, feelings or inter-
ests associated with group members (McClain et al., 2008), even if the individual may not entirely
share those beliefs, feelings or interests. Abstract conceptualizers are able to understand such per-
ceptions and misperceptions, but are overall unmoved in their personal belief structures by them.
Abstract conceptualizers self-identified with a wide range of groups, from religion, nationality,
and, ethnicity to more abstract concepts like success:
“I would say that I’m driven, I would say that people typically – especially where
I’m from in Virginia – think I’m successful because I’m in New York and I work for
Morgan Stanley. And I went to school on a scholarship for basketball so everybody has
this perception that I’m really successful but honestly I don’t see myself as that. I see
86
myself like there’s really a long way to go. [INTERVIEWER: So a large part of your
identity is success?] Yeah, which is honestly subjective. There’s no one definition of
success...Because at the end of the day, whether you’re black, white, purple, Asian,
Indian, or whether you come from a certain country, success is what matters, you
know? You know, when you look at somebody you see if they’re successful or not,
you don’t view them just by their color and I feel like success is something that doesn’t
have to do with gender or race.” -Petra, 22, from Brooklyn, New York.
“There are a series of codes and ways to relate to another person that for me are
much more familiar with let’s say Mexican, Argentinian, Brazilians, or let’s say Lati-
nos in general than it’s going to be with American or even European people. It’s – I
think the fact of the land which makes interaction much more fluid. English is not my
first language of course, I think I’m kind of alright with it, but there’s this little lag,
sometimes I have to think a little too much of what I have to say. So I think that kind
of makes a difference whenever I express myself in Spanish. But yeah, there is a sense
of belongings with other Latinos...I had it naturally while I was living [in Argentina],
I lived in Argentina ‘til I was 22. And when I came here that got reinforced, it was a
way for me to cope you know, just having moved to a different culture. But now that
a long time passed, it’s going to be 17 years, I moved here in ’96, now I kind of feel
detached of this need to cling to ethnicity. Here is really, everybody is from different
backgrounds, so now background is not that important to me anymore.” -Carlos, 40,
from Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Jake Bianchi, Abstract Conceptualizer
Late August always comes with a sense of excitement for Jake, but the end of summer 2014
was especially full of good days for the twenty-five year old musician. He had just finished a
seven-month gig playing drums for the national tour of a major Broadway musical. He formed
a band with his brother and their two childhood best friends, and successfully crowd-sourced a
$9,000 campaign to raise money for the production of their first studio album. And as always the
season was full of outdoor festivals celebrating the final days of summer, which meant there would
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be plenty of paying gigs for Jake and his band, whose sound is reminiscent of a slightly softer
Mumford and Sons that fellow twenty-somethings would listen to with the windows down on a
drive to the beach. In many ways Jake’s music reflects his personality: positive and uplifting.
Jake is a northern New Jersey native whose love for his hometown is strong, though easily
surpassed by his love for his family. He smiles often when speaking of his parents, both children
of Italian immigrants, who he says, “raised him with Biblical morals as a kid,” without him even
realizing it. He lives with his parents in his childhood home while in-between gigs, his next
tour slated to begin sometime within the coming month. He spent his college days preparing for
a career as a musician at the prestigious Berkelee College of Music in Boston, Massachusetts.
Berkelee in fact has a notoriously low retention rate as many of its students earn commercial
success well before graduating - John Mayer, Gavin DeGraw, Quincy Jones, Maroon 5 guitarist
James Valentine, and Steely Dan frontman Donald Fagen are among those who once attended but
ultimately left the school for pastures made greener by money and fame. Jake was also eager to
jump-start his career, but not at the expense of a college degree. He completed his dual major in
music education and drumset performance by taking summer and winter classes every term, which
allowed him to finish the program in four years as opposed to the usual five.
Since graduating, Jake has spent more time on tour than off, and has played around the world
from Thailand to Croatia, Australia, Greece, and Israel (his personal top five tour stops). He
ultimately hopes to settle, though, in New York City where he aspires to work as a drummer for
Broadway musicals, because the nighttime performance schedule would give him the flexibility to
work as a studio musician during the day, and be a little more present for the family he hopes to
start at some point in the distant future.
In Jake’s opinion, the world needs more love, and infusing the lives around him with positivity
is part of his personal life mission. He is deeply influenced by his belief in Christianity, a faith his
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parents raised him to embrace as a child and which he now fully accepts as an adult. Faith is the
lens through which Jake sees everything else. It is no wonder, then, that Jake strongly identifies as
a Christian, or as he more specifically describes himself, a believer.
When asked how he thinks other people might identify him, Jake paused and tilted his gaze
upward. His brow furrowed a bit; he had never given the question much thought. Admittedly,
Jake describes himself to be a non-confrontational person, preferring to listen and observe heated
conversations rather than actively engage in them. So when his friends talk about identity-related
topics - religion, race, sexuality - Jake is rarely inclined to ask others what their perceptions of
him, or his faith might be.
“And why would they?” he adds,
“I think sometimes because of the fact that I’m not always super loud as a speaker and
stuff, and I’m always playing music, people are just like, ’Oh, you just play music,
your life’s easy.’ But it’s not at all! I think that’s how some people perceive me in
my life, people just don’t get the musician lifestyle, that it’s not easy...So I think some
people identify me like that - as a musician so that’s all that goes on in his head. As if
it’s because I’m not talking about my opinions all the time.
“But I also think people would identify me as someone with morals. Like I’ve never
tried smoking weed. And I was around it all the time in high school. God I mean,
like, I’m a musician. But I’ve never even tried it because I have no intention to do it.
I was in a blues band in high school with three other guys and we would rehearse -
like every rehearsal they would smoke. And we would order Domino’s pizzas and I
wouldn’t smoke but I could still eat a whole pizza by myself. And pretty soon they
just stopped offering [weed] to me because they knew I wouldn’t take it. They knew
me as someone who didn’t do that kind of stuff and didn’t drink and stuff like that.
Whether they’re strong in their faith or not, I think they do.”
[INTERVIEWER]: How do you feel about the status of Christians in society right
now?
“I think in [my church] community, it’s pretty strong.”
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Jake referenced his home church, a 5,000 member congregation born out of the even larger Hill-
song Church of Sydney, Australia. Since its founding in 1983, Hillsong has opened more than 20
campuses in cities all over the world including, Paris, Capetown, Bali, London, Kiev, and Los An-
geles, its churches brimming with young adults in their twenties and thirties, a demographic which
has typically strayed away from the Pentecostal type teaching on which Hillsong was founded.
Despite the appeal he sees in his church where the pastor has tattoos and is known to quote Biggie
Smalls lyrics during sermons, Jake was also mindful of the perception of Christians outside his
community:
“But then you’ve got like the Westboro Baptists who are just giving everyone in the
world a bad name. I think people are just, they’re relying too much on themselves
when they speak and they think that they’re right...and they try to force that on every-
one else and that’s no way to do it. It’s all about love, you know? So to say it simply,
I think people aren’t loving on each other enough as Christians. They’re accusing and
they’re blaming and they’re criticizing when really all they need to be saying is, ’Hey!
You do you, I’ll do me, and maybe you’ll see the love I have for you, and maybe
you’ll want a little bit of that.’ I think if there were more love in the Christians of -
everywhere - then it would be better.”
As an abstract conceptualizer, Jake relates group membership to his personal identity but attaches
no affective value to team “wins” or “losses” at the individual level. In the same way that his
decision not to smoke weed does not diminish his self-concept as a musician, the actions of the
Westboro Baptist Church and others do not diminish his identity as a Christian, although he is
aware of the ways both musicians and Christians may be perceived in the society around him.
For abstract conceptualizers like Jake, group membership itself does not produce any affective
value, it is a mere descriptive marker that of itself would not motivate a strong enough sense of
collective fate to motivate a person’s beliefs or behaviors. Abstract conceptualizers reflect the
core of structural symbolic interactionism in that abstract conceptualizers are keenly aware of how
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social structures shape their interactions. Still, an abstract conceptualizer type person does not
go so far as to believe that personal successes are bound to group outcomes. So while abstract
conceptualizers differ from non-affiliates in that they spend more time considering the role of
social structure and perceptions of the group by others, abstract conceptualizers are similar to
non-affiliates in that the role of personal agency in determining identity and individual status is
prioritized over group fate.
Non-Conformists
7 examples of non-conformists emerged among the 40 interview participants (see Appendix A).
The least common of the five types in the sample described here, non-conformists express a sense
of self-identification with a particular group but do not adhere to all of the characteristics or stereo-
types they believe are common to the group. In short, non-conformists believe themselves to be
part of the group, but also believe they don’t “fit the mold.” Non-conformists mostly expressed
a sense of belonging with a racial or ethnic group, and in one case with a gender category, but
recognized that they did not always fit in with the group:
“Okay. So I am Korean, but I grew up – I would say I grew up in a very West-
ern family, in the sense that my parents, they are from Korea but they immigrated to
Canada when they were very young, so like my mom was 8, my dad was 11, so they
grew up in Canada. So I feel like they had a lot of more Western views and Western
perspective, so that’s the home that I grew up with. Which is different from a lot of my
other friends that are Korean because their parents are very much – very strict, very
like, bold, very Korean values and hold on to the Korean culture very well, whereas
my family not so much. And my parents actually discouraged us from hanging out
with too many Koreans and they really want us to meet other people and branch out
and things like that. So I would say yeah, I’m Korean by ethnicity but culturally very
Western, I think. Even when I moved to Korea and it was just for that one year, that
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was my first time in Korea – so it was a definite culture shock. It was very hard to ad-
just because you feel like you look the part, but then people will treat you differently,
they’ll look at you differently, so it was a very interesting time when I was in Korea.
Yeah, I would say I’m very westernized.” - Patricia, 29, from Toronto, Canada.
Corbin Moreau, Non-Conformist
No one in his hometown expected Corbin to pursue an acting career. Men from Corbin’s neigh-
borhood in Schenectady, New York marry their high school sweethearts and start families by the
time they are in their mid-twenties. The majority of Corbin’s friends who pursued a postsecondary
education did so at Schenectady Community College and later earned one of many jobs made
available through the booming sustainable energy programs of General Electric Company. The
city of roughly 66,000 people once boasted itself as “the city that lights and hauls the world,”10 as
it is home to energy giant General Electric’s headquarters and was the site of American Locomo-
tive Works, the company once responsible for providing the country with steam and diesel trains in
the heyday of the United States locomotive industry. Schenectady was, and still is, a place whose
businesses and people reflect grit and innovation. And in the small, homey corner of the city where
Corbin grew up, the comfort of close community and promise of jobs were more than enough for
its residents, they were preferred. But then again, Corbin had never fit the mold his peers so readily
embraced.
At seventeen, Corbin started college at the Rochester Polytechnic Institute. He quickly be-
came a star athlete at RIT, was the celebrated captain of the crew team as well as the swim team,
president of the student government, and valedictorian of his class with a major in biochemistry.
He was smart, athletic, and tall. By his senior year, any opportunity that couldn’t be opened by
his athleticism or 4.3 GPA could have at least been pried looser by Corbin’s charm and chiseled
10According to the official website of the City of Schenectady (www.cityofschenectady.com)
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features. He is the kind of person who gazes straight into the eyes of the person he is talking to and
smiles warmly throughout a conversation, occasionally sweeping his hand through his curly blond
hair when it falls out of place.
It came as a huge shock to Corbin and everyone around him when at the time of his graduation
he had been rejected from every medical school program to which he had applied. His parents
expected him to become a doctor. His grandparents had been telling extended family and friends
in France for years that their grandson in the States was going to practice medicine. In his family’s
eyes Corbin was too smart, too full of promise, to do anything less.
“They urged me to reapply,” Corbin recounted during a subway ride in mid-July. He had just
come from the rehearsal for a local theater production he would be starring in three weeks later. It
was a muggy summer evening, and Corbin wore a tank top and basketball shorts - a much different
wardrobe from the pop shirt and khaki pants he wore during the day as a researcher at the Memorial
Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. Corbin had taken the job three years prior because it afforded him
the opportunity to move to New York City after graduation, an attractive location for Corbin who
interpreted his rejection from medical school as an opportunity to pursue yet another passion of
his: acting. As a child, he had always enjoyed participating in school plays and often belted his
favorite songs around the house. He was in a local production of Pippin in high school, but at the
time the arts scene in Schenectady left much to be desired.
Now in his mid-twenties, Corbin works at Sloan Kettering during the day and spends the rest
of his time building his performance resume – going on auditions, taking modeling gigs, and
participating in often expensive master classes with industry professionals whose face-time can be
a valuable resource in the incredibly competitive acting world.
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Corbin describes himself as a “smart, creative, multicultural person.” When asked how he
thinks other people might identify him, Corbin glanced down at his hands, rubbing his palms
together in a moment of contemplation:
“One thing that stands out to me is the idea of masculinity, and how that changes
depending on the culture around you. I’m fortunate enough to live in New York [City]
now, but in other places in the United States, masculinity is this thing with guidelines.
And if you don’t fit in those guidelines people will call you gay or homosexual, which
is unfair to gay men and straight men. Like where I lived in upstate New York, if I
went to work wearing anything but Timberland boots and a flannel shirt – if I dressed
the way I do now – people would say I’m gay. Whereas in French culture, it’s totally
normal to kiss people on both cheeks and to express who you are openly – there aren’t
the same boundaries on who gets to be considered masculine. There aren’t the same
judgments attached.
“When I was young I got made fun of a lot. I had a faint French accent and I couldn’t
pronounce my ’R’s.’ So kids in school believed I was gay and it always sort of stuck
with me. And even though I am not gay, as an actor I have a lot of friends who are.
I was actually talking to one guy...who said that people told him he was gay so much
growing up that he figured it must be true. And he’s openly gay now, and he’s very
happy, and I’m glad he’s happy. I just think it’s sad that what other people say about
who we are can affect us so deeply.”
Non-conformists like Corbin see themselves as members of a particular group, but do not ad-
here to common group stereotypes. So while Corbin discussed masculinity as an important part
of his self-identity, he acknowledged that he does not fit within the guidelines of what people in
his hometown define as masculine. Still, non-conformists tend to process group membership as
part of their personal identity even if they “don’t fit the mold.” Social identity theory posits that
when group membership becomes salient, an individual’s sense of membership in a group, par-
ticularly membership in a minority group, would become the meaningful basis for perceiving self
and others. However, because the social identity approach presents the self as relatively malleable,
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we may not expect group consciousness to activate a sense of shared fate uniformly across non-
conformists. There should be some variation in responses to the linked fate question depending on
how one’s personal identity is perceived.
Multiple Identifiers
Among the 40 interview participants, there are 14 examples of multiple identifiers (see Appendix
A). Along with abstract conceptualizers, multiple identifiers are tied as the most common type
among the sample. Multiple identifiers do not process one group membership in isolation as a
component of their identity. They may at times have a heightened sense of awareness of their
belonging in one group over others at any given time, but their considerations and actions are
overall guided by the fact that multiple identifiers cannot, or perhaps will not, compartmentalize
concerning the groups with which they feel the strongest sense of identity as seen in the following
examples:
“I actually would prefer the term ’African-American,’ stressing the hyphen in be-
tween. I think that there’s a double-consciousness as W.E.B. DuBois would explain,
where I have always sought resonance and balance in my identity as an American and
as a black person born in America. And I think that I’m too American to solely con-
sider myself African, and I am too African to solely consider myself an American.
And so I think that it fits well for me because I have Negro aspects and I also have
American aspects that I essentially live day-to-day in attempt to find balance between
both.” - Jairus, 23, from Illinois.
“I think it depends on the context that people are asking. I know that I identify as a
woman, as a white American, and then also can go into my educational levels, that I’m
an educated woman. I also identify as a lesbian so I connect with that community and
definitely present that in terms of who I am and what I’m about – so that’s always a
part of my presentation...I’ve also found that now that I’ve been working in the social
services field I identify as a social worker, also as a mandate reporter – those types
of things have become a part of my identity as my work has progressed...I definitely
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would say that if I had to sum it up, I would say that I identify as a white – or Caucasian
– lesbian from a middle class family.” - Rachel, 24, from Virginia.
“It’s very tricky to define myself. I feel that I have many backgrounds and identi-
ties. I feel that I’m able to relate to many different cultures because of my background.
There are different ways that I identify myself. Like, I am Brazilian. I feel more Brazil-
ian than any other country that I’ve lived in. But I look Korean. And I speak Korean to
my parents and I’ve grown up in a Korean culture, that’s my upbringing, is Korean...So
I do feel more, very open-minded like Brazilians are. And they’re a lot more friendly
and less clique-y than Asians. But I still hold that – the Korean – as who I am also.
And I feel like a resident of this country. Like, I am American in some ways. I’m more
conservative than most Brazilians are because I’ve lived in this country throughout my
teenage years. So yeah, it’s a little tricky.” - Elana, 29, from Brazil.
“I would say that it’s – it might be challenging for people to understand but you
are inherently – you can have two identities at the same time. I might come off as
very Nigerian in certain ways here in the states but when I’m in Nigeria I definitely
come off very American. And that’s something that’s an interesting balance. Because
you’re just programmed so much – you know I speak Yoruba, we speak it at home,
we eat the food, we listen to the music, we dress a certain way. The Yoruba culture
is definitely intellectual; they push you toward degrees, and multiple – right? One
[advanced degree] is not good enough. So that’s definitely a part of it. But then there’s
a lot of who I am and how I perceive the world and how I interact that’s very American.
The thing is, I’m a bit more conscious than other people are because I know when to
turn it off and when to turn it on.” - Ola, 32, from Florida.
David Hunt, Multiple Identifier
When asked about his identity, David Hunt quoted lyrics to the Cher song Half Breed, “’that’s all
I ever heard,’ and you end up loving the hated word.” David, whose mother is Filipino and whose
father is African American, says that although he has a sense of identity as a biracial person, he
most strongly identifies as an African American man and as a Christian:
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“Because I look in the mirror every morning and society reminds me every day
that I’m an African American man. And Christian? It’s just who I am. I think it’s
because I consciously work towards it on a daily basis...And it’s interesting, growing
up as a biracial kid the African American side treats me as if I’m outside of the race,
and the other side does, too.”
David reflected on his personal experiences often throughout the interview, and often referenced
the disconnect between his own sense of racial self-identity and the way he is perceived by others,
which influences the way he navigates throughout the world:
“Well, they definitely wouldn’t think [I’m] Filipino. I’m more mistaken for His-
panic or Latino. But I think generally non-black populations would look at my features
and think black before they’d think Filipino. And they’d think Latino before they think
black. And also with the black community, they don’t identify me a lot of times as
black, which I feel more close to because my dad’s black, and I grew up around black
people [laughing now], my relatives are black. So you know, that’s my strongest iden-
tity. But in terms of growing up on my dad’s side, going to the country where he was
from – the eastern shore – you know, that family is black. But outside of that black
family, with the general black community, they don’t look at me as black as much.
Some do, but most don’t. I don’t get that validation within the black community all
the time.”
∗∗∗
“When I was a kid in elementary school I used to be so proud when she would wave at me
from the front yard while we were outside for recess because I thought she was the prettiest mom
in the world,” David recalls his mother Benilda fondly. David, the third-youngest of ten siblings,
sometimes felt the need to compete for the attention of his mother, but he never minded. He was a
momma’s boy. One who beamed at the sight of his mom pinning laundry onto a clothesline while
his third grade class played in the yard of their San Francisco school. One who enjoyed showing
off his mom to new friends in each new city that the family would move to every three years.
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David’s dad, Bernie, was in the military. During David’s childhood the family lived on U.S.
army bases in Aberdeen, Maryland; San Francisco, California; Stuttgart, Germany; Anchorage,
Alaska; and Fort Drum, New York. It was in fact through the military that Bernie met Benilda
while stationed in the Philippines. Bernie was an officer at the time, who became completely
captivated by Benilda, a beautiful seventeen-year-old singer at a popular nightclub near the base.
Benilda had long, dark hair and a velvety voice. She, too, fell quickly in love and married Bernie
in a quiet ceremony in her home village. They had three children before Bernie returned with his
bride to the United States; Benilda never returned to her home country.
His family always joked that Bernie resembled Clark Gable with slightly darker skin. Bernie’s
mother was a freed slave who never spoke of Bernie’s father, though other relatives claim he
was the white owner of the plantation where Bernie’s mother once labored. Whatever his true
heritage, David sees himself as biracial, and describes himself with a keen sense of self-perception.
Throghouout my conversation with David I was struck by how thoughtfully he seemed to have
considered questions about identity prior to our interview, and possibly throughout his entire life.
Along with his faint regional accent, I picked up from David a sense of earnestness with which
he grappled with the idea of “belonging” in a society where he was never offered validation of
his membership in any particular social group. Though he most strongly identifies as an African
American and Christian (to “equal degrees”), he never severs from considering what it means for
him to exist in his communities as a biracial person:
“I think at times my physical appearance can be ambiguous so [people] don’t know
what I am, they just know I’m agreeable. Growing up as a biracial kid, the African
American side of me treats me as if I’m outside the race, and the other side does, too. I
identify with Cher’s song “Half Breed” – that’s all I ever heard, and you end up loving
the hated word.
“I think for the most part, when non-black people look at me, they think I’m black
before they think Filipino, and they think [I’m] Hispanic before they think [I’m] black,
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[David laughs], which I feel more close to because my dad’s black and I grew up
around black people – my relatives are black. I never really met my mom’s side of the
family other than a few cousins because they all stayed in the Philippines. But outside
of my black family, in the general black community, I’m not thought of as black. So I
think of myself as black, but I don’t get that validation most of the time.”
Multiple identifiers like David usually consider more than one aspect of their identities simultane-
ously, and importantly, they see their relationships to those identities as being interconnected. In a
sense, we might think of multiple identifiers as exhibiting a sense of intersectionality. For example,
while he strongly identified as Christian and referred to his faith consistently throughout the sur-
vey, David also considered himself to be a biracial person, and referred simultaneously to his dual
sense of identity as a black person and as a Filipino person, even if his magnitude of identification
varied between the two. Because multiple identifiers tend to interpret questions related to group
consciousness from the lens of self-categorization theory and social identity theory, they are most
likely to offer affirmative answers to linked fate and related questions.
Strong Identifiers
Among the 40 interview participants, 14 examples of strong identifiers emerge (see Appendix A).
For strong identifiers, personal identity is inextricably tied to group membership. Strong identifiers
refer to their group (or sometimes groups) consistently throughout the interview and express com-
mitment to the group and improving its status in society. Strong identifiers tended to refer to their
racial, gender, and religious backgrounds the most, and are often also doubly classified as multiple
identifier types. For strong identifiers, a sense of identity is integrated in many areas of life, and
strong identifiers refer to their identity groups often when discussing their self-concept and other
important considerations:
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“Yeah, I mean, I think people who are black women more often than not – not
always -- see me as you know, kind of a sister. Even if we don’t like each other
[chuckles] even if there’s no real, like, love, we still know what we know. And there’s
like a whole script you don’t even have to go over. We’ve already been through the hair
thing, we have already been called each other’s names by our neighbors who confuse
us, we have maybe been treated a certain way in a certain store on our main street in
our town, or we may have been profiled by one of our police officers in our town; we
already know what we know. Now, that doesn’t bond me with everybody. . . not every
black woman who lives here thinks she’s black or identifies as black, or wants to talk
to me. That’s fine, but in the main, as it’s been anywhere in the United States that
I’ve ever lived, you see another black woman and there is someone who knows certain
things about you. And it’s an entrée – it’s a possible entrée to friendship.” -Marsha,
52 from Illinois.
“I view myself as an African American male. I think I have a strong community
orientation. My basic view is that [Allah] put you here on the earth for a purpose, and
at the end of your life you need to decide: Why was I here? Did I live a purposeful
life? And so I’m community oriented, focus a lot on helping other people, I think,
how much money do you really need to live? So after you get to a certain point of
comfortableness, then you need to be thinking about others and sharing with others.”
- Tyson, 71, from Virginia.
“[I feel closest to] Latinos. I guess it’s just having things in common with them
and I think it’s more of a cultural thing. For example, when I graduated college I went
to work for a translation company. And I can say it was me and maybe me and one
other Latina in the office. Everyone else was white. Or African American. And I felt
that the culture was just different – they weren’t as inviting, they weren’t as open. I felt
that my life experiences were different from what their life experiences were. So when
they would talk about growing up and being on the yacht team and having swimming
lessons and this and that – not that I felt like I stood out – but I did, I stood out. I
couldn’t really relate. And to the point where they used to tell me, “Oh, it seems like
you’re so shy and so quiet.” And you know, I was like “Oh, that’s so ironic because
I’m totally not shy and I’m totally not quiet!” -Kristin, 23, from New York City.
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“The only thing that I take more seriously than any other thing is my Christianity,
my faith.” -Ryan, 34, from Ohio.
“[I’m] Black. Because if I say that my religion is the top defining [characteristic],
that opens up a whole lot of doors to some other issues. How could I be a Christian
and be black, knowing the role that Christianity played in slavery? And not even just
at Morehouse [College], but when I walk into the room, I’m basically defined by the
way you see me. So that’s why black would be the defining thing.” -Shawn, 24, from
New York City.
Lucy Jansen, Strong Identifier
From the front door of her Baltimore city home, Lucy yelled for her kids to keep off the street. Her
five-year-old and fifteen-year-old sons were playing catch in the yard. Anytime her oldest son took
the youngest outside to play was a much needed reprieve for Lucy. It gave her two boys a chance
to burn some energy before coming in for dinner and settling down for the night, and gave Lucy a
few moments of relative quiet to study for her upcoming GRE exam.
Lucy never met her father of Louisiana Creole descent, and was raised by her mother who was
of Native American and Dutch descent, but was considered to be white. Lucy, 36, dropped out of
high school in tenth grade, but later completed her G.E.D. and currently raises her two children as a
single parent while working on her associate’s degree in the evening. As a child raised by her single
white mother and among her white relatives, Lucy strongly identified as white and even reported
expressing prejudiced attitudes toward black people throughout her childhood and adolescence.
Despite being disconnected from the Creole side of her family, Lucy’s orientation shifted from a
strong white identity to a strong black one as she reached adulthood. When asked why she most
strongly identifies as a black person, Lucy replied,
“I think I do gravitate more to the black side, ’cause even though she’s part Native
American my mother is considered white, and actually on a lot of legal paperwork
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because my mom is considered white, I’m considered white. But I think I go more to-
ward the colored side than the white side. I actually check now that they have ’biracial’
[on the U.S. Census] I actually check that now, but before that I checked black.
“I’d have to say it’s because of the society I grew up in. Living in the suburbs, there
wasn’t very many white people...So even though in the household – in my home –
there were all white people, on the outside all my peers and stuff they were always
black. And with racism, you know when I was a child I didn’t really understand it.
When I was younger, I gravitated toward the white side. I want to say I was kind
of racist against black people myself as a child, and it’s because of the racism that
was inside the home. You know, for instance, my mother used to call my stepfather a
‘cotton-pickin’ bastard’ all the time, and I never really knew what that was. I didn’t
know what that meant until a few years ago it dawned on me – ‘wow, that was racist.’
“And like, as a child, I remember thinking that black babies were so ugly. I used to
think that white babies were so pretty. And even as far as men or boys went, I used to
think that black boys were ugly. My mom tells me that when I was in kindergarten, she
said I asked her why she was always kissing my stepfather, who was a black man, and
she said ‘because he tastes like chocolate.’ So she said I went to school and kissed a
little black kid and I said ‘no that was disgusting, he taste like snot and peanut butter.’
[Lucy laughs].
“I was always turned off by black people and even as I got older into my teenage years,
I started being interested in darker skinned guys but it was more of like Puerto Ricans
and very, very light skinned men, and it wasn’t really until I was in my 20s that I
started going out and saying ok, darker skinned men are actually ok.”
[INTERVIEWER: So what triggered that switch for you when you went from having
a sense of identity with white people to closely identifying with black people now?]
“When I got into my teenage years is when I started seeing a lot of the black power
movement and things like that, and it really caught my eye. Especially the Malcom X
biography that was the first book I read – period. So I sat down even though I watched
the movie, I sat and read the book and started really getting into it. So looking into
the Nation of Islam and things like that I started to relate more to black people and
understanding a little more the things that were going on around me. So I think that
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was the start of it, and again that was when I started getting into [black culture]. And
I was in high school [when] I started getting interested in the black power movement
and understanding who I am at that point, starting to do research. And as I got older
I started to do research and I got to travel and see other people there, and that started
building me, too.”
As Lucy described her experiences learning about the civil rights movement, the Nation of Islam,
and prominent figures in black American history, she also described how her own orientation
shifted from an interest in black culture to a commitment to the black community around her.
She began to travel, and reinterpret her own life experiences through the lens of a black American
identity. Lucy cited examples of laws such as Florida’s Stand Your Ground law (which authorizes
the use of deadly force in self-defense) and concealed carry laws (which in many states allow a
person to carry a weapon, including a handgun, in public in a concealed manner) when explaining
why she is so committed to improving the status of black people in the United States:
“Now I think those two laws together are a combination for the destruction of the black
man, because that right there, the stand your ground law automatically gives someone
permission to kill you just because they think they might be harmed. Now you see
a black man coming at you and he’s got a gun on him, what sense is anyone gonna
have? There’s a lot of things going on now that’s against us, and we don’t see that.
Because a lot of black people in our years do not think that racism still exists. They’re
thinking ’get over it,’ ’move on,’ but it really does still exist. And I’ve seen it in my
own family...There’s still a lot of [racism] and there’s a lot of things I see that are
starting to gear towards our destruction. Even in the community, they’ve taken away
a lot of things for the kids, recreation and things like that, things that are deemed ’too
expensive’ but things that are hard for people in low income families to afford for their
kids to do as after school activities and things like that. So it leads them to where?
Juvenile detention. Prison. We don’t see it, and those who do see it are not willing to
stand up for it.
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“And even us, just as a people, we don’t stand up for each other anymore. You look at
shows like Real Housewives of Atlanta and things like that, look what they’re depict-
ing! You act this way, wear all the pretty dresses and the makeup, and you go on T.V.
and kids see it and think ’Oh, that’s the life I want,’ but they have all this drama, all
this crazy being with that man and this man. And we’re not even careful what we’re
depicting! When we get into higher places like that where we could show young kids
a better place, we go on T.V. and say it’s all about the ratings anyway, so instead we
give the networks what they want so we can get the good ratings. And I want to do
better. I want us to do better.”
As someone who strongly identifies as African American, Lucy’s expresses a strong sense of com-
mitment to her group membership among other black people. To the extent that an individual
behavior is tied to her need for proximity to the attachment group, attachment theory may sug-
gest that developing a sense of shared fate with other ingroup members helps individuals achieve
proximity to the group. Thus, strong identifier types like Lucy tend to answer affirmatively to
questions related to group consciousness. Strong identifiers who view the world through a self-
categorization framework would see shared group consciousness as one of a variety of behaviors
that facilitate closeness with the group. Descriptions of strong identifier types are consistent with
self-categorization theory, illustrating that when social categorizations are salient to a person, the
ingroup becomes psychologically merged with, or linked to, the self. Thus, for strong identifiers,
the self and the group are inextricably tied once group-ness becomes salient to the individual.
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Responses and Fitting Into the Framework
The interview questionnaire for this study included a number of survey questions related to group
consciousness to determine whether interview subjects fell into the “predictor” categories de-
scribed by the type-predictor typology. The entire survey questionnaire is included in Appendix
A.
Each of the questions related to group consciousness listed below have been used on national
opinion surveys including the General Social Survey, the National Election Studies, and the Coop-
erative Congressional Election Studies, but are asked using a closed-format. In a departure from
the conventional survey format, my interviews asked the following four group consciousness ques-
tions in an open-ended format (respondents were not prompted to answer with a “yes” or “no,”
and the subsequent scaling questions were dropped. Respondents were asked the linked fate and
group success questions in reference to the group (or groups) with which they reported feeling the
strongest sense of identity.
Changing the form of the questions from closed- to open-ended provided considerable vari-
ation in responses, with some respondents answering yes or no straightforwardly, while others
meandered around a response that seemed to consider many factors.
• Linked Fate: Do you think that what happens to (people in respondent’s group) in this coun-
try will have something to do with what happens in your life?
• Life Chances: Do you think your life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion?
• Group Success: Based on your experiences, does it make sense to view your own life chances
as being tied to the success of other people in your group?
• Proxy: Do you ever use race as a proxy for your own self-interest?
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The majority of this analysis will focus on responses to the linked fate question classified as posi-
tive, negative, or mixed responses (exhibiting some combination of positive and negative feelings
toward linked fate). However, because the framework itself is not specific to linked fate and is
useful for understanding group consciousness more broadly, responses from the other group con-
sciousness questions will be used in some of the examples extracted from interviews. I find support
within the sample for each of the 4 predictor categories, and describe the in further detail the range
of responses for each, with context from selected individual interviews below.
Taken together, Figures 10 and 11 suggest that the type-predictor framework works among the
sample in the way I theorized it would. The bar chart in Figure 10 shows the number of unique
cases in each consciousness type that fall into each group consciousness predictor category. I
use cases rather than individuals as the unit of analysis here because in some instances, a person
classified as a multiple identifier could exemplify one predictor, say group membership, when
referring to one aspect of her identity, and exemplify a different predictor, say group attachment,
when referring to some other aspect of her identity. Non-affiliate types fall exclusively into the
group membership and disassociation predictor categories, and provide the greatest proportion of
disassociative responses among the sample. This means non-affiliate types, who derive a sense of
identity more from individual traits than group affinity, do not tend to express a sense of shared
fate with others. On the other hand, strong identifier types tend to fall into the group attachment
and group identity predictor categories, meaning they not only express a sense of shared fate with
in-group members, but may even derive a sense of personal gain from their perceived closeness
with the group.
The bar chart in Figure 11 shows the distribution of positive, negative, and affirmative responses
to the linked fate question within each group consciousness predictor category. Most negative re-
sponses to the linked fate question came from the disassociative predictor category. While all
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Figure 10: Distribution of Predictors among Types
predictor categories had people who expressed a positive sense of linked fate, the greatest propor-
tions of positive responses came from the group identity and group attachment predictor categories,
as expected because the strong identifiers and multiple identifier types who fell into these two pre-
dictor categories are theoretically more inclined to view themselves as part of the group and, by
extension, may be more inclined to express a sense of shared fate with ingroup members.
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Among the entire sample, 11 examples of disassociation emerged (see Appendix A), and as pre-
dicted by the type-predictor framework, disassociative responders provided the majority of neg-
ative responses to the linked fate question (6 of 11 cases). While I expected that disassociative
respondents would be more inclined to provide negative responses to the group consciousness
questions, I made no initial conjectures about what factors might motivate an individual to view
her personal status as being disconnected from the status of the group. The following disassociative
responses were given by non-affiliate type participants who may have reported feeling a stronger
sense of identity with one group relative to other groups in their identity set, but did not frequently
refer to the group during parts of the interview that were not specific to identity. Not surprisingly,
there seems to be little evidence of a sense of shared outcomes for individuals in the sample whose
identity ties to a particular group are relatively weak.
Carrie Parsons and Tara Williams, Disassociators
Carrie, a white female psychology graduate student in her mid-20s, hesitated for about five seconds
before asking the interviewer to repeat the question, “Do you believe what happens to Christian
people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” Carrie formed
her answer gradually, saying she believed what happens to Christians could potentially affect her
life, but that she wasn’t sure whether the status of Christians would affect her life over time, or
affect her kids. Tara, who attends the same graduate psychology program as Carrie, responded
by asking followup questions after being asked to answer the linked fate question regarding her
relationship to liberals in the United States. She was at first abrupt in her response:
“I don’t really think of that as a well-worded question. Like what happens to liberals?”
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[INTERVIEWER]: Well, when policies are passed that are what liberals want, and so
liberals start to feel a little better – when good things happen for liberals do you think
that has something to do with your life? Do you think you’d be better off when liberals
are better off?
“Yes because of my age, and yes, because of my profession, but besides that, no.
Because like I said, I’m very privileged. I think that’s why I don’t care so much about
politics in general. I think if it affected me more directly, like if I was gay, I’d probably
be way more passionate about politics.”
[INTERVIEWER]: I see. So you think if you were in a position where policy changes




Beth, from Rochester, New York, was similarly conflicted in her response regarding shared out-
comes with other Republicans:
“I don’t know. Let’s say that somebody doesn’t do his job and the neighborhood gets
incinerated. That would have something to do with my personal life. But I don’t think
it would in general because in general I don’t rely a lot on my community for what I
do and think. So only if it’s a major intrusion. (Beth is suddenly abrupt) Ok. That’s
my answer to that. (Beth laughs).
[INTERVIEWER]: Was this a hard question to answer?
“The thing is, it’s not a question that I had ever asked myself so I had to stop and create
a possible scenario in how I would react to it.”
Individuals in the sample categorized as having disassociative responses tended to express a sense
of belonging to groups that would not presumably be ascriptively identifiable, and are not politi-
cized in a way that felt salient to respondents. In this sense, perhaps Carrie, Tara, and Beth felt a
110
sense of shared outcomes with Christians or liberals because in a sense these groups are “selected
into” by the individual, and perceptions of group membership from others depends almost entirely
on what the individual projects. In contrast, individuals who feel a stronger sense of attachment
to racial and ethnic groups, class-based groups, or other minority groups may be more subject to
differential treatment based on out-group perceptions of individual group membership and thus,
whether negatively or positively, may respond differently to questions that prompt individuals to
think about group consciousness.
Group Membership
Among the entire sample, 16 examples of group membership occurred, making group membership
the second-most common of the four predictor categories (see Appendix A). Membership alone in
a particular group appears to be an insufficient condition to produce the type of utility-proxying and
collectivist attitudes and behavior associated with group conscious thinking. Group membership
alone does not carry any affective value with group-belonging; it is a mere descriptive marker
that of itself would not motivate particular feeling or behaviors other than perhaps a sense of
belonging. Membership is akin to a “fan,” who may occasionally cheer for her team and celebrate
team successes, but is ultimately unburdened by the team’s victories or losses at the individual level
to the extent that her own self-concept and decisionmaking behaviors are meaningfully affected.
Consequently, group membership produced equal proportions of positive and negative responses to
the linked fate question, and were most likely to produce mixed responses (four of the six “mixed”
responses came from people categorized in the group membership predictor).
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Fausto Herrera, Group Membership
Fausto responded to the linked fate question question knowing that although he sees himself as
Hispanic and that others automatically perceive him to be Hispanic “because of [his] heavy accent,”
he also distanced himself from the group, stating that his experience as a Hispanic person in the
United States differs from the experiences of the typical Hispanic/Latino immigrant around him.
Despite distancing himself from the status of other Hispanic people, Fausto expressed a desire
to see Hispanics improve their position in society during other portions of the interview. But after
a long moment during which Fausto sighed heavily and murmured, “I don’t know”, he concluded
that the status of other Hispanics would not affect him personally, primarily because of his elevated
socioeconomic position and personal motivations. He also noted that the question was difficult to
answer for Hispanics as a whole because so many subgroups comprise the Hispanic community:
“If the question is whatever happens to Hispanic people, well my question is what has
happened to Hispanic people? Like I said, there’s different geographic location. You
know, there’s South American, Central American, Puerto Rican, they’re the biggest
bulks of immigrants and each one has had different experiences. So what happens to
them has influenced what happens in my life? No, because I came to this country not
for economic prosperity, I came to this country to go to school. In the course of that,
there was a revolution in Nicaragua so I couldn’t go back – so I ended up staying. I
married an American lady from this area. So it wasn’t like I came here looking for
like a lot of people who have immigrated...So I don’t think what happen to Hispanic
people affecting me in any way. But I’m not the norm. So I’m not sure how to answer
that question. It’s a tricky question.”
Barrett Ackerman, Group Membership
Similarly, Barrett did not believe that his membership in the Jewish community meant his life
chances would be affected by the group as a whole, although he did seem to believe group status
112
may have had more of an impact for individuals in the past. After hesitating, Barrett asked for
clarification on the linked fate question:
“Uhh, that’s interesting. Is that in the future, or is that in the past?
[INTERVIEWER]: You know, when they ask on these surveys it’s usually just a closed
form ’yes’ or ’no.’
[Barrett takes a more decisive tone].
“I don’t think what happens to me or what happens to Jewish neighbors – not that I
have many – but I don’t think we’re stereotyped individually anymore.
[INTERVIEWER]: How about in the past? At least in your personal life did you ever
feel like your own life chances were affected by the success of other Jewish people?
“I think there were times with some negative difficulties. When I was up in Alaska
some of my board members were very hostile toward anyone who wasn’t white and
Christian. The group that hired me, which had a lot of Native representatives on it,
very successful Native people, that board disappeared and I got a few very conservative
people on it and it was very clear that they had certain reactions toward me.”
Fausto and Barrett expressed membership with their social groups, but did not believe their per-
sonal fates were determined by collective outcomes. Though Fausto self-identified as a Hispanic
person, he believed the term “Hispanic” encompassed too many diverse groups that may not share
common cultural or social interests in every case. And because his own experiences differed from
many of the other Hispanic immigrants in his community, he empathized with fellow in-group
members, but did not believe his own status was affected by the status of the group. While Barrett
acknowledged that shared fate may have been an important concept for Jewish people in the past,
he did not believe negative stereotypes against Jews had much individual impact in the present,
and consequently answered that although he self-identified as a Jewish person, he did not believe
negative perceptions of the group would affect him personally. In other words, both Fausto and
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Barrett had developed a an affinity with their respective groups strong enough to produce a sense
of membership, but not sufficient to produce an absolute sense of shared outcomes.
Group Identity
18 examples of the group identity predictor emerged from the sample, making group identity the
most common of the four predictors in my framework (see Appendix A).
Unlike membership alone, group identity appears to have implications for the predictions of
linked fate among respondents in this sample. In fact, 16 of the 19 examples of positive linked
fate responses came from people in the group identity predictor. In the group identity predic-
tor, a person’s status and sense of self are more connected with the status of the group; hence we
should expect a stronger relationship between group identity and individual well-being. Both social
identity theory and self-categorization theory suggest that minority status makes minority group
membership a salient category for individuals, thus minority group membership would become a
meaningful basis for perceiving self and others. However, because the self-categorization approach
presents the self as relatively malleable, we may expect under certain instances to see racial inter-
ests trumping class interests, for example. Perhaps to some degree this depends on how likely the
individual is to view race and class interests as inextricably tied. For black Americans with lower
socioeconomic status, the tie between race and class may be stronger than for African Americans
of higher socioeconomic status. Whereas Dawson would suggest that the black upper and middle
class continues to view racial interests as affecting their life chances, the self-categorization theory
may not strongly support such a claim.
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Patricia Lovett, Group Identifier
It is difficult within the framework of self-categorization theory to address why, when social iden-
tity is salient, not all group members think or behave similarly (Abrams, 1990). The theory does
not give a compelling account for why individual differences may exist among group members,
though Abrams and others have suggested that while subjective stability in the self must be based
to some degree on a person’s ability to make stable social comparisons, individual stability may
be accompanied by subtle variations that “allow people to arrive at different interpretations of the
same categorization at different times (Abrams and Hogg, 2001).
The predictions of the self-categorization approach seem to be borne out in Patricia’s position
on the linked fate of African Americans. Patricia is a black business owner whose government
contracting organization made her a millionaire by the time she reached her mid-40s. Though
she identified herself strongly and consistently as an African American, she did not believe that
racial interests trumped class interests. In fact, Patricia mentioned that she specifically prohibited
her organization from applying for minority-set-aside contracts from the government, even though
they would have faced relatively little competition for such bids. Patricia responded to the linked
fate question by saying,
“I would say no now. In the year 2014, no. In the 1900’s I would say yes, because I
lived during that time. And so many things are different, so many things have changed
since that time. But now? No. Because I think it’s more on merit and what you bring
to a specific situation, whatever the box is being checked for. I mean, we have a black
President. That wasn’t thought of in the 60’s or 70’s. So I would say that’s really a
2-part answer, it depends on the era. That’s initially a very black and white, yes / no
question, but it’s hard to make it yes or no when you’ve lived in both time frames.”
[INTERVIEWER]: Did you ever think differently?
“Yes, around the 60’s and 70’s. Because the opportunities weren’t there. For example,
and African American male who for whatever reason wasn’t able to finish school –
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they could have excellent common sense. But back in the day they weren’t viewed
as ’what you can bring to the table,’ they were viewed as ’you didn’t finish school.’
(Patricia chuckles). That was like the end. But now you can have someone who
didn’t finish college, but has total common sense, total ethics of brain – they could be
managing something now because the opportunities are different.”
Christina, Group Identifier
Social identity theory, on the other hand, posits that because individuals desire self-esteem (which
itself is dependent on positive social comparisons between the in-group and the outgroup), there
is a tendency to “seek positive distinctiveness for the in-group in comparison with the out-group”
(Turner, 1981). Thus, individuals may invoke social comparisons which result in competitive
intergroup processes and attitudinal biases. Consistent with Dawson, then, social identity theorists
may expect individuals to favor policies and political candidates that benefit the ingroup, even at
the expense of personal preference (if a discrepancy exists in the first place).
Christina, a recent college graduate, and the daughter of Chinese immigrant parents, said,
“When I see things that happen to women it makes me sad, but in terms of politics,
like laws, I guess it would have an impact...but most of these things don’t happen to
me.”
[INTERVIEWER]: Do you think your life chances are affected by the status of other
women?
“Yes, because I’m female, even more limited because my parents are working class.
And because not only am I female, but I’m a minority. Because people [are] more
likely to hire men. If women are headstrong they’re called bitchy or bossy, but if men
are headstrong, they’re called [leaders].”
[INTERVIEWER]: So would you say your life chances are tied to the success of
women as a whole?
“I don’t think the solution to it is having more women succeed, I think the answer is a
change in the mentality of others.”
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Jacob, Group Identifier
Jacob revealed a sense of shared identity and outcomes with other black people throughout his
interview, despite his belief that “at the foundational level [other people’s perceptions of his race]
shouldn’t matter.” He was quick to provide examples of injustices toward African Americans made
on the basis of racial perceptions, citing the murder of Trayvon Martin11 and the recent controversy
over Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard Sherman being labeled a “thug” by national media
outlets.12 Jacob was quick to explain that he feels personally affected by the status of other black
Americans, saying,
“What pissed me off recently was the Richard Sherman thing. We boast ourselves as a nation
as having liberty and justice for all...We made a lot of inroads with civil rights and all, but then
when a football player like Richard Sherman is hyped up and he says a couple things that might
not be consistent, then he’s a thug because he’s got dreads.
“...So many people in America, they come here to get a better life. They come here to escape.
But they get here and they’re looked upon as second class citizens. It’s the superiority that ticks
me off—certain races and groups of people. I’m not mad at people in particular, I’m mad at the
mindset, that ideology. With that ideology, the after effect is always injustice.”
11Trayvon Martin was a 17-year-old African American who was fatally shot by neighborhood watch volunteer
George Zimmerman on February 26, 2012. In 2013 a jury of six women found Zimmerman not guilty of the second-
degree murder for which he was charged, and in 2015 the United States Department of Justice announced that no
federal civil rights charges would be brought against Zimmerman. http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-
shooting-fast-facts/index.html.
12Following a 2014 post-game interview where Sherman made negative comments about 49ers receiver
Michael Crabtree, media outlets and users of social media platforms such as Twitter responded to Sherman




Eight examples of the group attachment predictor emerged from the sample (see Appendix A),
and though it is the least common of the four predictors, it is strongly associated with positive
responses to the linked fate question (of the eight people characterized by the group attachment
predictor, six responded affirmatively to linked fate).
To the extent that an individual’s behavior is inextricably tied to her need for proximity to
the attachment group, attachment theory suggests that individuals may achieve proximity through
behaviors motivated by group consciousness. Although Dawson and others (Capers and Smith,
2016; Gay et al., 2016) describe linked fate and group consciousness as a means through which
individuals make decisions for self-gain, individuals who view the world through an attachment
framework may see a sense of shared outcomes as one of a variety of behaviors which serve the
function of facilitating closeness with the group. In this sense, individuals are concerned with the
extent to which favoring the policy of the attachment group allows the individual to signal her
ultimate desire to be bonded with the group. Lucy and David both expressed feeling a sense of
shared fate with African Americans, despite the fact that neither one is readily embraced as a group
member by other blacks.
Lucy, Group Attachment
Lucy wholeheartedly believed the status of other African Americans would affect her life:
“. . . Regardless of the color of my skin, it’s definitely going to have an effect on me.
No matter how you look at it, if something effects someone of color – it doesn’t matter
how much education you have or how light or how dark you are, if it affects someone
of color it’s going to affect us all in the same way. People might view it differently,
um, our perspective may be different, but as a whole it’s gong to have the same effect.”
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David, Group Attachment
David spoke candidly about his desire to advocate for the status of black families at his children’s
predominantly white upper class parochial school, particularly because his wife is African Ameri-
can and his children and other families at the school were experiencing differential treatment at the
school in part because of what David believed to be presumptions about their racial identification.
According to David,
“It didn’t matter to me that we were African American, what mattered to me was how
they treated us because they perceived we were African American. So I created the
Minority Parents Advisory Committee. I wanted my children to grow up not feeling
the stigma and pressure of race – the little bit that I experienced, and I didn’t experience
a lot of it – because I truly believe that as I’ve navigated through life people really
didn’t treat me the way they treated most people that would be identified as African
American. And I think that goes back to the old mindsets of the south where you were
treated based on your darkness. If you were a lighter African American you were
treated differently. So growing up as an African American, in the greater society I was
treated better than darker African Americans,” he said in an almost apologetic tone.
“So my treatment as an African American wasn’t as severe or harsh as I’ve seen others
treated, but it bothered me to see others treated that way.”
For this reason, David started the organization to advocate for families whose children were being
treated unfairly sometimes by fellow students, and sometimes, more egregiously, by their educators
and administrators. “It bothered me to see how my racial peers were treated...and their families.”
Readers may quibble over whether the conjectures offered by the social identity theory and the
group attachment framework differ at all. I offer that the distinction lies in whether the individual
is perceived by out-group members to be a member of the identity group (as in the case of group
membership) or not (as in the case of group attachment). While both theories would suggest a
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sense of shared outcomes at the individual level, the motivations for individuals to link their fate
to the group varies by context.
Discussion
Though my work exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate
multidimensionality in the study of identity, more work must be done to offer alternative measures
of group consciousness that accommodate a more fluid operationalization of identity. Even from
the open-ended responses, the ambiguities highlighted at the start of this paper remain unresolved.
These interviews do, however, underscore at least three important ideas.
First, these interviews reveal support for the typologies of group conscious thinking introduced
in the type-predictor framework. The open-ended responses to group consciousness questions in
my interviews provide support for the type-predictor framework. I find examples of all five types
and all four predictors, and the relationships between types and predictors appear to be in the
directions I expected.
Second, the interviews reveal that individuals think about their identities and group affiliations
in nuanced ways. Not only do individuals claim membership in multiple groups simultaneously,
but those groups may hold conflicting interests and the salience of any particular identity may ebb
and flow depending on a variety of contextual factors. While the convention, at least in political
science research, has been to control for categories such as race, socioeconomic status, gender,
and religion in a regression framework, and to use these categories as explanatory variables for a
host of political phenomena, these interview findings suggest that we should be more careful in our
suppositions regarding the causal relationship between social group identities and their empirical
correlates. In what ways, and under what conditions should we expect race, gender, class, or
religion to be causal?
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Third, this study leads us to ponder the degree of subjectivity respondents have in choosing and
articulating the magnitude of their identity with a particular group. Some identities and social cate-
gories listed by respondents in this study (for example, “caring person,” “musician,” “student,”) are
roles or traits chosen by respondents that may only carry political significance and prompt shared
consciousness when activated in a particular way. Other identities listed by respondents (for ex-
ample, “black person,” “woman,” “second generation immigrant,”) may be identities respondents
choose for themselves, but may also importantly carry social significance or meanings that are as-
cribed to respondents, in a sense constraining a person’s ability to determine the social significance
of such identities because of the institutional and social factors that surround them.
Conclusion
The findings of this study, though illuminating, should be interpreted with caution. The sampling
procedure yielded a diverse population, but not a representative one. The responses of partici-
pants can not be compared across groups within the study, nor can responses be generalized to the
broader populations of the groups these individuals represent. I do not claim that my classification
of this particular set of respondents into the type-predictor categories should be universally true
of a larger population, and though great effort has been made to conduct this study in accordance
with best practices and rigorous analysis, it is yet reasonable to consider the falsifiability of these
findings. Evidence to counter my findings might look like a study in which the same set of respon-
dents classify themselves in the framework categories and place themselves in different categories
than the ones I chose for them, or a study with a larger sample where respondents fall into more
(or fewer) types that map differently onto more (or fewer) predictor categories. However, even if it
is possible to conceive of an observation that might prove this particular set of findings falsifiable,
it is also possible to conceive of research designs that would provide additional, and potentially
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stronger, evidence for the type-predictor framework. Additional work on this topic should include
a nationally representative sample, and use questionnaire designs that allow respondents to list the
identity or identities that matter most to them (as was done in this study). This work would also
be strengthened by research design and procedural elements such as the use of a second coder,
or the incorporation of additional interviewers in order to allay potential concerns about race of
interviewer effects. Future work might also incorporate designs where respondents categorize
themselves according to the type-predictor framework and those same respondents are categorized
by a third-party researcher or observer to determine the extent to which the framework can be used
consistently for self- as well as observational- categorization. Another possibility is to build on
the methodological tools used to investigate group consciousness in the style of Shingles (1981) or
Verba and Nie (1987). Long form interviews with open-ended questionnaires make it possible to
employ the type of count analysis used by Shingles and Verba and Nie. There are ample opportu-
nities for future studies to build upon the type-predictor framework as a tool for understanding the
relationship between self-categorization and shared political consciousness.
That said, we should glean from this study a fresh take on a longstanding literature, and a
range of ways forward for future research to especially examine the measurement questions that
arise concerning the conceptualization and behavioral implications of group membership, group
identity, and group attachment.
Political and social psychology research is ripe with opportunities for researchers to engage in
both qualitative studies to develop a richer contextual understanding of identity formation, as well
as quantitative studies to empirically demonstrate the distinctiveness of identity-related concepts,
especially in relation to political preferences and related behavioral outcomes. There is a strong
need within the linked fate literature specifically to develop research designs based on causal infer-
ence in order to fully understand the conditions under which aspects of an individual’s identity may
122
causally motivate her preferences and behaviors. The group identity literature must grow to incor-
porate new design strategies aimed at validating empirical distinctions between often-cofounded
concepts. Though a formidable task, broadening the scope of available measures will, at least, be
beneficial to the scholarly community and, at best, demonstrate an improvement in measurement
precision and provide a benchmark for future studies to build upon.
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3 Can Alternative Measurement Strategies
Provide New Insights for Our
Understanding of Group Political Attitudes
in the United States?
Introduction
The present chapter takes a closer look at one of the main findings from the interview analyses:
namely that respondents view their personal identities in layers, and that the relationships between
self-identities and political attitudes are complex and nuanced. I respond to the interview results
by asking: what further information can be learned by introducing a new measurement strategy
to the study of identity that allows respondents a greater degree of flexibility when considering
the subjective relationship between their sense of group identity and the policy attitudes often
considered to be empirical correlates of identity?
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This chapter begins with a bit of background on the group consciousness literature. I discuss
what has been learned from existing research and what information still stands at stake. Next, I dis-
cuss the specific ideas explored in this chapter and provide a description of the survey instrument
and measurement strategies used. I then discuss the survey itself and provide descriptive infor-
mation about the dataset. The data analysis consists of three parts: (1) an analysis of two feeling
thermometer questions regarding attitudes toward immigrants, (2) analysis of a series questions
about attitudes toward spending in five policy areas, and, (3) descriptive analysis of individual
groups of respondents. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this
project and directions for future work.
What Do We Think We Know From Empirical Data?
Before discussing what empirical literature has told us about group political attitudes in the United
States, we should first distinguish between the terms used throughout social science literature to
discuss individuals and their relationships to groups. While group membership refers to a per-
son’s ascriptive categorization in a particular group, group identity refers to a person’s awareness
of belonging to that group coupled with a sense of psychological attachment due to a sense of
shared beliefs, interests, feelings, or ideas with fellow group members (McClain et al., 2009). Dis-
tinct from group identity, group consciousness is in-group identification politicized by a system of
beliefs about the status of the group within the broader society, as well as a view that collective
action is the best way for the group to improve its status and realize its shared interests (Dawson,
1994, 2003; McClain et al., 2009). The empirical goal of this chapter is to understand whether the
policy attitudes we observe for individuals are different when we are looking from the perspective
of group membership (observing relationships in data based on ascriptive categorization alone)
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versus group identity (observing relationships in data by asking a person which group identities
matter to her).
Discussions of social identities in the United States tend to center around race, class, gender,
and religion. Early observations in social science literature by Tocqueville and others point out
that race is not only a significant part of American politics but also that race will continue to
drive social and political cleavages in the US (Tocqueville, 1945; Brown, 1931). Since Brown’s
seminal work The Nature of Race Consciousness (1931), scholars have sought to understand not
only the emergence of group consciousness at the individual level, but also the effects of group
consciousness as they relate to political outcomes.
Scholars who focus on race have highlighted the effects of racial identity and racial group con-
sciousness on voting and political participation and behavior (McClain and Stewart Jr, 1995; Cho
and Cain, 2001; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007; Lien, 2010; Sanchez, 2006; Segura, 2012; Lien,
1994; Miller et al., 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Kim and Lee, 2001; Tate, 2003; Gillespie
and King-Meadows, 2014; Enos, 2014, 2016), candidate choice (Cho and Cain, 2001; Segura,
2012; Stokes, 2003; Chong and Rogers, 2005; Wong, 2008; Cameron et al., 1996; Schildkraut,
2012), and preference for policies that purportedly benefit minorities (Griffin, 2014; Block, 2011;
Lee, 2008; Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Greer, 2013; Gillion, 2013). Many of
these observational studies treat race as a fixed categorical variable in which survey respondents
are asked to indicate the racial or ethnic group to which they belong, and subsequently asked a
battery of outcome measures whose relationships to racial identity are determined using regres-
sion analysis. To the extent that these studies contrast the political differences between groups,
the majority of studies focus on differences between white and black Americans although scholars
have increasingly begun to study the effects of group consciousness among Hispanics and Latinos
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(Stokes, 2003; Sanchez, 2006; Manzano and Sanchez, 2010; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Schild-
kraut, 2012; Gay et al., 2014a), women and individuals who identify as LBGT (Hero and Tolbert,
1996; Simien, 2005; Moore, 2010), and religious communities (Harris, 1994; Harris-Lacewell and
Junn, 2007; Granqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2008; Gay et al., 2014a).
Studies focusing on class and socioeconomic difference in the U.S. face the challenge of cre-
ating empirical distinction between the influence of class and race, which are not only highly
correlated but also often empirically endogenous. Still, scholars such as Gay (2004; 2006), Greer
(2013) and Carnes (2012; 2013) have posited the effects of class-consciousness on policy attitudes
and political preferences.
Gender and religion are among the least-frequently studied categories of social identity in re-
lation to policy attitudes, at least in political science literature. Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014)
argue that religion is more pervasive in United States politics than most people realize, and in-
fluence political attitudes, the behavior of political elites and ordinary citizens, individuals’ in-
terpretations of public policy, and the development of government programs. Using data from the
2012 American National Election Study Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner find that married white
and Latina women have slightly lower levels of gender linked fate than unmarried women of the
same race/ethnicity, while black women in the sample express high levels of shared consciousness
with other women regardless of marital status. The authors use mediation analysis to show that
differences in perceptions of shared fate explain a significant amount of the variation in political
ideology and partisanship for white and Latina women, arguing that marriage alters women’s per-
ceptions of self-interest by institutionalizing their partnerships with men and ultimately leading
women to feel less connected to other women. Black women, on the other hand, have more expe-
rience interpreting discriminatory events because they also experience more racial disadvantage,
and are subsequently more likely to view their fates as being connected to other women in addition
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to other black Americans (Stout et al., 2017). Sociologists and cultural anthropologists have also
sought to understand the influence of gender and religious identity at the individual level (Glem,
2013; Frable, 1997; Moore, 2010), but still, the majority of studies in these disciplines either rely
heavily on ethnographic work or feature again the fixed, categorical, observational measurement
strategies characteristic of group consciousness literature more broadly.
To a large extent, studies related to group identity also study categories of identity in isolation
from one another.
A Multidimensional Approach
How Might What We Think We Know Change if We Introduce a New Mea-
surement Strategy?
Changes to the racial and ethnic classifications on the U.S. Census over the years reflect demo-
graphic changes in the country, or at the very least, are an ever-adapting reflection of the ways
groups in the United States prefer to be enumerated (see Figure 9).
In the Census 2000 and Census 2010, the United States employed a new technique for mea-
suring race which allowed respondents were given the opportunity to check more than one racial
category for the first time, apart from previous Census strategies that quantified black heritage as
. In 2010, 9.0 million people reported multiple races, a 2.4 percent increase from the 6.8 million
people who reported multiple races in 2000 (Jones and Bullock, 2013). The growth of the popula-
tion reporting more than one race on the census is probably attributed to a combination of factors.
One explanation is outright population growth, the other is a shift in the thinking of people who
were already multiracial but are now more inclined to report themselves as being so on censuses
























































































































































































































































































































































may seem small, the two or more races population is often reported in a single-race category, es-
pecially in subnational surveys. If these individuals were removed from the single-race category
and placed in the two or more races category, “the numbers might begin to affect policy decisions
and resource allocation (Renn, 2009).” In education policy, for example, racial data are used to de-
termine funding for programs designed to promote equal opportunity, planning for schools serving
Native American communities, and monitoring of school segregation and possible racial discrim-
ination in the areas of ability grouping, discipline, financial aid, and programs designed to serve
special populations (Renn, 2009).
Lee provides a useful illustration of this point (2009). Consider two types of individuals con-
fronted with the 2000 Census questionnaire, type A and type B. Type A will check off a second
racial group if and only if she identifies as strongly with it as she does to the first racial group
she marks. Type B will check off a second group (or third) if she in any way identifies with it
- strongly or not. Now take the example of a biracial individual who identifies more strongly as
African American than as Asian American. If she is type A, she will mark only African American
in Census 2000; if she is type B, she will mark both.
An alternative strategy to measuring identity allows both types A and B to identify as biracial
by giving survey respondents a fixed number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across
a set of social identity categories. Work done by Taeku Lee in a 2009 pilot study introduces an
approach to studying ethnoracial self-identification which tests the fluidity of how race or ethnicity
is expressed in social surveys. Lee proposes a measure which gives survey respondents a fixed
number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across a set of racial and ethnic categories
(Lee, 2009). Analogous to Loni Guinier’s “cumulative voting” design (1994), which allows citi-
zens to vote for multiple candidates and weight their votes according to preference intensity within
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the set of candidates, the identity point allocation system allows survey respondents to identify
with multiple group identities and to weight the strength of their association across groups.
In addition to racial categories, the present research extends the identity point allocation design
to include class, religion and gender as categories to which respondents allocate points, and uses
a survey design that compares responses across six arms of varying measurement conditions. The
random assignment of individuals to different measurement conditions allows us to understand how
different approaches to measurement may reveal different outcomes on important identity-related
questions while also allowing us to compare policy attitudes among people who are given the
opportunity to select a primary identity from a comprehensive list of socially relevant categories.
The design also allows us to explore whether the attitudes we observe when individuals select a
primary identity are different from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures
of demographic correlation. Allowing respondents to tell us what identities matter to them may
provide a more robust scope of information about the subjects of social science research and the
policy preferences of their subjective groups.
Why Does it Matter if Our Inferences Change?
We might think measurement strategies matter not only because of the responsibility social sci-
entists have to accurately reflect populations through research, but also because social scientists
(and those interested in the application of social scientific research tools) use such research to de-
scribe important relationships between social groups and their relationships to power, policy, and
preference that have meaningful consequences in the political world.
The previous chapters of this dissertation demonstrate that individuals do not seem to per-
ceive their identities in strictly bounded categories but rather as fluid layers which they pick and
choose, as well as within typologies of identification. In addition, the striking gap between theory
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and measurement evinced through social science literature points to the need for a more adaptive
measurement strategy.
There are, of course, merits to conventional measures of identity. Check boxes and multiple
choice formats are familiar tasks that people recognize and can easily understand. However, in-
troducing alternative strategies for measuring identity and its nuances will help social scientists
inside and outside of academia better understand the link between group identification and group
preference. If all politics are group politics, our inferences about the demographic and attitudinal
traits of groups have real-world consequences that are further complicated if those inferences vary
as a function of how we ask individuals to self-identify.
Hypotheses
1. Policy attitudes will differ between groups of respondents by race, class, gender, and religion.
2. The policy attitudes we observe under conventional measures of group membership will dif-
fer from the attitudes we observe under methods that ask people to select a primary identity
group among the set of socially relevant identity categories.
Identity Measurement Task
The Identity Measurement Study (IMS) conducted in 2015 asked identity-related questions to
3,010 respondents. The survey was distributed to a national sample online as a module of the MIT
Political Experiments Research Lab 2015 Omnibus Survey. Respondents were recruited for the
IMS through three survey platforms: Survey Sampling International (SSI), Research Now (RN),
and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk). The goal of this survey was to test whether different
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Figure 13: Identity Measurement Survey Flowchart
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strategies for measuring identity are related to different outcomes on identity-related questions,
and whether these results vary for subgroups of respondents.
As illustrated in the Figure 10 flow chart, the survey first collected respondents’ demographic
information, asking subjects to self-report their race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender,
and religion, among other questions in a multiple choice format where they were given the option
to select as many options as applicable in a given category. Of the 3,010 individuals in the sample,
76 percent (N=2,280) of respondents identified as white, 11 percent (N=335) identified as black
or African American, 9 percent (N=283) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 5 percent (N=162) as
Asian or Pacific Islander, 1 percent (N=44) as American Indian or Alaska Native, and less than
1 percent (N=10) identified as Middle Eastern. Around 1 percent (N=31) of respondents self-
identified as belonging to some other racial group. 2.3 (N=70) percent of respondents volunteered
a “multiracial” identity, defined for the purpose of this analysis as checking more than one racial
category in the demographic portion of the survey.13 48 percent of respondents identified as male,
and 52 percent identified as female.
After collecting basic demographic information, the IMS asked identity-related questions to
respondents. The goal of this survey was to test whether different strategies for measuring iden-
tity produce different outcomes on identity-related questions, and whether these results vary for
subgroups of respondents. Prior to exposure, respondents were randomly assigned to one of six
treatment categories, each requesting subjects to complete a different identify measurement task.
The survey compares a traditional method for measuring identity: a multiple choice question where
respondents are asked to choose one category based on a list of options (solely racial options in
Condition 1, or a combination of racial, socioeconomic, gender, and religious identity categories
13In the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census the percentage of multiracial identifiers in the total U.S. population was 2.4
and 2.9 percent, respectively.
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in Condition 2) with a system of point allocation where respondents are asked to designate a num-
ber of identity points to a list of racial (Condition 3 and Condition 5) or combined (Condition 4
and Condition 6) categories. Conditions 3 and 4 constrain the total number of points available for
respondents to allocate. In these conditions, the number of points a respondent can allocate must
sum to 10 or 100, respectively. In the unconstrained point allocation conditions, respondents can
allocate up to 10 points to any given category in Condition 5, or up to 100 points to any given
category in Condition 6. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six measurement conditions:
• Condition 1: choose 1 identity, race only
• Condition 2: choose 1identity, combined IDs
• Condition 3: point allocation, race only, constrained (total points must sum to 10)
• Condition 4: point allocation, combined IDs, constrained (total points must sum to 100)
• Condition 5: point allocation, race only, unconstrained (can allocate up to 10 points per
group)
• Condition 6: point allocation, combined IDs, unconstrained (can allocate up to 100 points
per group)
Aside from the descriptions below, a full description of the prompts and instruments used in each
condition can also be found in Appendix A.
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Conditions 1 and 2: Choose 1
The Combined ID variant in Condition 2 also includes gender (male or female), religion
(Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist,
Hindu, Atheist, Agnostic, or None), and class (lower class, working class, middle class, or upper
class). The choices in each category are populated by previous responses and only appear if they
are selected by respondents in the demographic portion of the survey.
Conditions 3 - 6: Point Allocation
The point allocation conditions begin with a prompt. Conditions 3 and 5 include only race cate-
gories, where the only difference is that condition 3 constrains the number of points to sum to 10
while condition 5 allows respondents to allocate up to 10 points per group. Conditions 4 and 6
include the same combined ID categories as described for Condition 2: gender, religion, and class
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categories which appear if they are previously selected by respondents in the prior demographic
portion of the survey.
Condition 3 Prompt
In identifying a person’s race and ethnicity, we often use just one racial or ethnic
category. Sometimes, however, more than one racial or ethnic category is applicable.
Suppose you could describe a person’s race and ethnicity using 10 points to allocate
as you wish to any group that you think accurately describes a person. For example, if
you thought someone were half-white and half-Asian, you might allocate 5 points to
each. Or if you thought someone were mostly black but had some Hispanic heritage,
you might allocate 9 points for black and 1 point for Hispanic. Now suppose you were
asked to describe your own racial background in this way. How would you describe
your race and ethnicity using this 10 points system?
Condition 4 Prompt
We often describe people using one or only a few parts of their identity – such as their
race and gender. Sometimes, however, other aspects of our identities are also impor-
tant.Suppose you could describe your identity using 100 points to allocate as you wish
to any group that you think accurately describes you. Below are some group mem-
bership categories. Move the sliders to reflect how you view your personal identity,
where the total number of points allocated sum to 100.For example, you might think
these groups are all an equal part of your identity, and give them all the same amount
of points. Or you might think of yourself most often as a member of just one group
and give most of your points to that group, and give the other groups fewer points. You
might even give some groups zero points. If there is another group you think is part
of your identity, you can add it at the bottom of the list.How would you describe your
personal identity using this 100 point system?
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Condition 5 Prompt
In identifying a person’s race and ethnicity, we often use just one racial or ethnic
category. Sometimes, however, more than one racial or ethnic category is applica-
ble.Suppose you could describe your identity using 10 points to allocate as you wish
to any racial group that you think accurately describes you. Move the sliders to reflect
how you view your personal identity, where you can allocate up to 10 points to each
group.For example, if you thought of yourself as half-white and half-Asian, you might
allocate 7 points to each. Or if you thought you were mostly black but had some His-
panic heritage, you might allocate 10 points for black and 3 points for Hispanic.How
would you describe your personal identity using this 10 point system?
Condition 6 Prompt
We often describe people using one or only a few parts of their identity – such as their
race and gender. Sometimes, however, other aspects of our identities are also impor-
tant.Suppose you could describe your identity using 100 points to allocate as you wish
to any group that you think accurately describes you. Below are some group mem-
bership categories. Move the sliders to reflect how you view your personal identity,
where you can allocate up to 100 points to each group.For example, you might think
these groups are all an equal part of your identity, and give them all the same amount
of points. Or you might think of yourself most often as a member of just one group
and give most of your points to that group, and give the other groups fewer points. You
might even give some groups zero points. If there is another group you think is part
of your identity, you can add it at the bottom of the list.How would you describe your
personal identity using this 100 point system?
Point Allocation Task
Following the prompt, respondents are given the following task (illustrated here by the race only
condition):
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Respondents move the slider to indicate the number of points they would like to allocate to a
given category; the total number of points allocated between all categories is shown at the bottom
of the screen. Although the system of point allocation used in this survey is an extension of work
done by Lee (2009), the original contributions of this work are threefold. First, I allow respon-
dents to allocate points to categories other than racial and ethnic identities. By including gender,
socioeconomic status, religion, and an “other” box alongside race and ethnicity in three of the six
treatment branches, we observe how respondents may weigh aspects of their personal identity with
respect to other traits with which they self-identify. In the “other” box respondents were given the
option to write in another category using an open text format. The open text option was included
to give respondents the opportunity to reject traditional categories of self-categorization as well as
to give respondents greater flexibility in choosing the categories with which they self-identified.
In addition, for each respondent assigned to a condition including a combination of identity cat-
egories, I customize the survey to display only the unique gender, socioeconomic, religious, and
ethnic categories that they selected in the demographic portion of the survey prior to treatment.
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Thus, each respondent completes the point allocation task for the set of categories to which he or
she self-reported membership.
Second, my design allows for comparison between a constrained “pot” of points where respon-
dents must allocate points that sum to a specific amount, with an unconstrained version that does
not force respondents to sum their points to a specific amount but rather allows them to give any
amount of points to their categories of choice (constrained only in the sense that the sliding bar
on the survey itself must have a limit, and so the number of points available for any selection is
limited, but not the amount of points respondents can spend in total).
Third, I employ experimental design to understand whether sets of respondents differ in their
responses to outcome questions across treatment groups, conditional on their earlier responses.
Because the conditional branching used in my approach leads to different sets of respondents
answering the outcome questions, this design does not allow us to compare outcomes for equivalent
randomly assigned groups. However, we are able to observe how outcomes differ based on the
type of measurement strategy used for respondents to self-identify. Additionally, the conditional
branching yields a wealth of observational data about how individuals self-identify and contributes
valuable data about the behavioral and attitudinal considerations of people who identify in more
nuanced ways that are not captured in ways that can be observed through conventional survey
methods.
As noted by Lee (2009), the operationalizaion of this point allocation approach rests on a few
seemingly arbitrary decisions. First, the number of identity points given to respondents is set at
10 in the third and fifth branches, and 100 in the fourth and sixth branches. Lee explains that
10 is a reasonable number of points that is likely “to minimize the cognitive task at hand, given
the ubiquity of the base-10 system and 10 point systems generally to rate a range of phenomena.”
The 100 point system is equal in familiarity for respondents as it is used for tasks such as rating
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performance on an exam, and is directly analogous to a percentage point system. Thus, the 10-
point and 100-point systems are expedient, familiar scales appropriate for the IMS point allocation
task.
The second seemingly arbitrary decision is over the slate of racial and ethnic categories that
individuals can choose from when allocating points (Lee, 2009). The group categories used in
the IMS are the group names and categorizations used annually in the MIT Political Experiments
Research Lab Omnibus Survey and are similar to the categories used on other familiar surveys such
as the General Social Survey, the American National Election Study and the United States Census.
The six categories of white/Caucasian, Black/African-American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander,
American Indian/Alaska Native and Middle Eastern are frequently encountered by respondents on
official forms and other documents, and correspond closely with common conceptions of race. In
addition, the IMS offers an “other” category where respondents are given the option to fill in a
text box with an unlisted identity group. This helps address concerns over the arbitrariness of the
conventional categories offered and provides an opportunity for respondents to add any category
she deems necessary to describe her identity more fully.
Analysis
All respondents were assigned to an identity measurement task and were asked a number of ques-
tions related to their attitudes on undocumented immigrants, foreigners with work visas, gov-
ernment jobs, and spending on welfare, aid to the poor, education, defense, and climate change.
Because policy attitudes are widely regarded as political expressions of group identities, the rela-
tionships between group identities and policy attitudes are analyzed along two dimensions: 1). The
difference in mean attitudes between groups themselves, and, 2). The difference in mean attitudes
observed under descriptive categorization versus primary group membership.
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This analysis reveals that outcomes related to policy attitudes vary between subsets of respon-
dents. Specifically, those who most strongly identify as Protestant, male, or as a white person are
most likely to have colder feelings toward immigrants and more conservative views on welfare
than people who more strongly associate with other groups. Class also emerges as a relevant iden-
tity on welfare related issues. We see these attitudinal differences more strongly when looking at
policy views according to the primary identity offered by respondents rather than by descriptive
categorization alone.
First, to get a better sense of whether the survey measures themselves had an impact on subject
responses to outcome questions, I assess the difference in means across treatment categories for a
given outcome variable. Figure 11 shows that across treatment categories, there is no significant
difference in means for a commonly used “feeling thermometer” outcome variable which asks
respondents to rate their feelings toward illegal immigrants on a scale from 0 (unfavorable) to 100
(very favorable).
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Figure 14: Response Means to “Illegal Immigrants” Question For All Respondents by Treatment
Category
The bars surrounding each mean plot represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 11 implies that the identity measurement tasks randomly assigned to respondents do
not produce significantly different responses on outcome questions. Plots of the differences in
means for all outcome measures used in the analysis of this paper can be found in Appendix B. In
the remainder of this analysis, I will pool those respondents in Conditions 2, 4, and 6 who were
assigned an identity measurement task in which they were able to select a primary identity from a




Respondents were asked two feeling thermometer questions with a scale ranging from 0 to 100 to
gauge their attitudes toward immigrants in the United States. The prompt reads as follows:
“We’d like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days.
Below we list several groups, and we’d like you to rate that group using something we
call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that
you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50
degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the group and that you don’t care
too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don’t
feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.”
Respondents were then asked to rate their feelings toward two groups: illegal immigrants, and
foreigners with work visas.
Among the entire survey population, the mean response to the feeling thermometer regarding
foreigners with work visas was 56.94. The mean response to the feeling thermometer regarding
illegal immigrants was 37.19. When comparing the means across Tables 1 and 2, we see that
respondents expressed warmer feelings toward foreigners with work visas than those who had
entered the country without legal documentation; this pattern persists when we look more closely
at the responses across the groups respondents selected as their primary identities in Tables 3 and
4.
Tables 3 and 4 reflect responses from people randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, and 6, who
were exposed to the full set of social categories from which to select a primary identity.
While most respondents have generally warmer feelings toward immigrants with work visas










































































































































































































































































































































Protestant as their primary identity category reported especially cold feelings toward undocu-
mented immigrants (means 31.7, 31.7, and 35.5 respectively). 36 percent of people who most
strongly identified as white or male, and 28 percent of those who most strongly identified as
Protestant rated their feelings toward undocumented immigrants between 0 and 10 points, with
the majority of feeling thermometer points from all three groups clustering around 0 to 40. Peo-
ple who strongly identified as females expressed somewhat cold feelings as well, though not as
strongly. Tables 20 and 21 in Appendix C reveal that individuals who primarily identify as white
and male have an average feeling thermometer rating towards undocumented immigrants that is
statistically significant from the sample mean. Further, primary male identity reveals a statistically
significant difference from ascriptive male identity concerning attitudes toward undocumented im-
migrants, underscoring the notion that primary identity reveals potentially different information
than what we observe under the ascriptive “checked box” categories for some respondents.
Because immigration has been a highly contested policy issue cutting across racial lines and
especially affecting communities with high rates of immigration to the United States such as His-
panic, Latino, and Asian communities, we might think immigration matters for particular subsets
of respondents, perhaps especially for those who strongly identify with a racial or ethnic group
(Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Gest, 2016; Lee, 2008; Sanchez, 2006).
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Table 5: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigration Question by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 2,263 33.8 29.0 0.6
1,300 32.7 28.4 0.8
183 31.7 28.3 2.1
Black / African American 333 47.7 28.3 1.6
222 47.4 28.8 1.9
51 50.3 30.3 4.2
Asian American / Pacific Islander 158 43.5 27.0 2.2
105 45.7 29.2 2.9
18 39.4 19.5 4.6
Hispanic / Latino 278 52.0 28.9 1.8
127 57.0 25.8 2.3
25 66.2 28.5 5.7
Native American / Alaska Native 44 42.1 30.3 4.6
13 43.8 31.9 8.8
1 53.0 NA NA
Middle Eastern 10 43.7 21.9 6.9
5 49.2 24.3 10.8
0 – – –
Other 31 39.5 37.8 6.8
NA – – –
NA – – –
Survey Population Mean 2,984 37.2 29.4 0.5
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
In each column of Table 5, the top set of numbers represent responses to the illegal immigration
feeling thermometer question among all respondents using the conventional demographic measure.
The middle set of numbers reflect responses from all the individuals who selected a racial or ethnic
category as their primary identity group. The bottom set of numbers represent responses among
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only those individuals randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire
set of social categories from which to select a primary identity.
Among the entire survey population population, the mean feeling thermometer rating toward
undocumented immigrants is 37.2. When using the conventional survey measure of race, we ob-
serve a mean response to the illegal immigration feeling thermometer question of 33.8 among white
respondents (N=2,263), 47.7 among black respondents (N= 333), 43.5 among Asian and Pacific
Islander respondents (N=158), 52.0 among Hispanic and Latino respondents (N=278), 42.1 among
Native American respondents (N=44), and 43.7 among Middle Eastern respondents (N=10), as re-
flected in Table 5. Comparing these groups with one another, all groups but white respondents
have a warmer than average mean rating toward undocumented immigrants. Demographically
Black and Hispanic respondents reported the warmest feelings, more than 10 points above the
survey population mean.
When we look at feelings by race and ethnicity according to the primary identities offered by
respondents in the bottom row for each group, we see that those who offered the Hispanic/Latino
group as their primary identity reported warmer feelings toward undocumented immigrants than
those who were merely descriptively categorized as Hispanic/Latino. Primary Hispanic/Latino
respondents gave an average of 66.2 points on the feeling thermometer, more than 14 points higher
than what we would have observed through descriptive categorization alone, and nearly 30 points
higher than the survey population mean. Table 21 in Appendix C confirms that these differences are
statistically significant from the sample mean. Similarly, Table 21 reveals that black respondents,
both primary and ascriptive, have statistically warmer means than the broader sample.
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Attitudes Toward the Government’s Role in Guaranteeing Each Citizen a Job
Respondents were asked the following question regarding their attitudes toward jobs provided by
the government:
“Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person
has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale,
at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their
own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other
people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would
you place yourself on this scale?”
Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Government Jobs Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Frequency 310 302 507 626 545 397 323
% 10 10 17 21 18 13 11
N= 3,010. Mean= 4.1
The survey mean response to the government jobs question was 4.089. Table 6 displays the
frequency distribution of responses to the welfare question among all respondents in the survey.
Mean responses to the jobs question were the highest among males, Protestants, white, and
Asian Americans, signifying that they are the most likely among the subpopulations included in
Table 7 to believe individuals are responsible for their own fate rather than advocating for policies
that make the government responsible for public job creation.
We might also expect class identities to be related to the attitudes reflected in this government
jobs question. Work by Carnes (2013) and Gest (2016) suggest that class consciousness influences
a number of politically relevant attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, researchers spanning the past
several decades have noted the role of class as a powerful predictor of voting behavior and political








































Fiorina, 1981). Table 8 takes a closer look at how views on government jobs may differ among
those who express a class category as their primary identity compared with what we might see
under a cross tabulation of attitudes using the conventional descriptive measure of class.
When we measure class in the conventional sense as a demographic variable answered by
the entire survey population, the mean response to the government jobs question for lower class
individuals is 3.5 (N=360), 4.0 for the working class (N=1,208), 4.3 for the middle class (N=1,366)
and 4.8 among individuals in the upper class category (N=75). The IMS allows us to compare
the cross tabulation of welfare attitudes and the conventional class variable with welfare attitudes
among the subset of respondents who were given the opportunity to select a class category as their
identity object – individuals assigned to view the full set of identity groups in Conditions 2, 4, or
6. Among people who selected a class category as their identity object, approximately 10 percent
of the individuals in Conditions 2, 4, and 6, the mean response to the government jobs question
for lower class individuals was 2.7 (N= 13), 3.9 for working class (N=74), 3.9 for middle class
(N= 62), and 2.8 among people who identified as belonging to the upper class (N=2). When we
observe individuals who selected one of the four class categories as their identity object, we see
that people who strongly identify as belonging to the lower class have a lower mean response
to the government jobs question that what is reflected in the conventional measure of class. In
other words, people who subjectively see themselves as lower class believe more strongly that the
government has a responsibility to ensure jobs and a good standard of living than what we would
observe under conventional survey observation methods by almost a full point on the 7 point scale.
Tables 24 and 25 in Appendix C show that lower class respondents have a statistically significant
difference in mean attitudes from the sample mean on the government jobs question. Tables 24 and
25 further reveal that primary identifying white (mean 4.5), male (mean 4.5), and Protestant (mean







































significance that (in the case of white and male respondents) would not be observed if the analysis
considered only ascriptive categorization for these individuals.
Part II
For the following set of questions, survey subjects were asked to respond to the following prompt:
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. Some of these problems are listed below, and for each one
indicate whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or
about the right amount.
Half of respondents were assigned to answer the first welfare question (N=1,494) while
the other half were assigned to answer the second question regarding assistance to the poor
(N=1,511).14 All respondents answered the final three questions regarding spending on educa-
tion, defense, and climate change. All the crosstabs in Part II reflect attitudes among people in
Conditions 2, 4, or 6 who were exposed to the full set of identities and who selected one of the
racial, class, gender, or Protestant groups as their main identity group.
14Respondents were not forced to answer every single question on the survey, so although the assignments to the
first or second question were random and equal, the final N in each group reflects some missing responses).
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Welfare
Table 9 is a crosstab of attitudes on welfare spending. In general, people who offered a lower class
primary identity believe too little money is spent on welfare, while those who offered an Asian,
























Table 10: Mean Responses to Welfare Question by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 1,137 1.8 0.8 0.0
670 1.9 0.8 0.0
93 1.8 0.7 0.1
Black / African American 179 2.2 0.7 0.1
113 2.2 0.7 0.1
25 2.1 0.8 0.2
Asian American / Pacific Islander 77 2.1 0.7 0.1
56 2.0 0.7 0.1
7 1.6 0.8 0.3
Hispanic / Latino 124 1.9 0.8 0.1
61 1.9 0.7 0.1
18 2.0 0.7 0.2
Native American / Alaska Native 21 2.2 0.8 0.2
10 1.7 0.7 0.2
1 2.0 NA NA
Middle Eastern 8 2.0 0.9 0.3
3 1.0 0 0
0 NA NA NA
Other 15 2.1 0.9 0.2
NA – – –
NA – – –
Male 716 1.9 0.8 0.0
– – – –
187 1.7 0.8 0.1
Female 778 1.9 0.8 0.0
– – – –
235 2.0 0.8 0.1
Protestant 388 1.7 0.7 0.0
– – – –
20 1.9 0.8 0.2
Survey Population Mean 1,494 1.9 0.8 0.0
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
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In Table 10 we can observe some differences between mean responses to the welfare question
based on the conventional demographic variable (the top line in each group), and mean responses
among those who offered a racial, gender, or Protestant primary identity (bottom line in each
group).
Although people who primarily identified as black or African American had a mean response
0.13 points lower than descriptively black respondents, people who chose an African American
primary identity still had a mean response of 2.1, fully .2 points higher than the survey population
mean of 1.9.
On the other end of the spectrum, people who offered a white or male primary identity had
lower means compared to the survey population average (.14 and .16 points below the survey
population mean, respectively), reflecting the attitude that they believe too much is being spent on
welfare, and to a somewhat stronger degree than what we would observe using the conventional
measures of race and gender.
Tables 26 and 27 in Appendix C report the statistically significant differences in means for
responses to the welfare spending question. The significance table reveals that among lower class
respondents (which are not shown in Tables 9 and 10), both primary and ascriptive lower class in-
dividuals have significantly stronger attitudes toward welfare spending. Because the question uses
only a three point scale, it is difficult to observe variation which may explain why the differences
for other groups fail to achieve statistical significance from the sample mean. Further, the entire
sample was randomly assigned to receive only one of either the welfare question or the “assistance
to the poor” question, which follows in this analysis. Because only half of all respondents were
exposed to the welfare question, the statistical power may have been diluted for this portion of the
analysis.
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Assistance to the Poor
In general, most respondents tended to believe too little spending is being given toward aid to the



























Table 12: Mean Responses to Assistance to the Poor by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 1,142 2.3 0.8 0.0
640 2.3 0.7 0.0
92 2.3 0.6 0.1
Black / African American 155 2.6 0.6 0.1
110 2.5 0.7 0.1
27 2.6 0.6 0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander 84 2.2 0.7 0.1
50 2.2 0.7 0.1
11 2.2 0.6 0.2
Hispanic / Latino 157 2.4 0.7 0.1
66 2.3 0.7 0.1
6 2.7 0.5 0.2
Native American / Alaska Native 23 2.7 0.6 0.1
3 3.0 0 0
0 – – –
Middle Eastern 2 1.5 0.7 0.5
2 2.0 0 0
0 – – –
Other 16 2.0 0.9 0.2
NA – – –
NA – – –
Male 730 2.2 0.8 0.0
– – – –
191 2.1 0.8 0.1
Female 781 2.4 0.7 0.0
– – – –
245 2.4 0.7 0.0
Protestant 393 2.1 0.8 0.0
– – – –
22 1.9 0.8 0.1
Survey Population Mean 1,511 2.3 0.7 0.02
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
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In Table 12 we see that means across groups are higher when asked to rate spending on aid to
the poor rather than welfare. Recall that while the survey population mean for views on welfare
spending was 1.9, the survey population mean regarding aid to the poor was 2.3 – fully 0.4 points
higher on the three point scale.
Still, people who offered a white or Protestant primary identity were likely to give lower mean
responses regarding their views on aid to the poor (2.1 and 2.0, respectively). People who primarily
identified as women also had a mean response lower than the population average, and lower for all
three groups than what would be observed using the conventional demographic identity measures.
Table 28 in Appendix C reports the statistical significance of the difference in means for all groups
used in this analysis, and shows that no groups means are statistically significant from the sample
mean on the “assistance to the poor” question. Again, because only half of all respondents were
exposed to the question, and because of the limitations of a three point scale, the statistical power
may have been diluted for this portion of the analysis.
Education
Table 13 shows that in general, individuals across group conditions believe that education spending

























Table 14: Mean Responses to Education Question by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 2,277 2.5 0.7 0.0
1,309 2.5 0.7 0.0
184 2.4 0.7 0.1
Black / African American 334 2.7 0.6 0.0
223 2.7 0.6 0.0
52 2.7 0.6 0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander 161 2.5 0.6 0.1
106 2.4 0.7 0.1
18 2.6 0.6 0.2
Hispanic / Latino 281 2.5 0.6 0.0
127 2.5 0.6 0.1
24 2.5 0.5 0.1
Native American / Alaska Native 44 2.8 0.6 0.1
13 2.5 0.8 0.2
1 3.0 NA NA
Middle Eastern 10 2.5 0.7 0.2
5 1.6 0.9 0.4
0 – – –
Other 31 2.45 0.9 0.2
NA – – –
NA – – –
Male 1,444 2.4 0.7 0.0
– – – –
378 2.39 0.7 0.0
Female 1,559 2.6 0.6 0.0
– – – –
480 2.6 0.6 0.0
Protestant 781 2.4 0.7 0.0
– – – –
42 2.3 0.7 0.1
Survey Population Mean 3,003 2.5 0.7 0.0
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
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When it comes to views on education spending, Protestants again stick out as the group dis-
tinguishing themselves from the population mean. Table 14 shows that across most groups, mean
responses regarding education spending do not differ much between the conventional and subjec-
tive measures of identity. People who offer a primary Protestant identity however, have views .15
points lower than what we would observe under the conventional categorization, and .24 lower
than the sample mean on the three point scale. Table 29 in Appendix C reports the statistical sig-
nificance of the difference in means for all groups used in this analysis, and shows that no groups
means are statistically significant from the sample mean on the education spending question.
Defense
Table 15 shows that among the primary identity groups listed, Protestants again seem to express
distinctive views, this time as the group with the highest share of respondents indicating that not
enough money is being spent on defense. Those who offered primary middle and lower class
identities however had higher shares of respondents expressing that too much is being spent on
defense although, as noted in Tables 30 and 31 (Appendix C) this difference is only statistically
significant for primary identifying middle class respondents. Again, in the case of middle class
respondents on defense spending, we see on Table 31 that primary identity as a middle class person
























Table 16: Mean Responses to Defense Question by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 2,278 2.0 0.8 0.0
1,309 2.0 0.8 0.0
185 2.0 0.8 0.1
Black / African American 334 1.8 0.8 0.0
223 1.9 0.8 0.1
52 1.9 0.8 0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander 161 1.5 0.6 0.1
106 1.5 0.6 0.1
18 1.8 0.6 0.2
Hispanic / Latino 281 1.8 0.7 0.1
127 1.8 0.8 0.1
24 1.7 0.7 0.1
Native American / Alaska Native 44 1.8 0.8 0.1
13 2.0 0.8 0.2
1 2.0 NA NA
Middle Eastern 10 1.8 0.9 0.3
5 1.6 0.6 0.2
0 – – –
Other 31 1.8 0.9 0.2
NA – – –
NA – – –
Male 1,445 1.9 0.8 0.0
– – – –
378 1.9 0.9 0.2
Female 1,559 1.9 0.8 0.0
– – – –
480 1.9 0.8 0.0
Protestant 718 2.2 0.8 0.0
– – – –
42 2.2 0.8 0.1
Survey Population Mean 3,004 1.9 0.8 0.0
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
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In Table 16 we do not observe much difference between mean group attitudes toward defense
spending. Table 30 in Appendix C complements this result, showing that none of the race, gender,
or religious categories of primary identity produce statistically significant means from that of the
broader sample.
Climate Change
The identity group we might expect to matter on attitudes toward climate change spending is the
Protestant group, given the long history and sometimes contentions relationship between religious
and scientific thinkers. The Pew Research Center reports that views about climate change vary
by religious affiliation and level of religious observance. In a 2015 study, white Protestants were
the least likely of the religious groups surveyed to believe that climate change was primarily due
to human activity at 41%, compared with 56% of black Protestants, 77% of Hispanic Catholics,
and 64% of the religiously unaffiliated. The report also notes that other social identities (such as
political party identification) are stronger predictors of beliefs about climate change than religion,
however, the report does not specify the exact question used to determine racial and religious group
affiliation ().
The IMS survey does reveal that Protestant identity may be relevant on the climate change
spending question. On Table 17 we see that a large share of people who primarily identify as
Protestant (50 percent) give a rating of 1, indicating that they believe too much money is being
spent on climate change. Hispanics and those offering a lower class or middle class primary
identity tended to have a larger share of respondents indicate that not enough money is being
spent on climate change issues. Tables 32 and 33 in Appendix C confirm that for people who
primarily identify as lower class, middle class, and Protestant, attitudes toward climate spending




























class primary identifiers, these attitudes are stronger than what we would observe under ascriptive
categorization alone, revealing again that primary identity affords more nuance in the analysis and
provides a deeper picture of the relationship between identity and attitudes.
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Table 18: Mean Responses to Climate Change Question by Race and Ethnicity
N Mean SD SE
White / Caucasian 2,279 2.2 0.8 0.0
1,310 2.2 0.8 0.0
185 2.1 0.8 0.1
Black / African American 334 2.3 0.7 0.0
223 2.3 0.7 0.1
52 2.3 0.8 0.1
Asian American / Pacific Islander 161 2.4 0.7 0.1
106 2.4 0.8 0.1
18 2.4 0.6 0.2
Hispanic / Latino 281 2.3 0.8 0.1
127 2.3 0.7 0.1
24 2.5 0.7 0.2
Native American / Alaska Native 44 2.6 0.7 0.1
13 2.6 0.7 0.2
1 3.0 NA NA
Middle Eastern 10 2.2 0.9 0.3
5 1.6 0.8 0.4
0 NA NA NA
Other 31 2.1 0.9 0.2
NA – – –
NA – – –
Male 1,446 2.1 0.8 0.0
– – – –
378 2.0 0.8 0.0
Female 1,559 2.2 0.8 0.0
– – – –
480 2.2 0.8 0.0
Protestant 781 1.9 0.8 0.0
– – – –
42 1.7 0.8 0.1
Survey Population Mean 3,005 2.2 0.8 0.0
For each group category represented in this table, the top set of numbers reflect responses among
all survey subjects under the conventional demographic measure. The middle set of numbers
represent responses among individuals who selected that racial or ethnic category as their main
identity object. The bottom set of numbers represents responses among only those people assigned
to Conditions 2, 4, or 6, who would have seen the entire set of identities from which to choose.
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Table 18 shows that Protestants in the sample are already on average more inclined to believe
too much is being spent on climate change than the rest of the survey population. But those who
offer a primary Protestant identity give an average rating of 1.7 on the climate spending scale,
.2 points lower than the conventional categorization would suggest and 1.6 points lower than the
survey population average on the three point scale. The differences in means for both primary and
ascriptive Protestant respondents are statistically significant from the broader population mean (see
Appendix C, Tables 32 and 33).
In the opposite direction, people who offer a Hispanic/Latino primary identity have a mean
view on climate change spending .2 points higher than what we observe under the conventional
measure, and .3 points higher than the survey population average on the three point scale, though
again, these differences are only statistically significant for individuals who self-categorize, either
ascriptively or primarily, as Protestant.
The finding that primary identification leads to stronger opinion for some groups may lead
one to wonder whether group identity is related to particular political ideologies. However, for
most groups in this sample, primary self-identification only leads to stronger opinion on some, not
all issues. Still, throughout this analysis of IMS data, we find that people who offer a primary
white, male, or Protestant identity seem to have stronger attitudes than what we would observe
under conventional categorizations. Part III below presents demographic profiles of these groups




So Who Are The People Who Primarily Identify as White, Male,
and Protestant?
Table 19 reflects responses from people randomly assigned to Conditions 2, 4, and 6, who were
exposed to the full set of social categories from which to select a primary identity, and displays
demographic traits of people who offered a primary white, male, or Protestant identity.
People who primarily identified as Protestant (N=42) were overwhelmingly white (88%), and
were mostly conservative (64%). Primary Protestant identifiers were also more highly educated
than other groups, with about 30% of respondents having attended some college, 30% possessing
a 4-year degree, and 12% possessing a post-graduate degree such as a law degree or Ph.D. Primary
Protestant identifiers were also more likely to be women (64%) and from the middle class (57%).
Those who offered a primary white identity (N=186) were mostly male (59%), and mostly
middle (50%) or working class (35%). People who primarily identified as white were fairly evenly
dispersed in self-reported ideology with a slight conservative leaning (31%).
Respondents who offered a primary male identity (N=378) were mostly white (76%) although
some people who primarily identified as male also self-reported being African American (7%) or
Asian American/Pacific Islander (9%), with fewer primary male respondents identifying as mem-
bers of other racial and ethnic groups. Primary male identifiers were also most likely to belong to
the middle class (45%) or working class (39%) and were fairly evenly dispersed in ideology and
region.
To reiterate, white and male respondents do not seem to be particularly distinctive in their ex-
pressed ideology. In fact, the relatively even ideological distribution of white and male respondents
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Table 19: White, Male, Protestant Identifier Demographics
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may gesture that identification is drawing out something more than ideology. A question for further
research emerges: how should we explain the shared political attitudes of white and male respon-
dents apart from ideology? There may something distinctive about the choice to identify as white
or male in the first place, given that respondents were given a host of socially relevant categories
from which to choose, and given that primary identification with a group does not appear to be
related to consistently different attitudes for most other groups (although for some issues, primary
group identification seems to matter, such as immigration for Hispanics and Latinos, and welfare
for Black Americans).
Discussion
The findings of the IMS complement the findings of previous theoretical and qualitative work
showing that individual perceptions of identity are more subjective than researchers have assumed
using conventional strategies for the measurement of identity. Specifically, we see that attitudes
across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differ for
some groups from what we might observe using the conventional “checked box” measure of group
identity. Individuals who primarily identify as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as
having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what
we would observe under conventional correlation between ascriptive categorization and attitudinal
outcomes, especially on welfare and immigration issues.
Protestants held the most consistently conservative attitudes among the sample represented in
this paper. Having a distinct Protestant self-identity is associated with colder feelings toward im-
migrants whether undocumented or in the country with a work visa, the belief that people should
advance their social standing without the assistance of guaranteed jobs from the government, pref-
erence for less spending on welfare, aid to the poor, education, and climate change, and more
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spending on defense. These attitudes were even more strongly in the conservative direction for
people who offered Protestantism as their primary identity. When being Protestant is more than a
descriptive category and is part of a person’s self-concept, we observe differences in policy-related
attitudes. In other words, being Protestant is one thing, the belief that being Protestant matters is,
substantively, another.
Protestants, males, and white Americans are not the only categories where primary identifi-
cation with the group relates to distinctive policy attitudes. However, for groups such as Black
Americans or Hispanic and Latino Americans, it seems the identity to attitude relationship only
peaks for certain policy areas. Concerning immigration, those who offered the Hispanic or Latino
group as their primary identity reported warmer feelings toward undocumented immigrants than
those who were merely descriptively categorized as Hispanic or Latino. Primary Hispanic and
Latino respondents gave an average of 66.24 points on the feeling thermometer, more than 14
points higher than what we would have observed through descriptive categorization alone, and
nearly 30 points higher than the survey population mean. Similarly, black self-identity is associ-
ated with the view that more money should be spent on aid to the poor and welfare programs, and
though black respondents expressed numeric differences that bear substantively my interpretation,
this finding does not appear to be statistically significant. Class likewise surfaced as a relevant
identity related to preferences for increased welfare spending and the belief that the government
should provide jobs for citizens. Lower class and middle class respondents also tended to believe
too little money is being spent on climate issues.
Perhaps equally as interesting are the places where primary identity does not appear to coin-
cide with stronger policy attitudes. While I certainly do not intend to undercut the relevance of
identity in American politics, I do take these results to mean that identity may not be of paramount
influence on every policy area that a person considers. The IMS provides an especially specific
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measure of self-identification, and if we don’t see social identities cropping up on our measures of
policy attitudes when individuals select those identities themselves, I believe it is an even stronger
test of when identity does matter. On the other hand, when we do see primary identities emerge
through distinct political attitudes, we have a more direct indication that identity with a particular
group matters for the policy considerations of individuals in that group. This is especially true
when the policy preferences observed for primary identifiers are statistically different from those
observed using ascriptive measures because it indicates that primary identity tells us more specific
information about respondents’ attitudes than we would have otherwise observed. In other words,
the measurement strategy used in the IMS provides a useful way for future scholars to determine
the policy areas for which identity (rather than ascription) plays an especially important role.
Conclusion
In February 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) added male supremacy groups to its
list of hate groups for the first time since SPLC began tracking hate organizations in 1999 (Southern
Poverty Law Center, 2018b). The addition of male supremacy groups comes at a time of increased
political visibility among women, people of color, immigrants, and even children. The perception
of dispossession among some men, especially some white men, plays an increasingly important
role in the political considerations of white America, and in many cases is underscored by other
elements such as religious conservatism and socioeconomic status. Indeed, when the politics of
equality for marginalized communities are perceived as dispossession for white people, we see
the politics of white identity rise to the surface. Though the politics of white identity are not new
to American politics, the particular social and political climate in the United States mean this is
something worth paying attention to and analyzing with nuance. There is important variation to
understand, and social scientists need to refine the discussion about what white identity means
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apart from white nationalism and white supremacy. In an increasingly pluralistic society, social
scientists stand to gain information about the degree of variation displayed in self-identification,
especially for people who most strongly identify as white, male, or Protestant. In a time when
the dividing lines of politics are increasingly drawn along racial boundaries, understanding how
identity relates to political choice has clear and immediate implications for both public policy and
electoral politics. As research and measurement strategies are further refined, we may stand to see
a more robust portrait of identity and its ties to the policy preferences and political behaviors of
groups.
While the measure proposed in this paper provides a promising alternative conceptual frame-
work for understanding how individuals may be thinking about group identity at the individual
level, identity remains a broad topic with several spaces of nuance left to consider. First, we may
question how much individuals are really picking and choosing their level of personal proximity to
groups. For instance, individuals with certain class, gender, or racial and ethnic attributes may be
reminded of their group membership status by societal forces such as socioeconomic inequality,
gender disparity or racial and ethnic animus from other groups. Regardless of whether they wish
to be closely associated with certain groups, individuals whose mere membership places them in
group categories heavily affected by societal factors may conceive of their group membership as
a heavily influential part of their personal identity and group consciousness may play a major role
in their political attitudes and behavior. One feature of the point allocation measure used in this
paper is that it allows us to gauge an individual’s strength of association with a particular group
by counting how many points were allocated to one group in relation to another. While assess-
ing strength of association was beyond the scope of this paper, the data does allow for continued
research that may help us understand the role of proximity operationalized as relative point distri-
butions in the point allocation task. Future work can use point distributions to understand whether
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stronger identity is related to stronger policy preference, and whether there are thresholds at which
point allocation begins or ceases to correspond with political attitudes.
Second, the context in which individuals consider their personal fate to be connected to group
status matters. Some individuals may exhibit a consistent sense of attachment between groups
regardless of environment and allocate the same number of points to each group whether at home,
work, or elsewhere. Other individuals may feel their status as a woman, for example, matters less
at home where familial roles may be established within the household than at work where gender
norms tend to dominate certain office settings and can affect the likelihood of receiving certain
types of work assignments, equal pay, promotions and the like. Further research should attempt to
distinguish whether individuals who differ in their primary self-identity based on environment also
change their policy attitudes with those environmental considerations.
Third, we may question at what age individuals begin to discover identities they did not pre-
viously know they had. Identities are fluid, but they are also largely reinforced by social sur-
roundings. As individuals age, exposure over time to different social environments may serve to
reinforce or challenge a person’s concept of self. The measure as used in this paper does not allow
us to understand how individual attachments to groups may change over time, and future research
should use the point allocation measure on panel studies to assess identity and political attitudes
as they manifest within individuals, across social categories, and over time. A panel study over
time, or questions adapted to measure attachment retrospectively may allow researchers to begin
understanding how group identity is formed, maintained, and adapted throughout an individual’s
lifespan.
As research expands to consider more nuance in the relationship between self-identity and
political outcomes, social scientists will gain better sense of how individuals subjectively relate to
group identities. Continued work will shed light on the relationships between individuals, their
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subjective identities, and the empirical correlates of identity such as inequality, intergroup conflict
and violence, coalitional politics, and descriptive representation, the implications for which are
useful for the study of group preference comparatively and across scholarly disciplines.
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Conclusion
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate how additional theoretical concep-
tions and measurement strategies may add context to our understanding of identity group politics.
Here I discuss the contributions of my thesis, summarize the main arguments and findings of each
chapter, present recommendations for further consideration among scholars and practitioners of
social science, and detail my plans for future research.
Chapter Summaries
1 Typologies of Group Conscious Thinking
This chapter outlined the intellectual lineage of theories in group politics, addressing the tension
between research in political behavior which often links behavioral outcomes to fixed categorical
identity variables, and political psychology which often treats identity as fluid and malleable. By
introducing the type-predictor framework, I placed my work on an expanding frontier of the iden-
tity politics literature that commonly links ascriptive group membership to political attitudes and
behavior, but has increasingly developed to consider intersectionality. The framework rests on the
notion that perhaps it is not ascriptive identity that we should think of as being tied to particular
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trends in attitudes and behaviors, but the way individuals understand their relationship to group
identity when group membership becomes individually salient.
2 The Type-Predictor Framework in Action
In this chapter I presented support for the type-predictor framework using data through the analy-
sis of 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The interviews demonstrated that when we further
interrogate how attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, we may develop a more
refined picture of identity and intersectional politics in the United States. The open-ended re-
sponses to group consciousness questions in my interviews provided support for the type-predictor
framework. I found examples of all five “types” and all four “predictors” in the typology, and the
relationships between types and predictors appeared to be in the directions I expected. Among
the interview sample, a sense of shared outcomes was related to the different degrees of group
consciousness individuals may hold at the individual level depending on the group categories with
which they did (or did not) self-identify. While the convention, at least in political science research,
has been to control for categories such as race, socioeconomic status, gender, and religion in a re-
gression framework, and to use these categories as explanatory variables for a host of political
phenomena, these interview findings suggest that we should be more careful in our suppositions
regarding the associations between social group identities and their empirical correlates.
3 Can Alternative Measurement Strategies Provide New Insights for Our Un-
derstanding of Group Political Attitudes in the United States?
In this chapter I developed a new measurement strategy for the study of identity that allows re-
spondents a greater degree of flexibility when considering the subjective relationship between
their sense of group identity and the policy attitudes often considered to be empirical correlates
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of identity. In the 2015 Identity Measurement Study (IMS) I introduced a point allocation strat-
egy for measuring identity that allows survey respondents a fixed number of identity points to
allocate at their discretion across a set of social identity categories. The design also allows us to
explore whether the attitudes we observe when individuals select a primary identity are different
from the attitudes we observe when using conventional measures of demographic correlation. The
findings of the IMS complement the findings of previous theoretical and qualitative work showing
that individual perceptions of identity are more subjective than researchers have assumed using
conventional strategies for the measurement of identity. Specifically, the findings showed that at-
titudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and
differed for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional “checked box” mea-
sure of ascriptive group identity. Individuals who primarily identified as white, male, or Protestant
consistently stuck out as having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having
stronger views than what we would have observed under conventional correlation between ascrip-
tive categorization and attitudinal outcomes. Specifically, those who most strongly identified as
Protestant, male, or as a white person were most likely to have colder feelings toward immigrants
and more conservative views on welfare than people who more strongly associated with other
groups. These attitudinal differences were even more pronounced when the analysis considered
policy views according to the primary identity offered by respondents rather than by ascriptive
categorization alone.
Contributions
My work is situated at the intersection of political psychology and race and ethnic studies, drawing
from, and contributing to, the literatures of political science, psychology, and sociology. I use both
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qualitative and quantitative methods as research tools, bringing disciplinary perspectives into dia-
logue with one another as a way of engaging with the literatures mentioned above. In particular,
this dissertation exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate
multidimensionality in the study of identity, and is part of a growing scholarly literature offering
alternative measures of group consciousness that accommodate a more intersectional operational-
ization of identity. I offer the following contributions through my dissertation research:
• A typology for conceptualizing group consciousness. My type-predictor framework ad-
dresses the variation in inter-group expressions of shared political fate and posits that it is
they way a person self-categorizes, rather than her ascriptive categorization alone, that influ-
ences whether she perceives her personal fate to be tied to the status of other group members
or not. At the same time, the theoretical underpinnings of the type-predictor framework in-
corporate intersectionality, making the typology specific enough to describe the relationship
between self-identification and expressions of shared fate yet flexible enough to encompass
the range of identity expressions that may be expressed either within a single person or across
groups.
• An analysis of open-ended responses to the linked fate question and other measures of group
consciousness. My dissertation analyzes open-ended responses to the linked fate question
across a large cross-section of interview respondents. In addition, my work is one of a hand-
ful of studies to allow respondents to answer the linked fate question in reference to the group
with which they primarily self-identify rather than having respondents answer the linked fate
question in reference to an ascribed social category such as race or gender. By asking respon-
dents how they self-identify before asking them to relate their sense of shared outcomes to
the primary group, I am able to analyze linked fate according to a person’s primary identifi-
cation rather than by group membership alone, providing an additional dimension of context
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to the linked fate literature. In addition, the open-ended response format allows me to under-
stand how individuals are interpreting the linked fate question. Some respondents take the
question literally (if a specific event happens to my neighbor who shares my identity, will
it impact me personally?) while others interpret the question more conceptually (if people
in my group are better/worse off in society, will I be better/worse off by extension?). The
variation in interpretations of linked fate, quite apart from the variation in negative versus
affirmative responses, lead me to believe more work can be done to develop more precise
measures of shared consciousness, which will be discussed in my recommendation section.
The variation in responses to linked fate do not affect my type-predictor framework, which
should be applied to understand group consciousness more broadly, as linked fate is but one
operationalization of group consciousness. Overall, the open-ended format of the questions
used in my interview work reveal that new information and contextual development can be
gained when respondents are allowed to describe the important relationships between polit-
ical, psychological, and social factors in their own words.
• A point allocation system for the survey measurement of identity. By using a point allocation
task to measure identity, I am able to understand how respondents weigh certain aspects of
their identity in relation to others. While a handful of surveys allow respondents to select
a primary identity group (the American National Election Study began asking respondents
to select a primary identity in 2016), this study is the first to use the point allocation de-
sign to measure identity across a range of relevant social categories alongside one another,
and assess whether differences in primary versus ascriptive group membership affects our
interpretation of policy attitudes within and between groups. The advantage of point al-
location compared with other methods of identity measurement is that the point allocation
design allows for the recognition of a primary identity (the group with the highest number
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of points) group and provides a measure of a person’s magnitude of identity with each group
(the distribution of points across categories). Point allocation has the potential to provide
more information about how individuals self-identify relative to other measures, yet is flex-
ible enough to be analyzed in ways that are analogous to more conventional measures of
self-identification.
• Finally, by making the subjectivity of self-identification the fulcrum of my research, I engage
with the increasing number of scholars who bring multi-faceted considerations of identity
into greater focus within the academic literature. I especially emphasize the need to expand
our scholarly understanding of marginalized communities that often believe many aspects
of their identities are important to their political selves, and advocate for the further devel-
opment of theory and measurement strategies aimed at encompassing more fully the range
of expressions of self-identification present in a pluralistic society. Refining the techniques
for examining the important, if complex, relationships between social identities and their
political correlates will have impactful consequences for scholarship (because of the respon-
sibility social scientists have to accurately reflect populations) as well as policy (because
better measures can lead to more precise matching of policy to citizen preference).
Reflections and Recommendations
Though my work exists within a growing body of research examining how best to accommodate
multidimensionality in the study of identity, more work must be done to offer alternative measures
of group consciousness that accommodate a more fluid operationalization of identity. I offer the
following reflections and recommendations for the consideration of social scientists and practition-
ers interested in the application of social scientific research tools:
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• As more and more communities amplify their collective voices, social scientists should re-
spond by placing those voices at the center of theory development and the adaptation of
empirical design strategies. This means doing more to allow research subjects to describe
their identities and political considerations in their own words, and placing academic value
on the experiences they describe alongside our social scientific interpretations of those ex-
periences in both qualitative and quantitative research contexts. Such adaptations will be
especially useful for understanding the political attitudes and experiences of communities at
the margins of power, understudied populations, and groups of people who consider inter-
sectionality to be an important part of their self-concept.
• Empirical measures of group consciousness should be more precisely developed and tested
for measurement validity. Specifically, studies should test whether discriminant validity
exists between linked fate and other correlates of group identity, given that several differ-
ent interpretations of the linked fate question were expressed throughout my open-ended
interviews. I also recommend the development of a group consciousness index that en-
compasses literal and conceptual dimensions of shared fate, an individual’s magnitude of
self-identification with the primary group, her perception of the status of the group within
the broader society, whether she believes her identity to be politicized, and the degree to
which she believes collective action is the best way to improve group status. Such an in-
dex would contain each element that defines group consciousness, address the notion that
individuals may conceive of the relationship between group and self status along multiple
dimensions, and allow researchers to conduct analyses using the index as a whole measure,
or by comparing intergroup differences across its parts.
• The empirical design strategies presented in this dissertation provide new opportunities to
study identity and its political correlates in other institutional and comparative contexts.
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Including the point allocation design in frequently occurring surveys could allow researchers
to better understand how different events can affect the salience of particular identities and
influence how people allocate points within the same set of social categories over time,
especially in the presence of open (or subdued) political conflict, or in the wake of political
stimuli that raise (or lower) the salience of particular identities. The point allocation design
can also be adapted to look at how people identify with other socially relevant categories
such as caste, ethnic groups, and linguistic groups.
• As further research uses the point allocation strategy and compares analyses of point alloca-
tion designs to those of conventional measures of identity, a guide should be developed to
focus on the merits and implications of each type of design for survey researchers. The guide
should summarize when the point allocation strategy adds analytic value and should be used
over conventional methods such as checked boxes and multiple choice format questions.
Future Research
This dissertation provides fertile ground for the research community to continue examining mul-
tiple dimensions of identity in relation to political outcomes. Here I identify three examples of
future work that would build upon the findings and empirical contributions of this dissertation:
• An empirical analysis of the type-predictor framework. Future work should test for quantita-
tive evidence of the type-predictor framework among a national sample with an oversample
of racial and ethnic minorities to compliment the qualitative findings described in this disser-
tation. Continued work should also develop survey measures for each of the consciousness
types and predictors in the typology and develop an index of group consciousness as an out-
come measure that separately measures each of the comprising parts of group consciousness:
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politicized in-group identification, a shared system of beliefs about the status of the in-group
within the broader society, and a view that collective action is the best means for the group to
improve its status and realize its shared interests. Developing survey measures for the con-
sciousness types and predictors and refining the survey measurement of group consciousness
will bring empirical precision to the literature which has not yet adopted a standard survey
instrument for measuring the different ways a person may exhibit group consciousness (this
is what a type-predictor survey measure would contribute), nor has the literature adopted a
standard index for separately measuring the components of group consciousness (prior mea-
sures capture each element separately, and individual measures such as “linked fate,” the
“close to” question and the “life chances” question do not adequately measure the extent to
which a person believes her identity to be politicized, or the role a person believes collective
action will play in improving the status of her identity group).
• Additional analyses of point allocation data. The Identity Measurement Study (IMS) point
allocation survey experiment yielded a rich dataset ripe for further analysis. This dissertation
used only the primary identity group recorded for each respondent in the analysis, that is,
the group to which a respondent allocated the greatest number of points. Continued research
on the IMS data and other surveys using the point allocation design should examine other
patterns in point allocation that will provide a more complete descriptive picture of the way
individuals allocate points to groups. How many respondents allocate all of their points
to a single group? What types of respondents distribute their points evenly across groups?
Are some people more likely to skew their points in favor of one group while distributing
the rest of their points evenly? Are patterns in point distribution observable across social
categories? Specific work on the IMS data should take a closer look at how to explain the
shared political attitudes of white and male respondents apart from ideology. To reiterate,
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white and male respondents in my sample do not seem to be particularly distinctive in their
expressed ideological identification. In fact, the relatively even ideological distribution of
white and male respondents may gesture that identification is drawing out something more
than ideology. There may something distinctive about the choice to identify as white or male
in the first place, given that respondents were given a host of socially relevant categories
from which to choose, and given that primary identification with a group does not appear to
be related to consistently different attitudes for most other groups (although for some issues,
primary group identification seems to matter, such as immigration for Hispanics and Latinos,
and welfare for Black Americans).
• Additional tests of the point allocation task to larger national samples and over time. Con-
tinued experiments should explicitly test whether assignment to the point allocation task
yields different responses to an index of group consciousness questions and policy attitude
measures than assignment to a task that solely asks respondents to check a box indicating
primary group membership. Such experiments will add to the descriptive data about how
individuals subjectively allocate points to relevant social categories while at the same time
testing the causal effect of assignment to the point allocation task versus the conventional
method of checking a box to indicate group identity.
My own long-term research trajectory will continue to focus on the theoretical conceptualization
and measurement strategies useful for understanding how political attitudes and behavior respond
to self-categorization, the applications for which are not limited to the United States. By develop-
ing theory and measurement designs that are applicable to local and comparative contexts I situate
my work in a space that is accessible to scholars from multiple disciplines, and offer a touchpoint
for continued scholarship to addresses changing political and social environments comparatively
and in the United States.
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This section provides basic demographic information about your background characteristics.
1. Age (if respondent is younger than 18, the interview will not proceed):
2. Place and date of birth:
3. Parents’ countries of origin:
4. Gender:





Now I’m going to ask a few questions about your identity, how you view yourself and how you
believe other people view you in a broad sense.
1. How do you identify yourself? Why?
2. 2. (If respondent identifies with multiple groups)- Do you feel a stronger sense of identity
with one group over the others (Or, what group do you feel closest to)? Why?
(a) Do you think your personal identity is tied to this group?
(b) How do you feel about the status of your group in society right now?
3. How do you think others identify you?
(a) a. Do you think that people in your group identify you in a different way than people
who aren’t in that group? Why or why not?
(b) b. Do you think other people’s perceptions of your identity matters? Why or why not?
Political Decisionmaking
Now I’m going to ask a few questions about how you form your opinions and attitudes about
important issues in your life and in society more generally.
1. When you think about politics and public policy, what sorts of issues matter most to you?
Why?
2. When you’re forming your opinion about these policies, how do you figure out what’s best?
3. Think back to the last Presidential election in 2008 between Barack Obama and John Mc-
Cain. You don’t have to tell me who you voted for, what I’m interested to know is how
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you decided which candidate to support? What were the most important factors for you
during that election? Or if you didn’t vote, what things do you think would have been most
important to you at the time?
(a) How about in general? What are the most important things when you’re figuring out
who to vote for?
Linked Fate
1. Do you think what happens to (people in respondent’s group) in this country will have some-
thing to do with what happens in your life?
(a) A lot, some, or not very much?
(b) Why?
2. Do you think your life chances are affected by race/class/gender/religion?
3. Based on your experiences, does it make sense to view your own life chances as being tied
to the success of other people in your group?
4. Do you ever use race as a proxy for your own self-interest?
Group Solidarity
1. Do you think it is more important to foster unity within your group to achieve common
goals (such as better education, health) or is it more important to join forces with other
groups that are fighting to achieve similar goals such as better education, licenses, health,
and immigration?
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Interviewer 1 M African American
Interviewer 2 F Chinese American
Interviewer 3 F African American
Respondent Profiles
Names and identifying information (including date of birth) are omitted to protect the anonymity
of respondents.
Respondent SU2014_01 Date: 6/25/14 Duration: 44:09 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 23
2. Place and date of birth: Illinois
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: M.A., Columbia University. B.A., Moorehouse College
6. Party ID: No affiliation
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, resident of New York City.
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Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_03 Date: 6/24/14 Duration: 20:45 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 20
2. Place and date of birth: Albuquerque, NM
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines. Father - United States.
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Morehouse College (current student).
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, resident of Virginia.
Type: Multiple Identifier, Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_04 Date: 6/25/14 Duration: 23:55 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 20
2. Place and date of birth: New York City
3. Parents country of origin: China, both
4. Gender: Female
208
5. Education (years of education, if they went to College, name of the institution): B.A., Bing-
hamton University.
6. Party ID: I don’t know.
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_05 Date: 6/27/14 Duration: 18:53 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 21
2. Place and date of birth: Manhattan, NY
3. Parents country of origin: China, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Baruch College (current student).
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation
File Name: SU2014_06 Date: 6/29/14 Duration: 33:45 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 83
2. Place and date of birth: Peakesville, NY
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3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education : Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_07 Date: 6/29/14 Duration: 60:30 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 52
2. Place and date of birth: Chicago, IL
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., Pratt Institute
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, New Jersey resident
Type: Non-Conformist, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity
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File Name: SU2014_08 Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 34:00 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 71
2. Place and date of birth: Virginia (also lived in DE, NC, MD, KA, CA, MI).
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: Ph.D., Harvard, also University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Washington
University in St. Louis.
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Non-Conformist, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_09 Date: 6/30/14 Duration: 29:28 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: Now works in consulting for a tech firm. Young African American male, cited many
prominent figures in Black political thought throughout interview. Graduated from Morehouse
College in 2013.
1. Age: 22
2. Place and date of birth: Aumsbach, Germany
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Morehouse College
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6. Party ID: Republican
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, New York City resident.
Type: Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_10 Date: 7/1/14 Duration: 49:50 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: Skype
1. Age: 24
2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY. Grew up in Bedstuy
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (Brooklyn)
4. Gender: Male
5. Education M.Div., Union Theological Seminary(current student). B.A., Morehouse College.
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity, Group
Membership
File Name: SU2014_11 Date: 7/2/14 Duration: 31:06 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person
Notes: fast talker, tends to mumble for lack of diction because she talks so fast. Works for
Morgan Stanley.
1. Age: 22
2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY
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3. Parents country of origin: Father - Dutch (Netherlands), Mother - Nigeria
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Stonybrook University
6. Party ID: Independent
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_12 Date: 7/1/2014 Duration: 22:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 21
2. Place and date of birth: Flushing, Queens, NY
3. Parents country of origin: South Korea, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Carleton College
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership
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File Name: SU2014_13 Date: 7/1/14 Duration: 33:35 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 63
2. Place and date of birth: San Francisco, CA
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: Ph.D., UCLA
6. Party ID: None, Independent
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_14 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 55:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: Older man, gentle voice, Southern. Slow talker.
1. Age: 83
2. Place and date of birth: Birmingham, AL (repeated address of first home, which is still in
his family).
3. Parents country of origin: United states, both. Mother schoolteacher, father small en-
trepreneur.
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: Ph.D. Nova Southeastern University.
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6. Party ID: Democrat, sometimes Independent
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_15 Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 48:19 Interviewer: Eileen Lam Interview Style:
Phone
Notes: Southern drawl in his speech, doesn’t always go straight to the point of what he’s
talking about, speaks with many “um’s and uhh’s.” Kind way about his demeanor, seemed happy
to provide his insights for this interview.
1. Age: 75
2. Place and date of birth: Washington, D.C.
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: 4 year college, North Carolina Central University
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. 7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_16 Date: 7/6/14 Duration: 31:08 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person
1. Age: 21
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2. Place and date of birth: New York City
3. Parents country of origin: China, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Boston University
6. Party ID: Democrat, but doesn’t strongly identify
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_17 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 40:37 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 29
2. Place and date of birth: “Born in Toronto and when I was about 8 years old our family moved
to Birmingham, England, and I lived there for 3 years, and then we moved back to Canada
but we moved to like a smaller town outside of Toronto. And then I lived there for like 7
years, and then I moved to Korea, and I did my last year of high school in Korea, and then I
moved back to Toronto where I did college, and now I’m here [in NYC].”
3. Parents country of origin: Korea, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., Columbia University.
6. Party ID: No affiliation.
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7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Permanent Resident
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_18 Date: 7/8/14 Duration: 28:33 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person
Notes: Upbeat attitude, lots of rapport with interviewer.
1. Age: 23
2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY
3. Parents country of origin: Father - Puerto Rico, Mother - United States
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., SUNY Stonybrook
6. Party ID: Democrat (hesitant)
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_19 Date: 7/11/14 Duration: 40:00 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 29
2. Place and date of birth: “Brazil until I was 13, then I moved to Miami. I’m in New York
now.”
3. Parents country of origin: South Korea, both.
4. Gender: Female
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5. Education: M.A., Columbia University.
6. Party ID: No party affiliation.
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Permanent Resident.
Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Disassociation
File Name: SU2014_20 Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 26:49 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-person
Notes: Upbeat, warm, positive personality. Thought the interview was so cool, and really liked
the questions because these are things people don’t really get to talk about much. Identified as a
gay woman during the interview.
1. Age: 24
2. Place and date of birth: Woodbridge, VA. But lived in Maryland briefly.
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., Columbia in Social Work
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier, Abstract Conceptualizer, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Member-
ship
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File Name: SU2014_22 Date: 7/16/14 Duration: 28:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype
Notes: Skype interview. Some technical difficulties - connection interrupted once.
1. Age: 25
2. Place and date of birth: Schenectady, NY.
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - France, Father - United States
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Rochester Institute of Technology
6. Party ID: Independent
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Non-Conformist. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_24 Date: 8/8/14 Duration: 49:50 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-person
1. Age: 36
2. Place and date of birth: South Bend, IN, grew up in Baltimore MD, then moved to NYC.
3. Parents country of origin: “Taiwan and China. My mom was born in Taiwan, my dad was
born in China but then fled to Taiwan during the revolution so his roots are in China but
he’s not Taiwanese, so there’s that whole divide on who’s Taiwanese, who’s Chinese. Huge
political debate.”
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., University of Virginia (Architecture).
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6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_25 Date: 7/16/14 Duration: 35:30 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 27
2. Place and date of birth: Spanish Harlem (New York)
3. Parents country of origin: Nicaragua, both.
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Fordham University.
6. Party ID: “I’m more independent nowadays. By independent I mean I kind of don’t get
involved in politics as much as I used to.”
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, lifelong New York City resident.
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_26 Date: 7/12/14 Duration: 51:20 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 29
2. Place and date of birth: New York City – Harlem. But has also lived in Cleveland, TN for
Bible College.
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3. Parents country of origin: United States, both - but doesn’t know anything about her father’s
background
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., New Life Bible College (Theology)
6. Party ID: “I usually say Independent because I never really am swayed by weather an issue
is Republican or Democrat. I kind of just go according to what I’m feeling in terms of if
I agree with the party or not. Because I don’t always agree with one or the other, because
I am a Christian so it’s like, of course because I’m black, African American, I’m gonna
lean more to the Democratic side for the minorities, things like that. But being a Christian
I don’t always agree with certain things that society says we’re supposed to in a sense. So
it’s like that’s when I lean more on the Republican side when they want everything to be in
such a uniformed way. So I’m not in-between, so therefore instead of saying I’m one or the
other I kind of lean more toward Independent. That doesn’t mean I go for the independent
candidate.”
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_27 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 1:00:13 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 32
2. Place and date of birth: Cookville, TN. “It’s outside of Nashville. I grew up in Gainsville,
FL. I’ve lived in New York for quite some time. I lived in London for a while when I was
getting my Master’s, and then I spent some summers in Nigeria.”
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3. Parents country of origin: Nigeria, both. “And they’ve lived for the last twenty-some years
in Gainsville. There’s a lot of trees. It’s mainly a college town, there’s not much going on.
But you know, it’s an ok area for Florida. It provides a nice balance because it’s a college
town, so it’s not too Southern or closed-minded. Both my parents are from Nigeria, and both
my parents are Yoruba.”
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., Holt International Business School in London.
6. Party ID: “I say that I’m independent, I have consistently voted recently Democratic, espe-
cially when it comes to presidential elections. I do consider myself probably – I mean, I
don’t know. I think in some environments I would come across as conservative, and then in
others I would be liberal. So it just depends on what group of people we’re talking about.
But I probably in the next democratic election will vote democrat as well. So my voting be-
havior says democratic but I think my ideology is more independent. But I don’t think we’ll
ever have an independent president, so we’re stuck with this two party system. So despite
what I may think, that’s how I’m voting.”
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen, but dual citizen with a Nigerian passport.
Type: Multiple Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment, Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_28 Date: 7/9/14 Duration: 22:17 Interviewer: 2 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: Brief answers, not very talkative, but happy to give his insights. Overall a pleasant-
seeming person if somewhat reserved in his responses.
1. Age: 21
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2. Place and date of birth: China until I was 8, and after that in New York City in Chinatown.
3. Parents country of origin: China, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., SUNY Buffalo
6. Party ID: No affiliation
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_29 Date: 7/10/14 Duration: 20:37 Interviewer: 1 Interview Style: In-
person
Notes: Strong New York/Bronx accent. Interview at a Starbucks with upbeat oldies Motown
era music playing in the background. Interview starts with the song “It Takes Two” playing in the
background.
1. Age: 23
2. Place and date of birth: Bronx. “I practically lived in the Bronx my whole life, I moved to
Yonkers 5 years ago.”
3. Parents country of origin: Dominican Republic, both.
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Stonybrook University (Sociology). “I’m going for nursing school next.”
6. Party ID: “I’m not really into politics but I guess I’m a Democrat. That’s what I put.”
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7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen.
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation, Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_30 Date: 8/25/14 Duration: 51:53 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 34
2. Place and date of birth: Akron, Ohio
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Lehman College
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Non-Conformist., Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_31 Date: 8/25/14 Duration: 39:51 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype
Notes: Full time musician, interviewed over Skype while sitting in his apartment recording
studio. Had been thinking about identity because he’s moving back to Argentina after living over
half his life in the U.S. Moving back to be with his girlfriend who is a dancer, been together 5
years, and they want to start a life together because it’ll be more affordable in Argentina.
1. Age: 40
2. Place and date of birth: Buenos Aires, Argentina
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3. Parents country of origin: Argentina, both.
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: M.A. in musical composition, CUNY. B.A., Berkelee College of Music
6. Party ID: No party ID, leaning more toward left independent views.
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Resident
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU_2014_32 Date: 4/8/14 Duration: 50:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 26
2. Place and date of birth: Washington, D.C.
3. Parents country of origin: Nigeria, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: M.A.
6. Party ID: Independent
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment
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File Name: SU2014_33 Date: 4/9/14 Duration: 40:41 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 25
2. Place and date of birth: Annapolis, MD
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both.
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: M.A., University of Maryland, College Park (current student). B.A., University
of Maryland, College Park.
6. Party ID: Democrat, but has not always been voting D lately.
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_34 Date: 4/22/14 Duration: 39:39 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-
person
1. Age: 52
2. Place and date of birth: “I’m originally from North Carolina, even before that I come from a
military family, so we traveled extensively. Probably saw every state twice – at least twice,
and overseas, and we had the opportunity to learn a lot about different cultures, it helped
us out a lot. And then from that point I was stationed, I was in the military, my dad was in
the air force for 28 years, and then I was in the army for 7, I have a brother in the air force,
another brother in army, and then my sister is retired air force. The whole family is military.”
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (both from North Carolina).
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4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., Mt. Olive Christian College and Atlanta Christian College (now Barton
College).
6. Party ID: No response
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Non-Affiliate, Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Disassociation
File Name: SU2014_35 Date: 4/24/14 Duration: 37:18 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In Per-
son
1. Age: 55
2. Place and date of birth: Fort Meade, MD. “I grew up all over the continental US, my dad
was in the military.”
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines, Father - United States
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: High School diploma, and an Associate’s degree in art.
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment
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File Name: SU2014_36 Date: 4/24/14 Duration: 26:32 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: “I like to go running, I like to spend a lot of time with my family, so I’ll go home. I like
going to happy hour with my group of friends, I don’t party very much – I’m not a big partier, but
I do like drinking with my friends, so we do a lot of wine nights. I enjoy reading, definitely a lot
of things that involve being outside so like hikes, things like that.”
1. Age: 21
2. Place and date of birth: Virginia
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both. (Parents are both from West Virginia).
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: B.A., working on M.A. in Counseling Psychology
6. Party ID: No response
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_37 Date: 4/25/14 Duration: 18:45 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: In-
person
Notes: “I do a lot of craft things, like crochet, I do crafts. I read some, my family, like my
grandchildren – I have 5. One lives in Tennessee and the other four live about a mile from my
house. The nine year old, she’s a pain. She wants to hang out with me this weekend, so we’re
gonna get together tomorrow she’s gonna spend the night. I don’t know, I told her since we got the
store – she has a rubber band loom, the little bracelets, so I told her I said bring it over and we’ll
make some bracelets and I’ll put ‘em in the store and we can sell ‘em under “Zoe’s Creations.” So
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she’s – I think if we do it together, I’ve told her this before. It’s entrepreneurship, yeah. She hasn’t
been real busy at it, but I think if we do it together. The other thing, we have tea parties, too.”
1. Age: 65
2. Place and date of birth: Syracuse, NY
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both (Syracuse, NY)
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: “I went to business school after I finished college, at Policy Business Institute in
Syracuse – I went for a year and got a certificate in bookkeeping and accounting.”
6. Party ID: Republican
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_38 Date: 4/25/14 Duration: 26:51 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Skype
Notes: [First section of interview recording may be absent - transcript still available].
1. Age: 25
2. Place and date of birth: New Jersey
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: B.A., Berkelee College of Music
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6. Party ID: Republican
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Identity
File Name: SU2014_39 Date: 8/8/14 Duration: 37:43 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: “Let’s see, I like social media [laughs]. I do like arts and crafts. Mostly like scrapbook-
ing and cross stitch.”
1. Age: 51
2. Place and date of birth: Aberdeen proving grounds, but also grew up in Germany, California,
Alaska, and MD.
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Philippines, Father - United States
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: High School
6. Party ID: No response
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Multiple Identifier, Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment
File Name: SU2014_40 Date: 5/7/14 Duration: 40:15 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: Very easygoing, gave thorough responses. Mother of 2 kids who were playing outside
during the interview - she was keeping an eye on them and had to check on them a couple of times.
1. Age: 36
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2. Place and date of birth: Maryland
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - U.S. (Native American and Dutch), Father - Louisiana
(Creole)
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: GED, taking classes at Community College
6. Party ID: No response
7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Strong Identifier. Predictor: Group Attachment
File Name: SU2014_41 Date: 5/5/14 Duration: 29:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
1. Age: 83
2. Place and date of birth: Rochester, NY
3. Parents country of origin: United States, both
4. Gender: Female
5. Education: College
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer, Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Disassociation.
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File Name: SU2014_42 Date: 5/6/14 Duration: 23:00 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
Notes:
1. Age: 77
2. Place and date of birth: Brooklyn, NY
3. Parents country of origin: Mother - Poland, Father - Russia
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: College
6. Party ID: Democrat
7. Resident/Citizen: U.S. Citizen
Type: Abstract Conceptualizer. Predictor: Group Membership
File Name: SU2014_43 Date: 5/8/14 Duration: 39:15 Interviewer: 3 Interview Style: Phone
Notes: Strong accent. Kind demeanor, thoughtful in responses.
1. Age: 58
2. Place and date of birth: “I’m from Nicaragua. I came to the United States [in] 1975.”
3. Parents country of origin: Nicaragua, both.
4. Gender: Male
5. Education: M.A.
6. Party ID: No response
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7. Resident/Citizen: No response
Type: Non-Affiliate. Predictor: Group Membership
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Appendix B
Difference In Means Graphs for All 2015 Omnibus Survey Re-
spondents







Difference In Means Graphs for Policy Outcomes by Primary
Identity and Ascriptive Categorization
Differences in means to response questions for respondents in Conditions 2, 4, and 6 of the Iden-
tity Measurement Study (IMS) who were exposed to the full set of social categories from which to
select a primary identity. The first difference in means table for each survey question below dis-
plays the survey mean along with the 10 groups most frequently selected as a respondent’s primary
identity. For some survey questions I also include a second table which compares the difference in
means for the survey mean and any primary identity categories that are statistically different from
the survey mean, along with the mean responses for individuals ascriptively categorized in that
group (i.e.: individuals who checked the category box during the demographic portion of the IMS.
Attitudes toward Immigrants
Question wording: “Weld like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these
days. Below we list several groups, and we’d like you to rate that group using something we call
the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable
and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable
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toward the group and that you don’t care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the
50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.”
• “Illegal immigrants”
• “Foreigners with Work Visas”
Scale: 0 to 100
Illegal Immigrants
Table 20: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigrants Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 37.5 0.7 39.0 36.0
White 31.6* 2.1 35.8 27.6
Black/African American 50.3* 4.2 58.6 42.0
Asian / Pacific Islander 39.4 4.6 48.4 30.4
Hispanic / Latino 66.2* 5.7 77.4 55.1
Male 31.7* 1.5 34.6 28.7
Female 38.6 1.4 41.4 35.9
Lower Class 49.1 8.3 65.4 32.7
Working Class 40.7 3.3 47.2 34.1
Middle Class 44.0 3.4 50.6 37.3
Protestant 35.5 4.1 43.7 27.4
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
240
Table 21: Mean Responses to Illegal Immigrants Question for White, Black, Hispanic, and Male
Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 37.5 0.7 39.0 36.0
White (Ascriptive) 34.2* 0.8 35.9 32.5
White (Primary) 31.6* 2.1 35.8 27.6
Black (Ascriptive) 49.1* 2.2 53.5 44.8
Black (Primary) 50.3* 4.2 58.6 42.0
Hispanic / Latino (Ascriptive) 52.6* 2.8 58.0 47.1
Hispanic / Latino (Primary) 66.2* 5.7 77.4 55.1
Male (Ascriptive) 35.9 1.1 38.1 33.8
Male (Primary) 31.7* 1.5 34.6 28.7
“All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group
categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive” denotes responses
from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. “Primary”
denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point
allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respon-
dents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Foreigners with Work Visas
Table 22: Mean Responses to Foreigners with Work Visas Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 57.4 0.7 58.7 56.0
White 51.89* 2.1 55.9 47.9
Black/African American 54.8 3.9 62.4 47.3
Asian / Pacific Islander 60.3 4.2 68.5 52.1
Hispanic / Latino 78.0* 4.4 86.6 69.4
Male 53.8 1.3 56.4 51.2
Female 58.5 1.2 60.9 56.2
Lower Class 57.5 7.1 71.4 43.6
Working Class 59.0 2.8 64.6 53.5
Middle Class 63.5 2.7 68.9 58.1
Protestant 64.9 3.2 71.1 58.7
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
242
Table 23: Mean Responses to Foreigners with Work Visas Question for White and Hispanic Re-
spondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 57.4 0.7 58.7 56.0
White (Ascriptive) 55.9 0.8 57.4 54.4
White (Primary) 51.89* 2.1 55.9 47.9
Hispanic / Latino (Ascriptive) 65.1* 2.3 69.6 60.6
Hispanic / Latino (Primary) 78.0* 4.4 86.6 69.4
“All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group
categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive” denotes responses
from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. “Primary”
denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point
allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respon-
dents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
Government Jobs
Question wording: “Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at
point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose
these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Scale: 1 to 7
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Table 24: Mean Responses to Government Jobs Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 4.1 0.04 4.2 4.0
White 4.5* 0.1 4.8 4.3
Black/African American 3.6 0.2 4.2 3.2
Asian / Pacific Islander 4.8 0.2 5.3 4.2
Hispanic / Latino 4.0 0.4 4.8 3.2
Male 4.5* 0.1 4.7 4.3
Female 3.8 0.1 4.0 4.7
Lower Class 2.7* 0.5 3.7 1.7
Working Class 3.9 0.2 4.3 3.4
Middle Class 3.9 0.2 4.3 3.5
Protestant 4.8* 0.2 5.2 4.4
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Table 25: Mean Responses to Government Jobs Question for White, Male, Lower Class, and
Protestant Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 4.1 0.04 4.2 4.0
White (Ascriptive) 4.2 0.1 4.3 4.1
White (Primary) 4.5* 0.1 4.8 4.3
Male (Ascriptive) 4.3 0.1 4.5 4.2
Male (Primary) 4.5* 0.1 4.7 4.3
Lower Class (Ascriptive) 3.6* 0.1 3.9 3.4
Lower Class (Primary) 2.7* 0.5 3.7 1.7
Protestant (Ascriptive) 4.7* 0.1 4.8 4.5
Protestant (Primary) 4.8* 0.2 5.2 4.4
“All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The remaining group
categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive” denotes responses
from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the survey. “Primary”
denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point
allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respon-
dents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
Spending Attitudes
Question wording: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. Some of these problems are listed below, and for each one indicate whether
you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.”
• Welfare





Scale: 1 (too much spending) to 3 (too little spending).
Welfare
Table 26: Mean Responses to Welfare Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 1.9 0.02 1.9 1.8
White 1.8 0.1 1.9 1.6
Black/African American 2.1 0.2 2.4 1.8
Asian / Pacific Islander 1.5 0.3 2.2 1.0
Hispanic / Latino 2.0 0.2 2.3 1.7
Male 1.7 0.1 1.9 1.6
Female 2.0 0.1 2.1 1.9
Lower Class 2.6* 0.2 3.1 2.1
Working Class 1.7 0.2 2.0 1.3
Middle Class 1.8 0.2 3.1 2.1
Protestant 1.9 0.2 2.2 1.5
N= 652. The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the “welfare” or “assistance to
the poor” question. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The
remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation
task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned
to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Table 27: Mean Responses to Welfare Question for Lower Class Respondents, by Ascriptive and
Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 1.9 0.02 1.9 1.8
Lower Class (Ascriptive) 2.2* 0.1 2.4 2.0
Lower Class (Primary) 2.6* 0.2 3.1 2.1
The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the “welfare” or “assistance to the
poor” question. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The
remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive”
denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the
survey. “Primary” denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each
category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample
mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Aid to the Poor
Table 28: Mean Responses to Aid to Poor Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 2.23 0.03 2.3 2.2
White 2.3 0.1 2.4 2.1
Black/African American 2.6 0.1 2.8 2.3
Asian / Pacific Islander 2.2 0.2 2.5 1.8
Hispanic / Latino 2.7 0.2 3.1 2.3
Male 2.1 0.1 2.2 2.0
Female 2.4 0.04 2.5 2.3
Lower Class 2.8 0.3 3.2 2.3
Working Class 2.4 0.1 2.7 2.2
Middle Class 2.4 0.1 2.6 2.2
Protestant 1.9 0.2 2.2 1.6
N= 698. The entire sample was randomly assigned to receive either the “welfare” or “assistance to
the poor” question. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The
remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point allocation
task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents assigned
to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Education
Table 29: Mean Responses to Education Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 2.5 0.01 2.6 2.4
White 2.4 0.1 2.5 2.3
Black/African American 2.7 0.1 2.8 2.5
Asian / Pacific Islander 2.6 0.1 2.8 2.3
Hispanic / Latino 2.5 0.1 2.7 2.3
Male 2.4 0.03 2.5 2.3
Female 2.6 0.02 2.7 2.6
Lower Class 2.5 0.2 2.9 2.0
Working Class 2.7 0.1 2.8 2.6
Middle Class 2.6 0.1 2.8 2.4
Protestant 2.3 0.1 2.5 2.1
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Defense
Table 30: Mean Responses to Defense Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 1.9 0.02 2.0 1.9
White 2.0 0.1 2.1 1.9
Black/African American 1.9 0.1 2.1 1.7
Asian / Pacific Islander 1.8 0.1 2.1 1.5
Hispanic / Latino 1.7 0.1 1.9 1.4
Male 2.0 0.04 2.1 2.0
Female 1.9 0.03 2.0 1.8
Lower Class 1.6 0.2 2.1 1.1
Working Class 1.9 0.1 2.1 1.7
Middle Class 1.6* 0.1 1.8 1.5
Protestant 2.2 0.1 2.5 2.0
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
Table 31: Mean Responses to Defense Question for Lower Class Respondents, by Ascriptive and
Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 1.9 0.02 2.0 1.9
Middle Class Class (Ascriptive) 1.9 0.03 2.0 1.9
Middle Class (Primary) 1.6* 0.1 1.8 1.5
N=1, 331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The
remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive”
denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the
survey. “Primary” denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each
category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample
mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Climate Change
Table 32: Mean Responses to Climate Change Question by Primary ID
Group Mean SE UI LI
All 2.2 0.02 2.2 2.1
White 2.1 0.1 2.2 2.0
Black/African American 2.3 0.1 2.5 2.0
Asian / Pacific Islander 2.4 0.1 2.7 2.2
Hispanic / Latino 2.5 0.1 2.8 2.2
Male 2.0 004 2.1 1.9
Female 2.2 0.03 2.3 2.2
Lower Class 2.6* 0.2 3.0 2.3
Working Class 2.3 0.1 2.4 2.1
Middle Class 2.4* 0.1 2.7 2.3
Protestant 1.7* 0.1 2.0 1.5
N=1,331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The re-
maining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents, and represent
responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each category in the point alloca-
tion task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample mean (all respondents
assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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Table 33: Mean Responses to Defense Question for Lower Class, Middle Class, and Protestant
Respondents, by Ascriptive and Primary Identity
Group Means SE UI LI
All 2.2 0.02 2.2 2.1
Lower Class (Ascriptive) 2.1 0.1 2.2 2.0
Lower Class (Primary) 2.6* 0.2 3.0 2.3
Middle Class (Ascriptive) 2.2 0.03 2.3 2.1
Middle Class (Primary) 2.4* 0.1 2.7 2.3
Protestant (Ascriptive) 1.9* 0.04 2.0 1.9
Protestant (Primary) 1.7* 0.1 2.0 1.5
N=1, 331. “All” refers to all respondents who were assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6. The
remaining group categories refer to the primary identities selected by respondents. “Ascriptive”
denotes responses from anyone who checked the category box in the demographic portion of the
survey. “Primary” denotes responses among individuals who allocated the most points to each
category in the point allocation task. (*) Reflects statistically significant difference from the sample
mean (all respondents assigned to conditions 2, 4, and 6) at the .05 alpha level.
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